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This thesis investigates the effects of individual levels of political competence and the 
media literacy context on spotting manipulated information in Internet news reports on 
unfamiliar foreign affairs issues as well as on the acceptance or rejection of the standpoint(s) 
such news reports promote. University students in the age category of 18-26 years old from 
three countries that differ in their levels of media literacy context - Austria, Italy, and the 
Netherlands - were the target group of participants in this experimental/quasi-experimental 
research (N = 736). After measuring their media habits and attitudes as well as levels of 
political competence, they were randomly assigned to read one of two simulated Internet 
news reports - either a manipulated or a non-manipulated one. Each version of the news 
reports was presented as being taken either from a popular 'traditional' or an 'alternative' 
Internet news source in each country; however, the content of both was absolutely identical. 
The participants then evaluated the news report they had read according to a set of 
characteristics. Analysis revealed that political competence appeared to have no effects at all 
on spotting and rejecting. Moreover, a comparison of three age categories in the Italian 
sample (18-26, 27-35 and 36≤ years old; N = 394) showed that age was not a moderator of the 
effects of political competence on a critical evaluation of manipulated news. However, 
participants from countries ranked with a higher media literacy context were more likely to 
spot manipulation in the Internet news reports and reject the promoted standpoint(s). In 
addition, a puzzling relationship was discovered between spotting and rejecting, as not 
everyone who spotted manipulation subsequently rejected the manipulated standpoint, but 
accepted it instead. Also, it transpired that, depending on the country, a certain subtype of 
manipulated news report - from either 'traditional' or 'alternative' Internet news sources - was 
regarded by participants of that country as more persuasive and trustworthy. On the whole, 
the findings of the thesis revealed some important aspects of the relationships between 
individual skills of critical assessment of news media information and a susceptibility to 
manipulation effects, on the one side, and political competence and media literacy context, on 
the other, which collectively contribute to creating a framework for further research in the 
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Scholars have studied the effects of 
information on public opinion for many 
years. Is it time we examined the effects of 
disinformation and misinformation on 
public opinion formation? 
 
         Jack M. McLeod, Today and Tomorrow, 
       The Evolution of Key Mass Communication Concepts   
 
 
CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION.  
 
In 1922, Walter Lippmann published his famous book Public Opinion which became 
a seminal work for researchers in the realms of public opinion and communication. The title 
of the opening chapter of the book - “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads” - is 
quite revealing. The main idea of the chapter is that media, and specifically the news media, 
help their audiences to make sense of the world around them. Moreover, as our direct 
experience cannot provide us with relevant and reliable knowledge about a great deal of 
events, phenomena, persons etc., the news media guide us in these labyrinths of uncertainties 
creating cognitive maps in our heads. We then rely on these maps in our  judgments and 
evaluations of various aspects of social and political reality. Thus, it can be inferred that the 
news media, and mass media in the widest sense, construct a specific reality for their 
consumers, a reality which they perceive as realistic, perhaps even for a long period. In effect, 
Lippmann contended, the constructed reality turns out not to be the real environment but a 
pseudo-environment which audiences respond to with their opinions, attitudes, and behaviors. 
Yet, all those responses intended intrinsically for that pseudo-environment are, in actual fact, 
directed towards and manifest themselves in the real world, leading to results of different 
degrees of justifiability. Lippmann (1922) gave a vivid description of this process: 
 
In all these instances we must note particularly one common factor. It is 
the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. 
To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But because it is 
behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-
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environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real 
environment where action eventuates. If the behavior is not a practical 
act, but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may be a long time 
before there is any noticeable break in the texture of the fictitious world. 
But when the stimulus of the pseudo-fact results in action on things or 
other people, contradiction soon develops. Then comes the sensation of 
butting one's head against a stone wall, of learning by experience, and 
witnessing Herbert Spencer's tragedy of the murder of a Beautiful Theory 
by a Gang of Brutal Facts, the discomfort in short of maladjustment. For 
certainly, at the level of social life, what is called the adjustment of man 
to his environment takes place through the medium of fictions. 
By fictions I do not mean lies. I mean a representation of the 
environment which is in lesser or greater degree made by man himself. 
(pp.19-20)   
 
Much of the later research in psychology, public opinion studies, and communication 
has corroborated Lippman's foregoing ideas about the pseudo-environment that the news 
media create. In particular, agenda setting theory was built on and supports his supposition 
that news media information plays a leading role in the construction of the pictures of reality 
in our heads. McCombs and Shaw (1972), ‘fathers’ of the agenda setting theory, demonstrated 
that the media agenda becomes a public one over time; that is, those issues the news media 
regard as important and focus on often in their news reports soon turn out to be important for 
the public, as well. Or as McCombs himself put it:  
 
Through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and 
news directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what 
are the most important issues of the day. This ability to influence 
the salience of topics on the public agenda has come to be called the 
agenda setting role of the news media. (p.1)   
 
Research over many years in this realm has repeatedly substantiated the rationale of agenda 
setting: the news media do not tell us what to think, but what to think about.   
Ten years after McCombs and Shaw's work, political science and communication 
scholars suggested a new theory which expanded upon the previous one and overcame what 
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were viewed as its limitations. In particular, in the late 1980s, in attempting to explain how 
the news media affect their public, Robert Entman drew attention to “an interaction between 
media messages and what audiences make of them” (1989, p. 349). Unlike McCombs and 
Shaw, he argued that the media do not just tell us what to think about but also what to think 
and how to think by means of framing. In simple terms (more discussion on this concept 
follows in the next chapter), framing can be described as a process by which the specific 
construction of a message influences how it might be interpreted by its receiver. Or, following 
Entman’s definition, “the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived 
reality [and, thus, downplaying other aspects], and enhancing the salience of an interpretation 
and evaluation of that reality” (2004, p.26). Thus, journalists or politicians characterize an 
issue or an object in such a way as to help shape its specific vision for the public, creating, in 
this fashion, meaningful and understandable pictures of that object or issue in the minds of the 
public.  
In addition, as is apparent, news frames affect the information receivers through 
priming, which refers to the effect of a certain preceding stimulus or event on how individuals 
respond to a certain consequent event, issue, or person (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen 
& Carpentier, 2009).  For example, the frame ‘terrorist’ in a news report might develop 
associations between Osama bin Laden, Al-Quaeda, the tragedy of the World Trade Center, 
suicide bombers and so forth, evoking negative feelings. In this way, frames can influence 
what people think about and how they perceive reality around them (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). 
Moreover, as a number of studies demonstrate, the effects are stronger for situations that are 
ambiguous or unfamiliar to individuals (for a review, see Roskos-Ewoldsen & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 2009).  
In this way, we are all immersed in the pseudo-environment created by the media 
through its methods of information management, packing, and presenting, and we should thus 
deal with this environment very carefully in trying to distinguish what is effectively 
communicated, whether and what information is omitted, and what is an actual intent of the 
media communication. It may even be more challenging to separate the husk from the grain 
when individuals encounter biased or slanted information in the news media. Such 
information should greatly facilitate the construction not just of a pseudo-reality, or pseudo-
environment as Lippmann (1922) put it, but rather of a distorted pseudo-reality; or, stated 
differently, a pseudo pseudo-reality which audiences once again respond to with their 
opinions, attitudes, and behaviors that, in turn, manifest themselves not in the pseudo- but in 
the real world. As a result, disinformed opinions, ill-informed attitudes, and misinformed 
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behaviors may arise.  
All this may pose a threat not only to an individual or certain categories of citizens, 
but, in a determinate sense, to the very core of democracy. Thus, Paul and Elder (2006) 
expounded the statement clearly: 
 
Democracy can be an effective form of government only to the extent that 
the public (that rules it in theory) is well-informed about national and 
international events and can think independently and critically about those 
events. If the vast majority of citizens do not recognize bias in their nation’s 
news; if they cannot detect ideology, slant, and spin; if they cannot 
recognize propaganda when exposed to it, they cannot reasonably determine 
what media messages have to be supplemented, counter-balanced, or thrown 
out entirely. (p. 2) 
  
In this regard, as virtually every piece of news is framed in a certain way, the public 
also needs to be capable of sorting through the way in which news is framed, thus avoiding 
being captured by misleading media information that is presented in a particular way so as to 
exert a certain influence. In effect, news frames fulfill a dual role and facilitate two processes. 
On the one hand, it might be said that journalists and editors use frames purely for practical 
purposes - to process large amounts of information quickly, package it concisely, and make it 
convenient for their audience usage, providing in this way contextual cues for understanding 
(Pan & Kosicki, 1993). At the same time, reporters and editors adhere to the traditional 
standards of journalism and principles of good practice, maintaining the necessity to inform in 
a good and honest manner, not to persuade, and, of course, not to wangle or manipulate 
information. However, on the other hand and in actual fact, news frames might be as 
unintentionally inaccurate as they are deliberately misleading, handpicked to exert an 
intended influence on the audience, thereby supplanting the process of informing with the 
processes of misinforming or/and persuading.  
In addition, the news might not only embrace various forms of frames that differ in 
their impact on news consumers, but it may also be biased – one-sided, substituting facts with 
opinions, or tolerating allegations, that is, statements without proof. This bias or slant results 
not from (or rather not only from) any evil or other deliberate intent, but also from: the 
educational background of the journalists and news editors; the economic specifics of news 
media functioning; various restrictions imposed on journalists and editors by time, space, and 
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resources; the desire to stay competitive in the news market, etc. Whatever the reasons, a 
news consumer hardly analyzes them every time (s)he encounters biased news. However, the 
higher the ability of an individual to critically assess media information, the higher the 
probability that (s)he will not only spot news bias, but also manage to distinguish between the 
intentionality and inadvertency of that bias, and categorize it one way or another. The last 
type of capability - categorization - is achievable by virtue of the individual's personal 
knowledge (for one, as to a news topic or/and a certain ideological slant of a particular news 
medium), personal experience of dealing previously with various types of news bias, and 
ordinary verification of the biased information through other news sources. Thus, revealing 
and categorizing news bias in media reports on domestic or, all the more, local politics is far 
easier than when it comes to news coverage of unfamiliar topics or topics that are not easily 
verifiable by ordinary people, and in particular, reporting on foreign affairs. (Such ability 
should not be confused with a manifestation of the hostile media effect that will be explained 
in Part 1 of Chapter II).  
Indeed, the news media remain the primary source of information about foreign issues 
for the majority of people, their ‘window on the world’ that fulfills an important function of 
trying to keep citizens in our globalized world adequately informed. For this reason, 
individuals construct their reality of far-off lands, various nations, cultures etc. from 
‘information pictures’ provided by the media. And the latter frame the information in such a 
way as to convert unfamiliar images of various nations/cultures/people into familiar and 
understandable ones for the media audiences and ones that are within their accepted frames of 
reference. Therefore, as Entman (2004) argued, when reporting about world affairs, it is 
manifestly impossible to avoid framing.  
Nevertheless, an inability to distinguish biased information from balanced information 
as well as between a news report’s intent to inform from an intent to persuade might make 
news consumers to accept the report’s standpoint(s) and believe that, say, definitely, some 
foreign politicians are the Devil incarnate and some of those imprisoned in third countries, 
even for economic reasons, are to a man innocent and ‘prisoners of conscience’. Or, 
undoubtedly, some sovereign states are a menace to world peace for a number of reasons and 
not because of they have vast oil deposits. Or, indisputably, if some armed groups of people 
are referred to as 'freedom fighters' or 'peaceful protesters', that means they should be 
respected as good guys, despite the fact that, in reality, they fight their legitimately elected 
governments and presidents and use armed violence against their fellow citizens. The cited 
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examples are hypothetical and, perhaps, too global, but there are enough other, less prominent 
illustrations of biased media coverage of foreign affairs.                   
Indeed, in characterizing international reporting, scholars repeatedly noted journalistic 
inaccuracy and sloppiness as well as prevailing opinion over facts in news reports, bias in fact 
selection, ‘management of news’, and even stove-piping, such as with that unforgettable CIA 
report about mythical Iraqi weapons of mass destruction prior to the US invasion of Iraq. 
Perhaps, one of the most illustrative examples of misinforming and the use of misleading 
frames is the long-lasting news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the 
overwhelming majority of studies in different countries content analyzed national media and 
revealed a noticeable imbalance in favor of the Israelis in news coverage of the conflict (e.g., 
Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010; Karim, 2003; Moody-Hall, 2002; Saleem, 2002). Thus, 
Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2010), based on analysis of a number of studies, set striking 
examples of the biased, slanted toward pro-Israeli position media coverage:  
 
…a lack of contextual information leaves the motivation of Israelis and 
of Palestinians ill-defined… Palestinian victims are not personalized. 
Figures of the numbers of victims are inaccurate. Although more 
Palestinians are killed, the coverage takes it for granted that there are 
more Israeli victims… Labelling also favors the Israeli side of the 
conflict. Journalists write about disputed territories, settlements, 
terrorists, rather than about occupied territories, colonies or freedom 
fighters… Finally, the actors cited and reported on are predominantly 
Israeli, while Palestinian actors are rarely consulted… (p.93)   
 
With that, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unfortunately, is not the only vivid 
example of the ongoing misinforming and use of misleading frames in news coverage of 
international affairs (issues of the intentionality or inadvertency of such practices is not under 
of consideration here). Thus, Mann (1999), who wrote about media coverage of China, also 
described the general quality of international news reporting quite pessimistically:  
 
… reporters do not always get the story right; neither do their editors and 
publishers. This is especially the case when they report about distant 
lands and unfamiliar cultures…the readers, who are already conditioned 
by the prevalent stereotypes, accept the misleading stories as true and 
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react accordingly. The consequences can be disastrous media effects are 
enhanced when the information conveyed in stories in unfamiliar to 
audience and cannot be readily verified through their personal 
experiences or competing stories. (p. 102)           
 
Although this succinct and characteristic account was written more than 10 years ago, little 
has changed since then. The issue of quality in reporting foreign news is still widely debated 
as it is “thought to be defined largely in terms of Western values, with the main focus on a 
small, specific part of the world” (Flemish Peace Institute, 2009). So, it is hardly surprising 
that the expert meeting on ‘Transparency in Foreign News Reporting,’ held in April 2008 in 
Rotterdam, drew the deplorable conclusion that in the selection and construction of news 
items, the picture of ‘foreign affairs’ displayed to news consumers is filtered, distorted, 
manipulated, one-sided and simplified (Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010).  
Thus, the combination of biased media information with specific framing of that 
information, as Kucherenko and Christen noted (2014), should likely be able "to affect 
interpretation of media messages and construction of ‘foreign’ reality by audiences and, in 
this way, intentionally or not, manipulate people’s perceptions and evaluations of foreign 
objects, issues, persons, and events" (p.52). Accordingly, it should be remembered that, as 
was discussed earlier, framing contributes not only to the simplification and the convenience 
of passing on foreign news to audiences and their perception of it, especially, when it comes 
to unfamiliar topics (that is, playing a helpful role or, according to Chong and Druckman 
(2007), being construed in positive terms). It also facilitates in shaping the opinions of news 
consumers about an issue, say, shaping exclusively negative or positive opinions about 
something or someone (that is, carrying prejudice or being construed in negative terms). In 
such a case we are dealing with what I call ‘manipulated media information’, that is, one-
sided presentation of information which is based on opinions instead of facts and as such 
contains allegations, causal interpretation(s) of the issue or problem described in the news 
reports/messages and assignment of responsibility for it. Taken together, all this eventually 
lead the consumer of such information to drawing incorrect, erroneous conclusions about the 
issue or problem. In addition, manipulated media information might include emotionally 
loaded language and/or various framing and reasoning devices, strengthening the overall 
effects of such information on its consumers. 
Of course, there is usually no direct evidence in a manipulated news report of what 
underlies the manipulation – intentionality, ignorance, or the trivial inaccuracy of news staff. 
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Still, whatever the reason, manipulated information fulfills the function of not informing but 
softly persuading (whether always successfully or not is quite a different matter). In respect to 
foreign news reporting, it means that some individuals, at least, who receive such information 
will consequently have distorted, as Lippman put it, ‘pictures in their heads’ – even if for just 
a short time -- based on that information. This is why it is essential to study its effects on 
those exposed to this sort of news and, specifically, when the encountered information turns 
out to be completely unfamiliar or largely unfamiliar to them but, at the same time, includes 
familiar frames, for one, such as ‘terrorism,’ ‘military threat’ or ‘threat to national security,’ 
‘spread of epidemic disease’, ‘protest march’ or the like.  
I have placed an emphasis here on the aspect of the unfamiliarity of information as 
distinct from information which one has received earlier or if still receiving from, at the very 
least, periodic -- not to mention broad -- media coverage. Therefore, by focusing on 
something new and unfamiliar, we can rule out already established opinions and attitudes 
towards the topic in question which, for one, has been long discussed in the news media, or in 
various political organizations, student clubs, with relatives and friends, etc. Thus, we are able 
to exclude all those factors that might ‘pollute’ the original sensitivity of individuals to such 
information through preexisting beliefs and, hence, reduce their susceptibility to framing or – 
broader, in this case – manipulated information effects (Druckman & Nelson, 2003). Instead, 
it is possible to focus on the initial, ‘clear’ perception of new information which is 
manipulated. That is, when the audience members encounter media information which is not 
only totally novel to them, but also uncertain and ambiguous, they should be inherently, ‘by 
default’, susceptible to various media effects.  
When describing effects of framing in such situation, Tewksbury and Scheufele 
(2009) pointed out: 
 
It stands to reason that news accounts addressing a novel issue should be 
particularly powerful for audiences. If news receivers lack a set of 
linkages between an issue and diverse or countervailing considerations 
(as we would expect with a novel issue), news framing should strongly 
determine how audiences understand the issue. (p. 25) 
 
However, the question is whether audience members will remain susceptible 
immediately after reading/watching/listening to the new information and thinking of it (as 
well as in the long run, although this is not under investigation in this study). In other words, 
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the ability of the audience members to spot that media information is manipulated (that is, to 
reveal that the information is one-sided and biased) as well as to buy into that information 
(that is, to accept a general standpoint or standpoints promoted in the news report) will 
depend on their certain individual characteristics. Among these, the aptitude to critically 
evaluate information arises as the most prominent one. In this sense, an individual's level of 
political competence, that is, a close engagement with political information, political 
knowledge and political activity, is expected to induce that aptitude or, at least, have a 
significant effect on it.   
Undoubtedly, in reality, even if the first impression of unfamiliar news did factor into 
individual's incorrect conclusions about the news object, this might be changed afterwards in 
a number of ways, for example by getting more information on the issue from the media, 
conversations with other people, or relying on an opinion leader’s viewpoint. Nevertheless, 
this initial stage of opinion formation is important enough to investigate for several reasons. It 
might help to understand in a more pure fashion, first, what judgments citizens make on their 
own  based only on that new and manipulated information; second, how they come to those 
judgments, again, independently; and third, how robust the judgments are. Also, needless to 
say, the first impression in such a situation of a foreign issue, person or event, which has 
arisen from exposure to such information, might sometimes set a seal on subsequent 
sentiments toward the country, its people, culture, traditions, etc., as described earlier in a 
news message, thereby promoting stereotyping. In this regard, Tewksbury et al. (2000) found 
that when a news message contains information novel to the audience, retention of 
associations between the issue and the individuals’ considerations becomes more rooted. 
Moreover, as he claimed, the effect such news messages exert on audience interpretations 
immediately after news exposure lasted up to three weeks.  
But, irrespective of its duration, the initial effect of a novel news message might be 
easily reinforced in the short run. Thus, repetition of a particular message over time increases 
its credibility in the eyes of the message consumers (Koch & Zerback, 2013; Roggeveen & 
Johar, 2002) - an effect known as the "truth effect". It is noteworthy that the "truth effect" 
might be equally valid for incorrect or false information. As Kahneman put it in his bestseller 
Thinking: Fast and Slow (2011), "a reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is 
frequent repetition, because familiarity is not easily distinguished from the truth" (p. 62).      
Consequently, some novel information - either in its initial form or rephrased 
somewhat differently - can be repeatedly communicated very soon if we are talking about 
radio or TV broadcasting, or almost immediately if we mean the Internet, which, beyond all 
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doubt, nowadays plays a prominent role as a convenient source of news, including political 
and international news, and provides an immediate exchange of information. Thus, for 
instance, in 2013 in Europe, 61% of Internet users aged 16-24 and 66% aged 25-54 read 
online news (Internet Use Statistics - Individuals, 2013). Moreover, the open and global 
nature of the Internet allows virtually anyone to produce, edit, and disseminate news 
messages/reports around the world not only through social networks or blogs but also by 
contacting mainstream and local media and offering them exclusive ‘hot’ or breaking news 
witnessed – or allegedly witnessed - by the news author. It stands to reason that media more 
often catch on to the exclusive information than they do not. However, by so doing, editors do 
not always have enough time to verify the information and communicate it to the public as 
soon as possible because of a fear that their competitors will report the information first. We 
might then receive ‘the exclusive’ which is composed of very manipulated information that, at 
best, will be corrected later but at the moment of exposure may astonish, bemuse, frighten or 
anger its receiver. Blogs and social networks are also popular sources of information and 
news that, by their nature, are subjective, and, for this reason, biased. Political Internet forums 
or news comment threads often contain allegations and unfounded accusation toward persons, 
issues and events. All this makes the Internet a fertile ground for the use of manipulated 
information; purposefully, at times.  
In addition, according to the Eurobarometer survey #78 conducted in 2012, the 
average level of trust in Internet for then 27 Member States of the EU was 35%, with the 
highest level of trust in Slovakia (56%) and the lowest level of trust in Germany (26%) 
(Media Use In the European Union, Autumn 2012). Also, another study conducted by the 
World Internet Project in 2010 in 30 countries and regions involved in the project revealed 
that more than 40% of Internet users considered only half or less of the information on the 
Internet as reliable. With that, in all of the reporting countries and regions except for 
Colombia, more than 25% of users go online to look for news at least daily, including local, 
national, and international news, and more than half go online for the news at least weekly 
(The World Internet Project Report, 2010). That is, despite the unreliability issue, the Internet 
is nevertheless considered an important source of information.  
For certain, the impact of novel and manipulated information should be different for 
different people and under different conditions of exposure to it; generally speaking, this is 
equally true for any media effects. The specific degree of influence might depend on sundry 
factors. However, when it comes to the ability of revealing – or spotting – manipulated media 
information and, as a result, not accepting the standpoint(s) the news report promotes (or 
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insusceptibility as I term it), it is simply evident that such proficiency should come from an 
individual’s power for the critical assessment of obtainable media information and for 
drawing independent conclusions on the information by virtue of that critical assessment. 
Individuals possessing such qualities are expected to be virtually immune to the effects of 
manipulated media information.  
In turn, when speaking of the ability to critically assess media information, we may 
reasonably assume that individuals, who for reasons of necessity, are dealing with complex, 
incomplete, and controversial information on a regular basis ought to develop such critical 
evaluation skills as well. In particular, I hypothesize that persons who are interested in politics 
and thus ‘immersed’ in the world of political information and political activity, will have 
higher levels of political competence. For this reason, they should possess the aforementioned 
ability to critically evaluate media information and, as a result, to reveal manipulated media 
information and not buy into it. In fact, as is described in Part 3 of Chapter II, the concept of 
political competence has many surrogate terms – political sophistication, political awareness, 
political knowledge, political expertise, etc. However, all of them emphasize the same central 
component that they are based on – cognitive capacity (e.g., Fiske et al., 1990; Hsu & Price, 
1993;Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Goidel et al., 1997;  Nelson et al., 1997; Rhee & Cappella, 
1997; Guo & Moy, 1998). In particular, political experts possess more developed schemas to 
make easier and more accurate judgments, better interpret new information, and have a deeper 
analytic thinking – this can all be referred to as elaborative information-processing strategies. 
In addition, such strategies should not be restricted only to the political domain, but should 
function identically for nearly any type of information encountered, as its evaluation would 
take its course according to the same mechanisms and reference points underlying the process 
of elaborative thinking. Also, as Luskin (1990) points out, “the dependence on intelligence 
should be greater for political than for many other sorts of knowledge, because politics is 
more abstract and remote – simply 'harder material' – than, say, sports or cooking” (p.336). 
Therefore, the level of political competence an individual possesses may be indicative of 
his/her general cognitive capacities, including information processing strategies and will, thus, 
be measured in such a way as to educe the aforementioned attributes. For this study, political 
competence is defined as the amount of political knowledge, and experience sufficient to 
process political information, as well as other complex information. As a result of such 
processing comes a decision as to whether the information received might be trusted at face 
value or whether it should be verified first before coming to a certain conclusion on it. In this 
thesis, the concept of political competence comprises five components combined into one 
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composite scale: political interest; media use; factual political knowledge; political 
discussion; and political participation. Thus, the higher score a person will have on the scale, 
the higher the level of political competence (s)he possesses. 
In addition, and likely intrinsic to political competence, the ability to critically assess 
media information should apparently be influenced by the general media literacy context 
inherent to a certain social environment which, in this study, is a country. Thus, the Study on 
Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels, carried out in 2009 in the Member States of 
the European Union by the Consortium of research institutes on the request of the European 
Commission, emphasized that the “ultimate focus (and ambition) of media literacy is the 
development of individual Critical Understanding and citizen participation” (p. 9). Also, it 
was noted that “Europe’s citizens need to be better equipped to understand the media flow and 
to reveal why a message has been deliberately transmitted in a false or misleading way” (p.9), 
concluding thus that “the media is the primary (if not the only) vehicle for the diffusion of 
political and economic self-interest, and the more media literate a society becomes, the less 
likely it is that individuals and groups will subscribe to (or be seduced by) the specious and 
the fallacious” (p.9). Alongside this, in the course of investigation, the Study identified two 
important dimensions within the concept of media literacy – Individual Competencies, based 
on the idea that the symptoms of media literacy are manifested in the capabilities of the 
individual, and the Environmental Factors that may encourage or hamper the former. In 
addition, the Study demonstrated that the development of individual competences is clearly 
correlated with the state policy on media literacy that is implemented in a given country. Or, 
as the Study report put it, “there is a broad correlation between individual media literacy 
competence and the Environmental Factors” (Study on Assessment Criteria for Media 
Literacy Levels, 2009, p.12).  
   Therefore, although the Critical Understanding component cannot be measured 
directly, given its cognitive nature and complexity (it is comprised of semiotic and linguistic 
capabilities allowing individuals to obtain, use, contextualize, evaluate and analyze 
information, and making them aware of the information's validity and utility with regard to 
target goals), it may still be deduced on the grounds of the certain knowledge and/or attitudes 
individuals have and measured by exposing the individuals to manipulated media information, 
while afterwards taking their assessments of that information into account. Accordingly, if the 
Environmental Factors directly affect the Individual Competences, the media literacy 
environment should also be correlated, in particular with the Critical Understanding 
component, which it is also likely to predict. Given that, the Study ranked all the Member 
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States according to their general media literacy levels (except for measuring the Critical 
Understanding component), different ranking scores should denote different levels of Critical 
Understanding. Of course, it is conceivable that a good media literacy context nevertheless 
does not translate into the high media literacy levels of individuals, or that lack of a favorable 
media environment still is not a serious obstruction for the existence of media literate citizens. 
However, the Study contends, a positive relationship between the two is supported 
statistically, and the examples it cites “are likely to be an exception, and not the norm” (Study 
on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels, 2009, p.48). 
On the basis of all the above, this thesis sought to answer two principal questions: 
what effects, if any, do individual political competence and media literacy context have on (1) 
spotting manipulation in Internet news repots on novel issues in foreign affairs, as well as (2) 
accepting at face value the standpoints introduced by the manipulated news reports. In 
particular, guided by previous research findings as well as by theory, that were briefly 
mentioned earlier in this Chapter and will be described in more detail in further appropriate 
parts of Chapter II of the thesis, I hypothesized that manipulated media information on novel 
issues of foreign affairs should be spotted easier and its influence should be weaker for 
citizens with higher levels of political competence due to their assumed ability to analyze 
information more carefully and think about it more critically. On the same ground, and, 
specifically, based on the findings of the Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy 
Levels (2009) and the Study on Testing and Refining Criteria to Assess Media Literacy 
Levels in Europe (2011), I also hypothesized that, entirely in accordance with the statistically 
supported conclusions of both Studies (2009, 2011), citizens of countries with more favorable 
media literacy context should be better in critical assessment of manipulated media 
information, particularly, as to spotting manipulation in news reports on novel issues of 
foreign affairs, and rejecting a standpoint promoted by such reports, compared to citizens of 
countries with less favorable media literacy context.  
The present study was conducted in three countries with differing overall media 
literacy ranks – Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands. Given that the age of the heaviest Internet 
users -- as confirmed in various studies, for instance, the World Internet Project (2010) as well 
as Eurostat's Internet Use Statistics - Individuals (2013) -- is 16-24 years followed by those in 
the age group of 25-35 years (and this trend has not changed over the last decade, 
notwithstanding the fact that  the number of users going online for information has grown), 
the target group of research participants were university students aged 18-26 years old. The 
status of the participants prompted suggestions that they should be at least formally more 
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media literate, possess better cognitive skills, and enjoy advanced information processing 
abilities as compared to the general public and, specifically, those without higher education. 
To ensure variation within the samples along political competence criteria, students from 
different departments were recruited to participate in the study. Furthermore, to verify a 
possible moderating effect of age in the relationship between individual political competence 
and spotting manipulation in news reports as well as the acceptance/rejection of the 
manipulated standpoint(s), three age groups of participants were compared against each other 
in the Italian sample (those aged 18-26, 27-35 and 36 ≤ years old).                 .              
As a result, it appeared that political competence did not affect either the ability to 
spot manipulation or the acceptance of a manipulated report's standpoint(s). At the same time, 
the more favorable media literacy context was found to be related both to the higher rates of 
spotting manipulation and the higher rates of rejecting the standpoint of the manipulated news 
report. In addition, relationships were examined between informed media mistrust, or media 
skepticism, as an assumed manifestation of media literacy, on the one hand, and a country's 
media literacy ranks and individual levels of political competence, on the other. Thus, for the 
former the relationship was found to be positive, whereas for the latter it proved to be 
negative. Next, I investigated the effects of the type of Internet news source from which the 
manipulated news reports originated, namely traditional and alternative media sources, as to 
whether they were regarded by participants as more or less trustworthy. The results showed 
that the Dutch participants regarded the version of the news report 'taken' from an alternative 
Internet news source as more trustworthy, while the Austrians and the Italians considered 
more trustworthy the version allegedly 'taken' from a traditional Internet news source. Finally, 
I explored a relationship between more intensive Internet use by participants for gathering 
news of any kind and the ability to spot manipulated media information as well as to accept 
the standpoint promoted by the manipulated news report. As a result, a positive relationship 
was found for the Austrian sample only. Lastly, the expected moderating effects of 'age', 
which was investigated in the three age groups of the Italian sample, made no difference in 
this study. 
Thus, due to the interdisciplinary nature of the thesis, its findings contribute to more 
than one academic field and academic discussion. In particular, I would single out the role of 
political competence in critical assessment of media information (in the fields of political 
science, political communication, and public opinion); trustworthiness of information 
obtained from different types of Internet news sources; and the clash between spotting 
manipulated information and, at the same time, accepting the standpoint(s) it promotes (both 
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related to media and communication studies and, specifically, media effects, media trust and 
Internet communication) .   
In conclusion, there are three important points that have to be emphasized. First, the 
concept of manipulated information combines features both of biased media information 
(which are (1) one-sidedness and (2) allegations/unsubstantiated statements) and negatively 
framed information (which are (1) causal interpretation of a problem and (2) assigning 
responsibility for the problem). For this reason, referring to the manipulated media 
information in terms of 'generally' framed information or 'generally' biased information would 
be totally conceptually incorrect. By the same token, previous research findings on effects of 
media frames and media bias should be and were discussed in Chapter II by taking into 
account the specificity of the double nature of the concept of manipulated media information. 
Second, the findings of this study cannot be generalizable, of course, as the convenient 
samples of participants were employed. Nevertheless, some general trends or patterns, 
consistent in all three countries, were still uncovered and, thus, may be confirmed - or 
disproved - in further research with random samples. Third, although participants from the 
countries ranked higher on media literacy showed better scores on spotting manipulated 
media information as well as on rejection the standpoint the information promoted, one 
cannot conclude that this resulted only due to the influence of more - or less - favorable media 
literacy context which each of the three countries had. Notwithstanding the conclusions of the 
Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels (2009) and the Study on Testing and 
Refining Criteria to Assess Media Literacy Levels in Europe (2011), that indicated the 
positive relationship between the country's media literacy context and individual media 
literacy competence, were generally supported by the findings of this thesis, they also implied 
that some additional unobserved variables existed and affected this positive relationship. 
Therefore, stating the facts that participants from the countries with more favorable media 
context showed better results in this study, it is important to keep in mind that some additional 
contextual factors might have also contributed to the virtual 'ranking' the three countries 
according to the same order as the media literacy context did, and, eventually, influenced the 
participants' results with respect to the spotting and rejecting manipulated information.          
Overall, the thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter, Chapter II, comprises 
the theory and includes a literature review explicating the main concepts of the study. The 
chapter is structured into five Parts. Part 1 explains the concepts of biased, framed and 
manipulated media information. Part 2 examines how people process media information and 
what the relationship between the type of information processing and the critical assessment 
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skills of media information is. Part 3 analyzes the concept of political competence as used in 
the study. Part 4 includes an explanation of the concept of media literacy in broad terms and 
focuses particularly on the component of the critical assessment of media information. In 
addition, along with the literature review and the explication of the main concepts used in the 
study, I provide my own line of reasoning as to how they are applied to this research. Finally, 
Part 5 presents and explicates the research questions and the hypotheses this thesis seeks to 
explore.  
Chapter III is focused on the methods used in the research.  
Chapter IV contains the results of my empirical investigation.  

























CHAPTER II.  THEORY 
 
Based on a broad literature review, this chapter explains theoretically in which ways 
manipulated media information might impact upon its consumers as well as factors that can 
prevent that impact. In addition, the chapter explicates the main concepts of the study. In total, 
there are four parts to the chapter. Part 1 explains the concepts of biased, framed, and 
manipulated media information. Part 2 examines how people process media information, and 
what is the relationship between the type of information processing and (1) critical assessment 
of media information as well as (2) a level of political competence. Part 3 construes the 
concept of political competence as used in the study. Part 4 includes an explanation of the 
concept of media literacy in broad terms and focuses on an explanation of the variable of 
media literacy context, based on  the Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels 
(2009) and the Study on Testing and Refining Criteria to Assess Media Literacy Levels in 
Europe (2011). Finally, Part 5, starting from the principal research questions of the study, 
contains the hypotheses and explanatory questions that are tested in the study. 
 
Part 1. Media bias, framing, and manipulated information. 
 
The concept of manipulated media information presented in this part shares some 
similarities with what might be referred to as media bias as well as framing. In fact, it could 
be said that manipulated information comprises to a certain extent some characteristics of 
both of the aforementioned media phenomena. However, such a resemblance should not be 
mistakenly confused with the unconditional equality or interchangeability of manipulated and 
biased and/or framed information, for some media information might be biased but not 
framed in the way as to present a problem definition, indicate its causes and attribute a 
responsibility (Entman, 1993). On the other hand, some media information might be framed 
in the way described above but not biased, one-sided, or instead contains different viewpoints 
on the problem. Thus, for the purpose of making a clear distinction between the concepts, and 
understanding how media bias and framing relate to manipulated information, it is necessary 
to take a look at each of the former individually before proceeding to clarification of what 





2.1.1. Media bias 
What is media bias? 
Surprisingly enough, despite the fact that, in surveys and scholarly literature, news 
media is widely viewed as biased (e.g. Mann, 1999; Goldberg, 2002; Alterman, 2003; 
Groseclose & Milyo, 2005a, 2005b; Druckman & Parkin, 2005; Baron, 2006; Paul & Elder, 
2006; Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010), there is no widely agreed upon definition of “bias.” 
Moreover, such definitions are often inconsistently descriptive rather than normative and are 
focused on various sources or forms of media bias. In other words, the definition not 
infrequently depends on the approach being used in research (be it content analysis -- which is 
most often the case -- or individuals’ perception of media bias) or even in a particular study.  
Thus, Groseclose and Milyo (2005b) defined bias “as an ideological slant that may take 
a number of forms: Democratic or Republican partisanship; liberal or conservative positions 
on public-policy issues; or broader assumptions about, say, business corporations or the 
causes of social, economic, and foreign-policy problems. […] we assume that such a slant, if 
it exists, is either to the 'left' or to the 'right' (p.306). In addition, the authors considered other 
lines of judgment of what constitutes bias, such as having an “inherently subjective nature” 
(p.308) which refers to gatekeeping bias (coverage vs. non-coverage of issues), statement bias 
(paying attention in a news report on an issue to only one side and ignoring others), or 
coverage bias (connotation or tone of language). Such an "ideological approach" adopted 
mostly from American media bias studies, became quite a popular method in media content 
analysis research, and especially during various election campaigns (e.g. Goldberg, 2002; 
Adkins Covert & Philo, 2007; Chiang, 2007; Ho & Quinn, 2008; Puglisi, 2011). Groseclose 
and Milyo (2005b) conceded that the debate over media bias has focused mainly on American 
reality and taken American viewpoints into account, leaving, thus, the views of the rest of the 
world more often than not unattended. However, approaches to studying and defining media 
bias go well beyond the aforementioned ‘ideological’ or ‘partisan’ distinction also referred in 
literature to as a ‘supply-side model,’ according to which the news media try to increase the 
electoral prospects of their preferred political party.    
Another kind of model is a ‘demand-side’ one, according to which the media attempt to 
maximize their profits and, for this reason, supply readers/viewers/listeners with the 
information they prefer to receive (Baron, 2006). Or, in other words, news consumers choose 
to get information that confirms and reinforces their beliefs and attitudes (Mullainathan and 
Shleifer, 2005). In such a way, they might be caught in so-called ‘echo chambers’ trap, being 
supplied only with preferably slanted information. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) attributed such 
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behavior to the consequences of information overload. Yet, even when looking for accurate 
and balanced information, consumers may stick to their prior beliefs. In turn, Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2006) -- taking the meaning of media bias information slant as the selective omission 
of facts, specific choice of words, and playing with credibility of primary news sources -- 
stated that bias emerges not from “consumer preferences for confirmatory information, 
reporters’ incentives to promote their own views, or politicians’ ability to capture the media. 
Instead, it arises as a natural consequence of firms’ desire to build a reputation for accuracy, 
and in spite of the fact that eliminating bias could make all agents in the economy better off” 
(p.310).    
Nevertheless, definitions and descriptions of media bias are not limited to those 
proposed within the aforementioned two-model classification. In this vein, Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2002) distinguished between the ideological bias through which news media try to 
influence the public and spin bias which serves to make a news report catchy and memorable. 
Baron (2006) argued that the effects of media bias can be divided into ex ante and ex post 
cases.  Ex post refers to situations when citizens reading news reports take media bias into 
account and, for this reason, perceive the news skeptically. As a result, they will act with 
discretion based on what they have read/viewed/listened to. Ex ante media bias, in turn, 
affects the increasing probability of reporting of certain news stories and, thus, the likelihood 
that citizens will base their behavior on that information. Calais Guerra et al (2011) also noted 
that one of the most common types of bias is ideological or political, in addition to selection 
bias (what should be covered) and description bias (truthfulness of news report). Furthermore, 
the researchers described bias as a lack of appropriate balance and neutrality in argumentation 
as well as lack of appropriate critical doubt. D’Alessio and Allen (2007) defined media bias as 
“a systematic, persistent unbalance in mainstream news coverage for the purpose of 
influencing opinion on key issues” (p.432). At last, according to the Encyclopedia of Political 
Communication (2008):  
 
…the word bias refers to showing an unjustified favoritism toward 
something or someone. Thus, on a very simplistic level, media bias refers to 
the media exhibiting an unjustifiable favoritism as they cover the news. 
When the media transmit biased news reports, those reports present viewers 
with an inaccurate, unbalanced, and/or unfair view of the world around 




In this regard, two types of bias in news reporting were identified in the Encyclopedia (2008): 
‘partisan bias’ implying a certain slant in favor of a particular political party, and ‘structural 
bias’ stemming from some ‘structural’ specifics of the media industry such as time 
constraints, reporting routines, newsroom practices, focus on sensations, conflicts and 
negative news, commercial pressures, etc. Bias could also stem from distorted or hidden 
information presented by primary sources, from the personal preferences of journalists or 
editors (Baron, 2006), and from the ignorance or low professionalism of reporters (Deprez & 
Raeymaeckers, 2010).  
Such a distinctive feature of media bias as a lack of appropriate balance and neutrality 
in argumentation has also been specifically emphasized. Thus, D’Alessio and Allen (2007) 
defined media bias as “a systematic, persistent unbalance in mainstream news coverage for 
the purpose of influencing opinion on key issues” (p.432). The Oxford Dictionary of Media 
and Communication (2011) explained news bias as "a professional lapse in the journalistic 
goals of impartiality, objectivity and/or balance (regardless of intention)" (p.32). Finally, 
according to the Encyclopedia of Political Communication (2008), the word 'bias' implies: 
 
…showing an unjustified favoritism toward something or someone. Thus, 
on a very simplistic level, media bias refers to the media exhibiting an 
unjustifiable favoritism as they cover the news. When the media transmit 
biased news reports, those reports present viewers with an inaccurate, 
unbalanced, and/or unfair view of the world around them. (p.433)  
 
Interestingly, according to Goldberg (2002), the news media often do not admit that 
they are biased. Earlier, Patterson and Donsbach (1996), who surveyed journalists in five 
western democracies, came to the same conclusion arguing that, generally, journalists denied 
the existence of any bias in their reporting and instead stated “that their decisions are 
premised solely on professional norms” (p.466). However, in some surveys (e.g., Pew 
Research Center, 2004) journalists themselves agreed that news reports were often sloppy and 
error-filled, and that they, journalists, often showed their political bias in the reports.   
Thus, if one tries to summarize various definitions and descriptions of media bias in one 
word, it would likely be 'unbalance', a notion which can then be accompanied by a range of 
attributes: unbalance of facts, unbalance of viewpoints, unbalance of words, unbalance of 
sources, etc. When speaking of 'unbalance', I imply the essence of the term 'media bias', not 
the perception of information as biased by its consumers - I will cover the peculiarities of 
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perception below when reasoning about bias effects. Besides, those who are convinced that 
the notion of balance/unbalance cannot exist without perception should consider, for one, 
media information on a controversial issue that contains one viewpoint only. 
     
Effects of media bias      
Essentially, the lack of agreement among scholars on a universal definition of media 
bias is not a serious obstacle for studying how individuals perceive such biased media 
information and what influence, if any, it might exert on them. In his book How We Know 
What Isn’t So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life Thomas Gillovich (1993) 
stated: 
 
Inaccuracies and fabrications propagated by the media are a particularly 
powerful cause of people's erroneous beliefs, in part because of the 
reputation much of the media have for objectivity and accuracy, a reputation 
that is not always deserved. The prescription that “you cannot believe 
everything you read” has unfortunately not been adequately incorporated 
into the public consciousness. It often seems overshadowed by the counter-
slogan that “they couldn’t say it if it wasn’t true. (p.99) 
 
In this regard, An et al (2012) noted that “traditional media outlets are known to report 
political news in a biased way, potentially affecting the political beliefs of the audience and 
even altering their voting behaviors”. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007a) found that media bias 
had a significant effect on voting, at least in the case of Fox News. Effects of media bias in 
fostering political polarization, voting outcomes as well as electoral mistakes (defined by 
Bernhardt et al. (2008) as "an outcome in which media bias matters, i.e. the candidate, who 
would be preferred by the majority if all voters received unbiased news" (p.1093)) were 
revealed in a number of studies by Glynn (1999), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Bernhardt et 
al (2008), Chiang and Knight (2009). Druckman and Parkin (2005) also stated they found 
compelling evidence of editorials slant impact on voters’ decisions. Moreover, they 
concluded: “Our results raise serious questions about the media’s place in democratic 
processes” (p.1030).   
Other scholars, however, pointed out that individuals differ in their perception of media 
bias. In this regard, Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007b), for example, noted that if voters were 
aware of possible media bias presented in news reports and sorted it out from plain facts, their 
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beliefs and attitudes are not affected by the slanted information. D’Alessio (2003) also 
emphasized that “people who consider news media biased are less likely to believe them and 
to use them, with obvious consequences both for people and for media” (p.282). In other 
words, the attitude or feeling such individuals possess typifies what is called media skepticism 
or “a subjective feeling of alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream news media” (Tsfati, 
2003, p. 67). Explaining the definition in detail, Tsfati specified: 
 
...media skepticism is the feeling that journalists are not fair or objective in 
their reports about society and that they do not always tell the whole story. It 
is the feeling that mainstream news outlets will sacrifice accuracy and 
precision for personal and commercial gains. It is the perception that one 
cannot believe what one reads in the newspaper or sees on TV news. In 
other words, media skepticism applies the general concept of mistrust to 
audience perceptions of the way mainstream news institutions function in 
society. (p. 67)   
 
Such mistrust presumes that news media do not represent the world in the correct way, and, 
for this reason, opinions expressed in the media cannot be relied upon and accepted by the 
audience (Tsfati, 2003).  Despite the reference to mainstream media specifically, and given 
that during last decade alternative media (such as social networks and blogs) have boomed, 
the foregoing quote about media skepticism should also be applied to these new forms of 
media as well (to a greater or lesser extent, perhaps).  
What is important to take note of here is the necessity of distinguishing between two 
types of media skepticism – one that we can call ‘healthy’ and the second that we can call 
‘subjective’ media skepticism. The former may be referred to as ‘informed media mistrust’ 
and is an inherent part of critical thinking skills of a media literate person. Such informed 
media mistrust should exist a priori toward all media as a whole, not merely toward a 
particular news report a person is reading/watching/listening to at a specific moment. In 
particular, informed media mistrust is expected to stem from and be based on the following 
premises:  
- the knowledge that media messages may have multiple meanings and pursue specific 
purposes (Wicks, 2001); 
- the ability also to recognize that media messages might exert a certain influence on 
news consumers and anticipate to what degree such influence is possible (Aufderhide, 1993); 
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- the understanding that media construct social reality; that they may be ideologically 
and politically biased; that they are concerned with profits which, in turn, affects the choice of 
what to report as well as the forms in which news information is presented; that it is 
impossible to give any ‘objective picture of reality’ in a given news report due to constraints 
on time and resources as well as the infeasibility of presenting in that report the standpoints of 
all parties involved in the issue described.  
That is why, rephrasing Kinder (1998), critically thinking individuals should be 
somewhat uncertain about practically everything, and specifically about remote and not 
directly observed facts. Such informed media mistrust, as I call it, should be viewed, thus, as 
an unexpendable quality of the critical intellect and welcomed in every possible way.   
As distinct from the foregoing type of media mistrust, there is another form of mistrust - 
contextual or situational (ad hoc) media mistrust, as I refer to it. Such situational mistrust 
pertains not to all the media taken together but to concrete media outlets or/and particular 
media messages, and is reflected in the fact that individuals perceive such media 
outlets/messages to be biased against the individuals’ viewpoints. D’Alessio (2003) described 
the subjective perception of media bias as idiosyncratic and even noted the opposing 
judgments different people came to after looking at identical media content. In addition, he 
argued, bias is relativistic in the sense that content is perceived as biased when it contradicts 
the views or beliefs of readers/viewers, regardless of whether they are aware of their own 
biases or even if the content is balanced.  
The latter point supports the conclusions of Vallone, Ross and Lepper (1985) who found 
that neutral media content is perceived as biased due to selective perception, and called this 
phenomenon ‘the hostile media effect’ or ‘hostile media perception’ (in abbreviated form, 
HME or HMP). According to this, the receiver of a news message shapes the meaning of the 
message themselves in accordance with their positions on an issue that they are reading about. 
HME might arise not only with regard to political issues, but also religion, sport, controversial 
topics covered by the news media, etc. (Vallone et al, 1985; Gunter et al, 2001; Christen et al, 
2002; Arpan & Raney, 2003; Ariyanto et al, 2007; Richardson et al, 2008). Notwithstanding 
that the inner workings of HME are still called into question, a number of scholars regard as a 
key attribute a person’s involvement with the issue covered in a given news report. Such 
involvement may be due to the salience of the issue, its personal relevance, or/and as a result 
of person’s own political/ideological partisanship (Christen et al, 2001; Gunter & Christen, 
2002; Christen & Gunter, 2003). Or, as this mechanism of HME is explained within the 
framework of Social Judgment Theory, “people process issue statements relative to their own 
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positions: statements close to one’s own position fall within a 'latitude of acceptance' and are 
judged as agreeable, while positions substantially different are grouped into 'latitude of 
rejection' (D’Alessio, 2003, p.283). Consequently, those statements in media messages falling 
into the latitude of rejection are more likely to be regarded as “biased” compared to opposite 
statements.          
As one can readily see, those susceptible to HME are inclined to be skeptical towards 
media outlets and news reports and also see slant in media messages only contextually, 
depending on a situation, and only when the standpoint of the media outlet or report 
contradicts their own standpoints. It is worth mentioning that HME does not refer to news 
reports that propagate only one point of view on an issue or problem, or to put it differently, 
when other viewpoints are lacking. What it refers to is the supposed predominance through 
the whole of a report of a standpoint which is opposite to “mine”, that is some “distortion of 
truth” of which “I am” securely certain. Further, following this string of logic, if one believes 
there are specifically biased media outlets/news, then he or she should also believe that there 
must also be unbiased ones as well, that is, those supporting her/his own views and beliefs. 
Moreover, such a person likely believes that position that he or she adheres to on an issue is 
the only correct one. In this way, the person also appears to be unaware of his or her own 
biases and takes little account of whether the particular news medium or report which 
communicates standpoints fully supporting his or her own opinion still conforms to 
journalistic norms of impartiality, by presenting different points of views, telling the story in 
context, giving facts instead of solely opinions or allegations, etc. All this can hardly suggest 
that such a person could be described as critically thinking. It can be said that manifestations 
of selective media mistrust and, consequently, selective media trust do not mix well with 
manifestations of informed media mistrust, as the latter presumes the existence of a skeptical 
attitude towards the impartiality of the media as a whole. Otherwise, if contextual media 
mistrust is typical of any population groups, irrespective of their critical thinking abilities and 
attitudes towards the media, then  the whole concept of media literacy, and specifically the 
critical assessment of media information, appears to be completely far-fetched and should not 
make any sense along with a practical application.   
According to Paul and Elder (2006), this difference between the two types of news 
consumers described above arises from the lack or the presence of what they referred to as 
“intellectual humility”, or knowledge of our ignorance. The gist of this lies in distinguishing 
between reading a media message and verifying the truth of the message. To be more precise, 
a critical news consumer is aware that information presented in a news report as factual may 
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actually not be factual at all. Instead, it might be propaganda, distorted information or 
misinformation. For that reason, knowing that he or she personally does not know these facts, 
the critical news consumer “brackets” what he or she reads, sees, and hears, and “suspends” 
his or her beliefs on an issue. The information is, thus, taken into account on a preliminary 
basis (“perhaps this is true, perhaps not”). In contrast, an uncritical news consumer will accept 
or reject a news message's standpoint(s) in accordance with the dominant opinion on an issue 
in his or her social environment. Thus, Paul and Elder (2006) concluded, such uncritical news 
consumers "take themselves to be in possession of the TRUTH. This confidence is in fact 
proof of their lack of objectivity” (p.7). Unfortunately, as the authors stated, intellectual 
humility does not prevail in life.  
In brief, the distinction between an uncritical and critical perception of biased media 
information may be expressed in the following tacit maxims adapted from Paul and Elder 
(2006) and summarized here in tabular form (Table 1): 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of uncritical and critical minds 
Uncritical Mind Critical Mind 
“It’s true if I believe it (for some reasons)”  “I believe it, but it may not be true” 
“It’s true if we (a group – social, political, religious 
etc.) believe it (for some reasons)” 
“We believe it, but we may be wrong”  
“It’s true if we (a group – social, political, religious 
etc.) want to believe it (for some reasons)”  
“We want to believe it, but we may be prejudiced 
by our desire” 
“It’s true if it serves our (group’s – social, political, 
religious etc.) vested interest to believe it (for some 
reasons)” 
“It serves our vested interest to believe it, but our 
vested interest has nothing to do with the truth”  
            
 
Detecting media bias 
How bias is detected in media texts and broadcasting through content analysis will not 
be considered here, for a description of the specifics of content analyzing media messages is 
not a purpose of my work, which is focused upon individual perception of media information 
and the individual critical thinking skills employed to assess it. Eventually, detecting media 
bias by ordinary people suggests using strictly clear practical techniques that should be 
effective in terms of time- and cognitive effort, which is by no means unimportant in the 
present day of information overload. Reasoning from this fact, different authors have 
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proposed different methods for spotting slanted information, which may vary but also have 
much in common with each other and promote a consistent approach for asking critical 
questions while assessing and interpreting the news.  
Specifically, Paul and Elder (2006) developed a set of key questions news consumers 
should ask when they are exposed to various news reports:  
 What is the intended audience? 
 What point of view is being privileged? 
 What point(s) of view is (are) being dismissed or downplayed? 
 How can I gain access to the point of view being negated (from those who 
most intelligently understand it)? 
 Which stories are featured “on the front page” and why? 
 What information is “buried” in the news report and why? 
 
In addition, of course, Paul and Elder (2006) do not regard merely an awareness of these 
questions as a panacea against media bias, but also emphasize the necessity of learning to 
read, view, and hear the news critically in addition to knowing how the media operate and 
why. 
Lee and Solomon (1991) proposed an extended set of questions for news consumers to 
ask in order to spot possible bias in the news: 
 What are the sources of the news report? Is there only one or are there several 
sources? 
 From whose point of view is the news reported? 
 Is there a lack of diversity of sources and viewpoints? 
 Are there double standards in describing different groups of people, countries, 
etc.?  
 Are there stereotypes in the news reports? 
 What are the unchallenged assumptions? 
 Is the language loaded? 
 Is there a lack of context in the news report? 
 Do the headlines and stories match? 





In turn, Baker (1994) suggested how to identify different types of bias in news reports. 
Notwithstanding the fact that he wrote specifically about “liberal bias”, his classification 
remains useful and valid for any form of bias. In total, he categorized eight types of media 
bias: 
1. Bias by commission.  
2. Bias by omission. 
3. Bias by story selection. 
4. Bias by placement. 
5. Bias by selection of sources. 
6. Bias by spin. 
7. Bias by labeling.  
8. Bias by policy endorsement or condemnation. 
 
Bias by commission is the most common form of bias (Baker, 1994) and refers to the 
inclusion in a news report of only one specific opinion or a viewpoint on an issue or/and 
details supporting only this opinion/viewpoint. In addition, Baker (1994) stated, portraying in 
a news report one viewpoint as the correct one also falls into a category of bias by 
commission.   
Bias by omission is, in actual fact, the reverse side of bias by commission and involves 
ignoring important opinions or viewpoints on the issue reported. This sort of bias might be 
difficult to spot. It requires from a news consumer to be knowledgeable about the subject of 
the news. In this way, either by knowing different points of view on the issue from the 
beginning or by comparing news coverage of the subject by different media outlets it is 
possible to detect bias by commission.  
Bias by story selection, as its name implies, refers to choosing a topic to be covered or a 
specific news report to be published. 
Bias by placement, evidently, means that news stories on the first pages of the print 
media or at the beginning of television or radio newscasts are judged as more significant and 
important than those left for later. Also, what are considered as the most important facts are 
usually published first in the story and less important ones are reported subsequently. Given 
that most people usually read only the headlines or first paragraph(s) (Baker, 1994), bias by 
placement within the news report might be quite an influential technique.  
Bias by selection of sources happens when information is supplied by those who support 
one viewpoint or another. In addition, this bias is observed when one reads or hears such 
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phrases as “experts believe that” or “the majority of people think that,” etc. Baker (1994) 
warned that quoting an expert by name does not necessarily makes a news story more 
credible, for the reporter may choose anyone he or she wants as an “expert”. The same is true 
when asking opinions of “people on the street”. In this case, the reporter might easily load the 
story with testimony that would support a particular point of view.  
Bias by spin refers to emphasizing in a report some aspects of an issue favorable for one 
party concerned while downplaying unfavorable aspects, or promoting that party’s 
interpretation of an event when only briefly mentioning or completely ignoring the 
interpretation of the opposite side.  
Bias by labeling means attaching some labels to describe people, processes, and events. 
For example, describing someone as either a “terrorist” or “freedom fighter” has different 
connotations and will provoke different meanings for the news consumer, in the same way as 
the use of positive or negative words (e.g., adjectives, adverbs).  
Bias by policy recommendation or condemnation occurs when a reporter does not only 
communicate the facts, sequence or description of events but also endorses some government 
action or policy or, alternatively, condemns them. In other words, this type of bias may be 
seen when a reporter peremptorily evaluates particular policies or actions while providing no 
attribution.   
According to Baker (1994), many news stories often contain several types of bias. For 
example, a news report displaying bias by commission might also include bias by selection of 
sources and bias by labeling. By the same token, bias by story selection is likely accompanied 
by bias by placement.  
Complimentary to the above, other types of biases were also identified, such as bias by 
statistics (reporting “two-thirds of respondents think that…” in reality may mean that only 
three persons were surveyed for this question); bias by headlines (setting the tone and 
programming the perception of a news report from the beginning); bias by photos, captions 
and camera angles (making someone or something look favorably or unpleasantly, or giving a 
dramatic shot and, thus, programming a news consumer to have a specific perception of a 
news report) (Media Awareness Network www.media-awareness.ca). As likely as not, there 
exist more kinds of bias that have been identified, for example, bias by type and size of font, 
or bias by a reporter’s silence in a newscast or some other sort of bias. However, while all 
questions intended to help in identifying media bias and offering descriptions of its various 
types make sense and are very likely useful for bias researchers, the practical utility of the 
proposed methods for ordinary people who are attempting to spot media bias easily and 
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without lengthy contemplation is somewhat doubtful.  
For example, would it be possible to answer questions such as “what point(s) of view is 
(are) being dismissed or played down?” and “what information is 'buried' in the news report 
and why?” without knowing what are the existing viewpoints on an issue and what all the 
available information is? To answer these questions, as Baker (1994) noted, it is necessary 
either to possess background knowledge on the issue or to carry out a sort of brief 
comparative research study by reading various news outlets in order to come to a certain 
conclusion. The same holds for identifying bias by omission: how should one know what 
specifically is omitted in a news report? The question “is there a lack of context in the news 
report?” may likely be answered differently by different persons, as for them the phrase “lack 
of context” might have various meanings. Detecting bias by story selection, at least, requires 
knowledge of which other topics were considered by editors for coverage, as well as which 
other news reports on the chosen topic for publishing/broadcasting. Finally, to be able to spot 
some types of bias in a particular news story (say, bias of double standards, or featuring 
stories on important issues prominently), one needs to consume news on a continuous basis 
and, moreover, from various news media, working thus like a media monitoring agency. 
However, ordinary people often have no time for verifying news reports and/or the 
willingness to become news junkies. Another question arises: how to deal with spotting bias 
in foreign reporting, especially when it comes to news coverage of some novel topics or on 
unfamiliar issues? Or, given that at the present day boom in the Internet and mobile means of 
communication, reading, viewing or listening to the news from other countries has become 
commonplace, how, if at all, one can spot bias in reports in the news media of a foreign 
country without knowing the specifics of how its media system functions? Of course, this is a 
topic for further research in its own right, but what seems important is that the fundamentals 
of media bias remain the same irrespective of the particular media system or particular 
country. 
Evidently, the very concept of media bias should be elaborated and specified more 
clearly, including making its components unambiguous and well-defined for use in research. 
In the same vein, this applies to the elaboration of the practical methods for spotting media 
bias that, it would seem, should be simplified, summarized to most differential characteristics 
of bias and unified for usability purposes. Having such a helpful "memo" will most likely 
prove to be a handy tool in a quick analysis of news messages for bias.                   





Artists know that the frame placed around a painting can affect how viewers 
interpret and react to the painting itself. As a result, some artists take great care 
in how they present their work, choosing a frame that they hope will help 
audiences see the image in just the right way. Journalists – often 
subconsciously – engage in essentially the same process when they decide how 
to describe the political world. They choose images and words that have the 
power to influence how audiences interpret and evaluate issues and policies 
(Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). 
 
The quotation cited above refers specifically to the use of framing in news reports. 
However, the concept of framing itself has been investigated in many branches of the social 
sciences, including cognitive psychology, sociology, political science, and communication. 
But, although the interpretations of the concept share some similarities – and quite 
considerable at times – across various disciplines, its treatment varies from field-to-field 
reflecting differences in their focuses, approaches, preferences, and limits with regard to the 
study of framing. For this reason, no common unified definition of the notion, unfortunately, 
exists; however, in general terms, all disciplines are agreed on a broad definition of framing 
“as information that conveys different perspectives on some event or issue” (Iyengar, 2010).  
Certainly, for a particular study a broad description of a concept is not applicable. 
However, before presenting a specific and more precise definition that will be used for this 
study, it is necessary to try to explain the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the treatment of 
the concept by examining its roots and attributes as well as distinguishing framing effects 
from similar ones, a confusion that often arises. Such scrutiny should allow us to see the 
concept in its pure form, distinguishing it from similar concepts and, eventually, ending up 
with a clear view of the phenomenon and a clear-cut and unambiguous conceptual definition.  
 
Disciplinary roots of framing and resembling effects 
Discussing different approaches to the interpretation and application of the framing 
concept, scholars have for long denoted its sociological and psychological roots as well as the 
frequent mistaking of framing effects with agenda-setting and persuasion effects (e.g., Gitlin, 
1980; Krosnick, 1991; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Shah et al., 1996; Nelson et al., 1997b; Price & 
Tewksbury, 1997;  Pan & Kosicki, 2005; Shah et al., 2009). Recently, in their lucid 
explanation of the theoretical foundations of framing, Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) 
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pointed out two important distinctions underlying variant treatment of framing by different 
scholars. One of the distinctions refers to disciplinary origins, and the other pertains to 
explanatory models. 
The disciplinary origins of framing imply micro-level or psychological approaches and 
macro-level or sociological approaches. The latter is based on attribution theory as well as 
frame analysis. The attribution theory, as stated by Heider (1959), declares that people make 
judgments about the complex world around them by linking an observed outcome and 
potential cause, thus attributing responsibility to personal or societal factors. Iyengar’s (1991) 
distinction between episodic and thematic frames in political news, when issues are 
considered at the level of particular events or persons or at the level of society and when 
responsibility is assigned to individuals or to society at large, respectively, reflects this 
approach. The frame analysis rests upon Goffman’s (1974) assumption that people rely on 
interpretive schemas called “primary frameworks” rather than on causal attributions. 
According to his viewpoint, primary frameworks represent sets of categories that are 
established and shared within society and that are usually employed by individuals when they 
process information. In addition, society itself as well as the media utilizes frames targeted to 
involve the very primary frameworks and, therefore, facilitate specific interpretations of 
messages by citizens.  
The micro-level or psychological approach, which underlies this study, is based on 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1984) idea that interpretation of a message usually depends 
on what interpretive schemas are used by individuals (more on this follows in Part 2 of this 
Chapter). In turn, specific frames might facilitate specific interpretations. Moreover, the same 
message framed in different ways might give rise to different interpretations. The study by 
Nelson et al (1997a) provides a good example of the last statement. In this study people were 
asked whether they would allow the Ku Klux Klan to conduct a rally by being asked to judge 
from one of two frames – free speech (that is, everybody has a right to speak) or public safety 
(that is, the possibility of violent confrontation between proponents and opponents of such a 
hate group). As a result, those exposed to the free speech frame were more inclined to allow 
the rally than those exposed to the public safety frame.  
The second important dimension influencing different interpretations of the concept by 
scholars is explanatory models. Given that “news frames can exert a relatively substantial 
influence on citizens’ beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors,” Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009, p. 
19) claimed, “it is not surprising that they appear to be related to other consequential 
processes in news consumption and processing.” In particular, there are three other processes 
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and effects to some degree resembling framing effects and quite possibly concurrently 
accompanying them: agenda-setting effects, information effects, and persuasion effects. They 
ought to be succinctly considered in order to demonstrate psychological processes underlying 
the distinct effects and, therefore, differences and similarities between them leading us, in this 
way, to a better understanding of the nature of framing. 
Generally speaking, agenda-setting deals with what is reported in the media whereas 
framing refers to how this issue is reported. In other words, topics most often discussed in the 
media are perceived by the audience as the most important. However, the central organizing 
ideas of news reports on those topics will affect how the reports are interpreted by the 
audience members. Nevertheless, some scholars have suggested that framing effects are 
merely an extension of agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004), specifically the second-level of 
agenda setting which refers to selecting the particular attributes of issues, thus, making them 
more salient, and presenting them to the public. In such a way, the second-level of agenda 
setting resembles framing very closely in that the latter makes some aspects of reported reality 
more salient for the purposes of promoting a definite “problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” 
(Entman, 1993, p. 52). That is why framing researchers contend that framing is distinct from 
agenda setting procedurally as well as conceptually (Kosicki, 1993; Maher, 2001); moreover, 
the opposite is also true – agenda setting borrows considerably from framing (e.g., Shah at al., 
2009).  
In this regard, an explanation of the differences between framing and agenda setting 
provided by Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) in their review deserves close attention. The 
main distinction claimed lies between two important psychological characteristics 
determining agenda setting or framing effects – accessibility and applicability, respectively. 
While frequent repetition of information/news about an issue increases its accessibility and, 
hence, makes it more important for the audience (that is, it sets the agenda for thinking), 
packaging the information/news in a specific way through choosing particular ideas, words, 
catchphrases, and images is targeted at making those elements applicable to the issue and, 
hence, facilitates the interpretation of the issue in an intended direction, “telling audiences 
what to think, not just what to think about” (Shah et al., 2009, p. 85). Interestingly, though, 
accessibility and applicability usually complement each other while individuals are processing 
information. Thus, on the one hand, the more accessible some information is in the memory, 
the higher the chances that it will be employed for interpretation of an issue. By the same 
token, the higher the applicability of the elements of the information to the issue, the greater 
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the likelihood that they will be used while evaluating the issue. I will examine the concepts of 
accessibility and applicability later on in this part when considering priming, and in more 
detail in Part 2, devoted to information processing. 
The information effects refer simply to presenting new information about an issue, event 
or person and the acquiring of that information by individuals. Framing does not imply 
learning something new from messages. Frames promote the building of specific associations 
between information described in messages and related concepts in the memory of the 
receivers of the messages. Being a central organizing idea of a message, as Gamson and 
Modigliani (1987) put it, a frame integrates all information elements together into a package 
that may affect the audience. Therefore, framing effects relate not to learning new information 
but to how information is packaged and presented (Druckman, 2002; Nelson, Oxley, & 
Clawson, 1997b), “when a phrase, image or statement suggests a particular meaning or 
interpretation of an issue” (Tewksbury and Scheufele, 2009, p. 20). 
Finally, persuasion effects differ from framing effects ones in that the former seek to 
affect and change attitudes and opinions regarding an issue, event or person by overtly 
presenting strong arguments or evidence to this purpose (Chaiken & Trope, 1999); as such, 
the one being persuaded usually knows or, at least, can guess about the intentions of the 
persuader. On the other hand, the latter is usually covert (in the sense that people are often 
unaware of frames and their possible influence) and concerned with how the information will 
be interpreted, that is, what inferences and opinions audience members will come to by 
themselves after reading the framed information. At the same time, persuasion and framing 
share important similarities as to influencing people’s attitudes in an intended direction as 
well as placing emphasis on source credibility as one important moderator of both effects 
(Druckman, 2001). This resemblance might become even closer if message frames are 
accompanied by the use of biased information. In such a case, the exerted influence is likely 
to be more persuasive than when biased information is not involved. For this reason, I would 
take the liberty of calling this form of influence soft persuasion. I will give a detailed account 
of this issue later in this Part, considering how both frames and biased information on a novel, 
directly non-verifiable subject matter might complement each other in exerting directional 
influence on audience members.     
 
Definitions and types of framing  
There are various definitions of framing employed by different scholars in the field of 
political science and communication. Chong and Druckman (2007), stated that “framing 
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refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or 
reorient their thinking about an issue” (p.104). Scheufele (1999) distinguished between media 
frames and individual/audience frames, where the former represent “a central organizing idea 
or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson & Modigliani 
1987, 143), whereas the latter refers to mental schemas used for organizing and processing 
information. In addition, media frames influence individuals’ frame through audience 
exposure to media information and the increasing accessibility and applicability of certain 
frames (this will be discussed below). In turn, Druckman (2001a, 2001b, 2004) differentiated 
between equivalence or valence and emphasis or issue frames. The first type is based on 
Kahneman and Tversky’s research in which equivalent information was presented differently, 
in terms of gains or losses, associated, in turn, with positive or negative outcome or, according 
to Druckman (2004), “casting the same information in either a positive or a negative light” 
(p.671).  The second type of frames deals with focusing attention on a narrow aspect of a 
certain issue.  
But, probably, the most widely recognized is the definition by Entman (1993): 
 
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe. (p.52) 
 
To frame political issues, it is necessary to fulfill in news coverage at least two of the four 
functions, namely, the assignment of responsibility and recommendation of a solution. 
Proposing, thus, the causes and the remedies of the issue by the means of such frames, news 
media give to the audience ready and easy to grasp templates for estimation of the issue. Ten 
years later, Entman (2004) described framing as “the process of selecting and highlighting 
some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and 
evaluation of that reality” (p.26). He argued that frames primed citizens’ responses “by 
activating associations between the information highlighted in the text and concepts already 
stored in their schema systems” (Entman, 2004, p.28). 
It should be noted that some researchers are skeptical about the foregoing definition; 
but, it must also be admitted that nothing more deserving of attention has been offered in 
return. For example, Pan and Kosicki (2005) criticized Entman’s conception of framing for 
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several reasons. The critics claimed that it does not take into account the role of individuals’ 
cognitions, is not treated as a phenomenon distinct from other theories such as media bias, 
gatekeeping and the like, and is also based on the associative network model of memory, 
neglecting other cognitive models. As a result, on the one hand, framing turns out to be a sort 
of ‘magic bullet’ of media influence, while, on the other hand, it is “a catch-all label with no 
well-defined empirical domain” (Pan & Kosicki, 2005, p. 177). Instead, they conceptualized 
framing as “a process of making sense in public deliberation” through selecting and adopting 
by individuals “an interpretive framework for thinking – and potentially, talking – about a 
political object” (p.177).  
Here I would like to dissect the criticism, to enable further understanding of the concept 
and its application to this study. For one thing, although Pan and Kosicki’s remarks are not 
groundless, at the same time they are not entirely accurate. First of all, Pan and Kosicki's 
(2005) definition of framing refers directly to the political domain, narrowing thus the 
applicability of the term. Secondly, as Chong and Druckman (2007) noted, framing “can be 
viewed as a strategy to manipulate and deceive individuals [that is, considered in negative 
terms], or it can refer more neutrally to a learning process in which people acquire common 
beliefs [that is, considered in positive terms]” (p.120). Therefore, in light of the two different 
functions which framing fulfills (that is, facilitating either positive 'informing' or negative 
'persuading'), it seems quite problematic to have an inclusive definition for both. Thus, to be 
more precise, Pan and Kosicki's definition of framing might be regarded as describing the 
phenomenon in positive terms (helping to inform), whereas Entman's definition best describes 
framing in negative terms (helping to persuade). For this reason, the two definitions simply 
describe different functions of framing.  
Also, the so-called disregard for individuals’ cognitions in Entman's (1993) definition of 
framing may be explained simply by not focusing on frames processing but on frames setting. 
But, let us be candid: there is no definition which takes into account all elements of the 
framing process in their entirety, including frames building, frames setting, frames processing, 
and frames effects, not to speak of frames' positive/negative valence. In substance, all and 
sundry of conceptual and operational definitions proposed by framing scholars differ not only 
with respect to their underlying assumptions, but also depending upon whether framing is 
treated as an independent or as a dependent variable (that is, how frames become established 
in societal discourse and compete for adoption by citizens, and how frames effect audiences, 
respectively). Besides, such definitions often suffer from conceptual overgeneralization and, 
therefore, there is even less clarity than for those that are more narrowly conceptualized.   
36 
 
On the other hand, all accusations that the definition is a “catch-all label”, akin to a 
‘magic bullet’ of communication effects, and based solely on the accessibility model of 
memory seem indefensible. First of all, Entman (2004) as well as many other scholars (e.g., 
Iyengar and Kinder,1987; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2007; 
Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009) agree that framing effects occur through priming which, in 
turn, is based, by its nature, as I will show later, on the availability, accessibility, applicability, 
activation, and strength of ideas associated with message frames. Next, a notional ‘catch-all 
label’ might be employed for the characterization of any other definition of framing, as I 
showed earlier. Finally, there are no premises for viewing framing in the form in which it is 
described as yet another a type of  'magic bullet’: frames do affect people but, at the same 
time, the effects are different for different people under different conditions and with different 
frames.   
I settled upon this critique purposely. First, in my opinion, and as I tried to demonstrate 
before, Entman’s (2004) definition of framing as selecting some aspects of an issue and 
making them more salient, thus downplaying other aspects, and in this way influencing an 
interpretation and evaluation of that issue mirrors the essence of the concept, and, specifically, 
its psychological component. It should be emphasized that this definition differs from earlier 
ones of bias by commission and omission, since such types of bias do not include the salience 
component but only mention the viewpoints of one interested party and ignore the opinions of 
the other(s). Second, Entman’s (1993) ‘older’ widely cited definition of framing (as regards 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation) 
suits in the best way possible the description of negatively constructed frames, that is, frames 
employed for the manipulation and deception of individuals (Chong and Druckman, 2007). 
Given that manipulation and deception are not only an incidental product of journalists' and 
editors’ carelessness, sloppiness or ignorance but, quite possibly, a conscious process as well, 
one might easily suggest intentionality in the use of such frames in the media and elite 
discourse, particularly. And, third, both mentioned definitions of framing are important for 
this study as the concept of manipulated information is partly based on them.     
 
Framing devices 
Before everything else, frames organize, accompany and strengthen news information 
and serve as the keynote of that message. As a vivid instance of the latter, we might mention 
Entman’s (1991) study of how the U.S. media framed the shooting down of the Korean 
Airline and Iran Air aircrafts in the 1980s. In both cases, military errors caused the crashes of 
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civilian planes and deaths of many people. However, the Iran Air crash that the United States 
was responsible for was framed in terms of “a technical problem”, while the Korean Airline 
crash that the Soviet Union was responsible for was described as “a moral outrage” (p. 6). 
(Within the proposed framework of manipulated information, the coverage would combine 
the employment of biased (prejudiced) information with allegations.) In addition, Entman 
(1991) argued that “in these two cases the news frame coincided closely with the [U.S.] 
administration’s interests” (p. 25).  
Certainly, not only the keynote of a message is utilized to frame it in a specific way. To 
frame media messages, journalists often use rhetorical structures, which were subdivided by 
Gamson and Lash (1983) as "framing and reasoning devices" Under the former, the scholars 
included special stylistic structures that provided frameworks within which a problem could 
be viewed: catchphrases, depictions, exemplars, metaphors and visual images. Catchphrases 
represent expressions that create a specific image (e.g., someone is а flip-flopper - a 
description of a person who changes his or her opinion too often). Depictions assume using 
lexical devices for descriptions - examples, modifiers or similes (e.g., he looks like an angry 
bull). Exemplars are illustrations of a discussed category (e.g., Jack the Ripper - as an 
example of a murderous maniac). Metaphors describe one idea by means of another (e.g., ‘the 
Axis of Evil’ is used to denote countries supporting terrorism or potentially dangerous to 
global security). Visual images are pictures or graphics accompanying articles. Reasoning 
devices - such as appeals to principle, consequences and roots - suggest that justifications or 
reasons are provided for certain positions. Appeals to principle imply the use of moral appeal. 
Consequences depict potential results. Roots explain causes of events (Gamson & Lasch, 
1983). 
Using such devices, the media encourage people to think about events in analogous 
ways. For example, Spellman and Holyoak (1992) noted frames that were used during the 
first conflict in the Persian Gulf when Iraq was compared to Nazi Germany in World War II 
and Saddam Hussein was compared to Adolf Hitler. This suggested a clear analogy as to why 
the conflict was disastrous and what consequences might be expected without stopping Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait. 
In addition to those described above, there might be other rhetorical techniques “that 
manipulate information in order to influence how the public responds to issues and 





  Innuendo (a form of attacking opponents or an opponent's viewpoint by raising doubts 
yet without giving any evidence at the same time). 
 Misrepresenting someone’s position and presenting it so that it will be likely rejected 
by news consumers. 
 Downplaying unpleasant and damaging evidence. 
 Supporting someone’s position with unsubstantiated incriminating evidence against 
opponents.  
 Taking someone’s words out of context. 
 Attacking the person / organization / institution instead of her/his/its arguments 
(Silverblatt, 2008).    
 
Relying on frames when exposed to novel issues 
It is not infrequent that individuals encounter messages on novel issues. In such 
instances, there are no linkages between a given issue and a person's established opinions 
about it. In such cases, news framing should be expected to have a strong impact on people’s 
understanding of the issue. Therefore, framing effects of news reports on novel issues “should 
be particularly powerful for audiences” (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009, p.25). First 
impressions from such reports on foreign affairs might set a seal on subsequent judgments 
about, say, a foreign country, its people, culture, traditions, etc.  Entman (2004) noted in this 
regard that “a dominant frame in the earliest news coverage of an event can activate and 
spread congruent thoughts and feelings in individuals’ knowledge networks, building a new 
event schema that guides responses to all future reports. First impressions may be difficult to 
dislodge” (p.7). 
 In turn, Tewksbury et al. (2000) found that when a news message contains information 
novel to the audience, retention of associations between the issue and individuals’ 
considerations becomes more rooted. Moreover, the authors claimed, the effect such news 
messages exerted on audience interpretations immediately after news exposure lasted up to 
three weeks. In turn, Chong and Druckman (2007a) stated that even individuals with strong 
predispositions/values were susceptible to framing effects arising from news messages on 
novel issues due to a lack of entrenched interpretations. Matthes (2010) also noted that mass 
media can strongly influence people's thinking when they are uncertain about their opinions 
on an issue. However, as he emphasized, “when people hold strong and established attitudes, 
exposure to counter frames in the mass media is unlikely to change their views” (p.8). 
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Another study conducted by Shen (2004) showed that novel constructs made applicable to a 
given issue are accepted by the audience, but that this happens even more readily if the 
audience members already possess certain schemas for the constructs.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that when encountering information on a novel issue (say, 
country X secretly develops a nuclear weapon) but which is framed in a familiar way (say, in 
terms of a terrorist threat), audience members will rely on the frames that correspond to 
existing schemas in their minds, in order to come to preliminary conclusions about the issue. 
In addition, the information which is itself presented in a biased way – say, it is totally one-
sided or contains solely allegations without any kind of proof – should resonate with the 
frames and strengthen them, thus exerting greater influence on information receivers than if it 
was reported in a more balanced manner. Obviously, definite individual characteristics should 
mitigate or even nullify that influence irrespective of the schema's strength, and I will discuss 
that, first, in brief later in this Part and, then, in more detail in subsequent parts of this 
Chapter. Now, to understand how framing affects individuals, it is essential to investigate how 
frames work from a cognitive and psychological perspective.                
 
The essential foundations of framing effects: availability, accessibility, applicability.  
In order for framing to take effect, a given consideration (say, free speech) highlighted 
in a message needs to be available and accessible in one’s memory as well as applicable for 
the message interpretation. Availability refers to an individual’s ability to understand what 
that consideration means (say, what ‘free speech’ implies) and, specifically, in terms of a 
given issue. It may be measured by asking individuals what considerations at all come to their 
minds when they think about the issue. Accessibility means that the consideration may be 
easily retrieved from long-term memory. Frequent – or recent – repetition of the consideration 
increases its accessibility, thus, making it possible to retrieve the idea automatically, that is, 
unconsciously. It can be measured by asking respondents what idea comes to their mind first 
when they think of the issue. Applicability implies the appropriateness of message frames to 
certain schemas an individual holds in his or her memory: the larger the resonance between 
the two, the larger impact the frame will have on the message processing, at least, before the 
stage of critical reasoning about the message. It may be measured by asking individuals to 
rate how effective a given frame is.  
On different occasions, people can use different ways for evaluating a given frame. 
Sometimes, people base their judgments only on available and accessible constructs, without 
employing conscious information processing. However, when accessibility is not enough for 
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coming to a conclusion about an issue, individuals try to consciously evaluate the 
applicability of the accessible constructs. When this occurs, the greater strength a frame has 
(that is, in terms of higher availability and applicability), the more effective its influence on 
opinion will be. In addition, when comparing between frame repetition (aka accessibility) and 
strength (aka applicability), it transpires that the latter matters more than the former (Chong 
and Druckman, 2007b; Druckman, 2010). Considering whether frames work primarily 
through accessibility or applicability, other authors also indicated applicability. Thus, Nelson 
et al (1997b) concluded that frames are involved more in building associations between the 
constructs than in improving their accessibility. However, Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) 
claimed that “the knowledge activation approach suggests that frequent exposure to a 
relatively consonant framing of an issue should strengthen the applicability link between an 
issue and a frame while increasing the long-term accessibility of that link” (p.30). Yet, it is 
reasonable to infer then, if some construct in an individual’s head is both accessible and 
applicable, it will be more likely used when evaluating the issue.  
Chong and Druckman (2007a) concisely described how frames are processed as 
follows: 
 
People draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in 
memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment. Out of 
the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged 
relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work on all three 
levels, by making new beliefs available about an issue, making certain 
available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs applicable or ‘strong’ in 
people’s evaluations”. (p.111)  
 
Given that to be applicable a belief regarding a given issue has to be accessible, first, and then 
activated, the question arises as to what can increase its accessibility in memory and activate 
it. Obviously, concept accessibility might be increased through frequent repetition of similarly 
framed messages about the issue in the media, whereas concept activation might be caused by 
two mechanisms: external stimulus (such as a strong frame) or the spread of activation from a 
related concept (e.g., Domke et al., 1998; Kinder, 1998; Roskos-Ewoldsen & Roskos-






Priming may be described as an effect of some preceding stimulus on subsequent 
evaluation of an issue, event or person. As Roskos-Ewoldsen and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2009) 
stated, this effect “is analogous to that which happens when a water well is primed. The act of 
priming the well enables the well to produce water when it is pumped afterward” (p.178). Its 
roots lie in cognitive and social psychology, which has been studying priming since the 
beginning of the 1970s to understand different aspects of how the cognitive system operates.  
Specifically, to explain the underlying mechanisms of priming, the best thing is to look 
at network models of memory (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1997). The models presume that 
information is kept in the memory as a variety of specific nodes, where each node poses a 
distinct concept (for example, the concept of ‘teacher’ is represented by the ‘teacher’ node). 
Nodes that are ‘conceptually close’ to each other are linked by associative pathways (for 
example, ‘teacher’ is usually likely linked to ‘school’ and is unlikely to be linked with 
‘cement-mixer’; for some people, there might be a specific unusual linkage, though). Also, 
each node has its own activation threshold; when that is exceeded, the node immediately fires 
and activates other conceptually close nodes or, as it is said, spreads its activation. Thus, once 
activated, the related nodes need less activation afterwards to fire and, therefore, can be 
triggered easier. This additional activation might occur, again, as a result of spreading 
activation from conceptually close nodes or from an external factor, such as a word, syntagm 
or a phrase, image, etc.      
With regard to media information, in particular, Entman (2004) defined priming as 
“activating an association between an item highlighted in the framed text and an audience’s 
thinking about a related concept” (p. 27). In his view, the relation between framing and 
priming is that "frames introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, 
activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular 
way" (Entman, 2007, p. 164). That is, schemas, which can be described as clusters of linked 
ideas or feelings stored in memory, are connected in networks, and activation of one idea will 
cause activation of a related idea or ideas. For example, the frame ‘terrorist’ as a description 
of someone might develop associations with Osama bin Laden, the tragedy of the World 
Trade Center, and so forth, evoking negative feelings.  
This raises the question of how to activate a certain association between a frame and a 
related concept or concepts? The answer is obvious, one might say: through frequently 
making the concept(s) chronically accessible. Chronic accessibility means that a concept or 
consideration is highly accessible from memory at any time. Increasing the chronic 
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accessibility of a concept is possible through repeated media exposure to that concept, that is, 
frequent repetition. If not reinforced, the concept gradually becomes less accessible and void 
with the course of time. However, if reinforced regularly, it becomes chronically accessible 
and comes to mind without effort when primed with specific frames that are associated with 
the concept(s) and which association has been established through being mentioned in 
repeated media messages. Given that primes exert stronger influence when the situations 
described are ambiguous or uncertain (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2007, 2009), as is the case 
with frames, and also that many thoughts and feelings arise without conscious effort and can 
be suppressed only afterward (e.g., Gilbert and Hixon, 1991), it can be inferred that priming 
and framing together might rule over and direct judgments under uncertainty, at least, in the 
early stages of processing the uncertain – or novel – information. Furthermore, the joint effect 
of two processes might be qualified as exercising a function of soft persuasion, by which I 
mean the power to implant convictions in individuals’ minds indirectly, done not by the 
means of overt persuasion techniques but surreptitiously by prompting individuals to draw 
conclusions seemingly all alone. Needless to say, when inferences about an issue, object or 
event are not enforced from outside but made under one’s own steam (even if such a belief is 
nothing more than an illusion), their significance for an individual becomes worth its weight 
in gold and gets the highest priority in making subsequent judgments on that issue, object or 
event. If this is the case, then it has succeeded - and the end of soft persuasion is gained.   
Surely, the hypothesized influence is not yet another ‘magic bullet’. Its effects are not 
universal and unconditional, and they differ for different individuals, depending on the 
specific characteristics inherent in them that moderate the degree of the influence.  
 
Moderators of framing and priming 
Moderators are variables that can modify the direction and/or strength of a relationship 
between independent or predictor variables and dependent or criterion variables (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). Previous studies identified a number of moderators that condition framing and 
priming effects, and, for this reason, should be applicable also to the effects of manipulated 
information. Many scholars have pointed out at an important role that individual 
predispositions, and, specifically, values, toward an issue play in people’s judgments (e.g. 
Druckman, 2001c; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001). That is to say, 
those with stronger values are more resistant and, thus, less susceptible to influence from 
frames that are based on alternative values. At the same time, as Chong & Druckman (2007) 
stated, “even those with form values are susceptible to framing on new issues that have yet to 
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acquire a settled interpretation” (p.112).  
Another important moderator is political knowledge; however, here the results of 
previous studies are conflicting to some extent. Some scholars found that framing and priming 
effects were stronger for individuals with less political knowledge (e.g., Krosnick & Kinder, 
1990; Domke et al., 1998; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001). On the 
other hand, other researchers claimed they had the opposite findings (e.g., Krosnick and 
Brannon, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997b; Miller & Krosnick, 2000). 
According to Goidel, Shields and Peffley (1997), evidence showed that people with 
more schematically organized knowledge about a certain topic were more capable of 
interpreting new information, storing it in their memory, and then retrieving it when 
necessary. Thus, Goidel et al. (1997) concluded that more knowledgeable citizens were able 
to cope with such tasks much better than those with lower levels of political knowledge. 
Valentino (1999) also pointed out that:  
 
…priming effects might be larger among the educated and politically aware 
because such citizens have richer associative networks in memory that 
facilitates storing and assessing new information. (p.314) 
     
Thus, there is no unanimity among researchers as to whether framing and priming 
effects are stronger among more politically knowledgeable people or those who possess less 
political knowledge. Druckman (2002) suspected that such conflicting results were obtained 
because researchers confounded political knowledge per se with the “existence of prior 
opinions based on other information that vitiates the impact of a new frame” (p. 8). Thus, he 
claimed, there is a need for a control for the prior opinions. Chong and Druckman (2007) 
stated that knowledge facilitates framing effects “because it increases the likelihood that the 
considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual” 
(p.112). However, when considering the effects of manipulated (roughly speaking, biased and 
framed) information, and specifically, about novel issues, I hypothesize that its influence 
should be weaker for citizens with higher levels of political competence due to their assumed 
ability to analyze information more carefully and think about it more critically while also 
understanding the role of frames. I will discuss this issue in more detail in Part 3 of this 
Chapter. 
Scholars also emphasized the role of a credible source when exerting influence (e.g., 
Kuklinski & Hurley, 1993; Druckman, 2001c; Schaffner & Atkinson, 2010). Interestingly, 
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Kuklinski and Hurley (1993) noted that when citizens always regard messages as credible 
because they originate from a credible source, they can be easily misled by those messages. 
By the same token, Kucherenko and Christen (2014) found that the more a person trusted a 
particular news outlet, the more he or she trusted the article published in that outlet and 
considered the article unbiased. The inference made from the experimental findings stated that 
trust in the news outlet affected participants' perceptions of slanted articles "as trusted and 
unbiased, and acceptance of the standpoints they promoted" (Kucherenko & Christen, 2014, 
p.63).     
 
2.1.3. Manipulated media information 
Taking all the above into consideration and using it as the foundation for the concept of 
“manipulated media information”, I will now explain what I mean by this term, which will be 
used throughout the rest of the thesis. I define manipulated information as one-sided 
presentation of information which is based on opinions instead of facts and as such contains 
allegations, causal interpretation(s) of the issue or problem described in the news 
reports/messages and assignment of responsibility for it. All of these together eventually 
might lead a consumer of such information to draw incorrect, erroneous conclusions about the 
issue or problem. In addition, manipulated media information might include emotionally 
loaded language and/or various framing and reasoning devices, strengthening the overall 
effects of such information on its consumers. As one can see from the definition, the proposed 
concept is inherently comprised of some of the most important, in my opinion, and 
characteristic features of both biased and framed media information. At the same time, it 
would be incorrect to refer to manipulated media information as only biased or only framed 
information. The reasons are that not always biased media information (say, one-sided) 
comprises features of negative framing (causal interpretation(s) of the issue or problem 
described in the news reports/messages and assignment of responsibility for it). By the same 
token, framed media information (moreover, framed in positive terms) by no means always 
contains elements of bias. Therefore, conceptually speaking, combining the essentials of 
biased information (in terms of one-sidedness and allegations) and negatively framed 
information (in terms of causal interpretation of an issue/problem and assignment of 
responsibility for it), manipulated media information provides ready templates for news 
consumers for making certain 'programmed' conclusions about the issue/problem described.    
I will further clarify the essence of the building blocks.  
One-sidedness here implies presenting only one viewpoint on an issue in a news report. 
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In addition, the presence of only one standpoint does not necessarily mean that it belongs to 
only one source – a person, organization or institution – that is cited in the report. Actually, 
more than one source might be mentioned or interviewed regarding the issue, but all the 
viewpoints will eventually and, of course, “accidentally” coincide. In other words, no 
alternative position on the issue is presented in the news report. It is in this particular sense 
that the notion of one-sidedness is used in my study. 
(However, conceptually speaking, news information might be also regarded as one-
sided in the case when an alternative point of view is mentioned in a news report just briefly, 
in a couple of sentences, or described in a critical or ironic tone. But since my thesis is not 
about the comprehensive substantiating of the notion of the “one-sidedness of news 
information” and uses it in the specified sense, I will leave all speculations about that for my 
future articles.) 
Here it is necessary to point out one important characteristic of one-sided news 
information: the lack of any alternative point of view in a news report automatically makes 
the information unbalanced. (Of course, this should not refer to every type of news reports – 
say, weather reports or crime reports, which hardly need to have different viewpoints; it 
depends, though) Such information may therefore be quite easily detected. But what would be 
its alternative, one might ask? What makes information balanced? At this point, some 
clarification is needed. I regard it as a widespread fallacy when the notion of “objectivity of 
information” is confused with the notion of “balance of information”. Objectivity is a kind of 
hardly achieved illusory ideal in presenting news information as it assumes presenting all the 
facts and the opinions of all parties (even third, fourth, and fifth ones) involved in an issue. To 
a certain extent, objectivity is an exhaustive, to the last detail, depiction of an issue. Perhaps, a 
very rough “objective view on an issue” may be achieved solely by a news consumer after a 
thorough exploration of a wide range of relevant viewpoints and perspectives, analyzing them 
and coming to a conclusion. But, even with that, there are always facts and opinions that 
remain hidden for one reason or another. Thus, when one maintains that objective news is just 
impossible, this statement makes sense. However, when it comes to balance in news, there is 
no necessity to mention every possible standpoint on an issue to make information balanced. 
Balance is a state of equilibrium or equipoise, and as such requires two alternative points of 
force to be exerted in order to counterbalance each other. In respect to news reports, the 
presence of two alternative standpoints (“yes – no”, “pro – contra”, “attacker – defender” etc.) 
expressed equivalently with regard to their size within the news report and language used for 
their description makes the story balanced but, at the same, not “objective”. Argumentation 
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justifying both standpoints may not be unique, of course, in the sense that support for a certain 
policy, for example, might be dictated by different reasons for different 
people/organizations/institutions. Therefore, the reasons cited in the news report might not 
necessarily be those that a person who also supports the policy personally prefers or considers 
most important. Nevertheless, despite the lack of “objectivity” (in this case, not every reason 
for support has been taken into account in the news report), the overall position of support for 
the policy is present (let us assume, of course, that the position of rejection of the policy is in 
evidence as well, and equivalent in size and language to its alternative). That is to say, a news 
report is very unlikely to be objective, but it might easily be balanced.  
Opinion-dominated or ‘opinion laden’ messages usually report not stark facts about 
events, issues etc., but contain interpretations of the events and issues. In turn, the opinions 
often fulfill the role of allegations, that is, statements without proof and references to the 
sources on which the opinions are based. A politically competent person ought to be able to 
recognize news information based on unfounded opinions. In the context of the concept of 
manipulated information, such opinion-dominated news messages also comprise 
unsubstantiated causal interpretations of the issue or problem described in the report and/or a 
precarious attribution of responsibility for it to someone or something.  
Lastly, loaded language implies the use of positively or negatively connotated words 
and phrases and/or various rhetorical structures consisting of framing and reasoning devices.  
In this way, manipulated news information might be regarded as a deceptive tool, 
enabling the misinforming or disinforming of citizens, especially with respect to novel or 
barely familiar information. The ability to recognize manipulative techniques and not to fall 
under such information influence, that is, not to believe what it proclaims, should depend 
greatly on to what extent a news consumer is able to critically assess media information. This 
component is in charge of analyzing, evaluating and drawing conclusions about news 
messages. Such a critically thinking individual is expected "to a greater degree [to] be 
immune to both unwitting and intentional attempts of news media to deceive or mislead with 
their news reports" (Kucherenko & Christen, 2014, p.56).  
The aforementioned individual's ability to critically assess media information should 
depend, first and foremost, on the particular information-processing strategy that the news 
consumer employs. The next part of this Chapter will show that elaborative processing 
contributes considerably to such type of news evaluation. Moreover, the denoted strategy is 
hypothesized to be illustrative also of a person having a higher degree of political competence 




Part 2.  News information-processing strategies. The role of elaboration.  
 
How people draw inferences from acquired news information depends on how they 
process it. That is to say, what news information-processing strategies they usually employing 
for getting the meaning (or even the various meanings) of media messages. Researchers in 
cognitive psychology and communication sciences have been studying these strategies for a 
long time. As a result, they have come to certain conclusions not only as to how we process 
information but also regarding how our individual traits, learned abilities and/or acquired 
characteristics are associated with particular types of reasoning or information-processing 
strategies. 
Thus, as far back as the 17th century, the French mathematician, physicist and 
philosopher Blaise Pascal distinguished between intuitive and mathematical systems of 
human reasoning. Sigmund Freud propagated a distinction between irrational and rational 
thought processes that was embodied in the ideas of the unconscious and the conscious. Many 
contemporary psychologists also argue for two systems of reasoning – one of which allows 
for rapid intuitive conclusions to be made, and the other of which is targeted at drawing 
slower, elaborate inferences. In the literature, this partition of cognitive processes into two 
basic components – intuition and reasoning – comes under the label of dual-processes models. 
In general, there are three types of them: elaboration likelihood, heuristic/systematic, and two-
systems models (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). 
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model suggests that there are two 
‘routes’ for persuasion or constructing attitudes: one is central and based on thoughtful 
consideration of information obtained, that is, on elaboration and analysis, while the other one 
is peripheral and employs various heuristic judgments (or simplifying techniques), based, for 
example, on attractiveness, likeability or group identification. Significantly, as O’Keefe 
(2009) pointed out, inferences drawn from central route processes are “likely to be more 
enduring… and to have greater influence on subsequent behavior than…[those] accomplished 
through peripheral-route process” (p. 277). Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly’s (1989) 
heuristic/systematic model differs from the previous one predominantly in that it, firstly, 
assumes that heuristic processing makes use of learned rules in lieu of usual associations, and, 
secondly, it follows that intuitive and thoughtful processes occur in parallel, not sequentially, 
as the elaboration likelihood model states (Sloman, 2002).  
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Despite the aforementioned differences, both models reflect the ‘cognitive miser’ 
perspective when it comes to heuristic information processing (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). 
The term ‘cognitive misers’ was coined by Fiske and Taylor (1991) to describe human beings 
as subjects with a limited information processing capacity. In other words, people are too lazy 
to engage in complex thinking and reasoning processes. As Fiske and Taylor (1991) 
emphasized, people search for “rapid adequate solutions, rather than slow accurate solutions” 
(p. 13). Or, as Hinton (2000) described it, “we rarely have the time or the inclination to 
ponder each new problem of our daily lives and so quick decisions without too much effort 
may have much pragmatic value to us” (p. 67). Thus, here heuristic processing takes the lead 
over systematic argumentative strategies that, in turn, are used, according to ‘cognitive miser 
models’, only when an individual has high motivation (involvement with the issue under 
consideration) as well as the cognitive capacity for information processing. While this 
approach seems convincing, it suffers from an oversimplification of human thinking 
processes, depicting humans as totally passive and lazy and who, with this condition, have not 
been capable of creating the world around us in all its variety or of effectively solving many 
tasks in our professional and daily lives.  
The third type of dual-process model I mentioned earlier is the two-systems model, 
which differs from the cognitive miser perspective and has recently received much 
recognition from psychology and communication scholars. This model is used as a basis for 
this study. It postulates that two mental systems always function in parallel: “an associationist, 
parallel-processing system (‘System 1’) that renders quick, holistic judgments… and a more 
deliberate, serial and rule-based system (‘System 2’)” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 16). 
System 1 is always running, and not just under conditions of low motivation, while System 2 
supplements or overrides inferences drawn by the associationist one. Or, as Kahneman (2011) 
noted in respect to the two-systems model, "System 1 is gullible and biased to believe, System 
2 is in charge of doubting and unbelieving" (p.81). Thus, System 1 provides so-called “natural 
assessments" based on general-purpose heuristics (such as affect, availability, causality, 
fluency, similarity), whereas System 2 ensures conscious selection and application of specific 
rules to monitor the quality of the assessments, which might be confirmed, corrected, or 
overridden. Therefore, the two-systems model does not conform to the cognitive miser 
perspective as it maintains a joint indivisible mechanism of information processing as distinct 
from the idea of two different ‘routes’ that function in an ‘either-or’ mode depending on the 
information processor’s motivation (which influence is taken into account, of course, and 
varies “in the effort applied to the rule-based system” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 16).  
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For clarity, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) summarized descriptions of the two 
systems in a table, which is presented below. Notwithstanding that the term ‘two systems’ 
might suggest something distinct and autonomous, the scholars noted that, this label 
represents a “collection of processes that are distinguished by their speed, controllability, and 
the contents on which they operate” (p.51) (Table 2): 
 
Table 2. Two cognitive systems*  








Rapid, parallel Slow, serial 
Process opaque Self-aware 
Skilled action Rule application 
Content on Which Processes Act 
Affective Neutral 
Causal propensities Statistics 
Concrete, specific Abstract 
Prototypes Sets 
   *Adapted from Kahneman and Frederick (2002). 
 
Moreover, they emphasized that although System 1 is simpler than System 2, the 
latter is not necessarily more capable. The point is that, in the course of skill and competency 
improvement, the complex cognitive processing inherent in System 2 becomes habitual and 
straightforward and, as a result, becomes the quick and holistic operation intrinsic to System 
1. To illustrate this, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) exemplified the process as follows: 
 
A striking demonstration of the intelligence of System 1 is the ability of 
chess masters to perceive the strength or weakness of chess positions 
instantly. For those experts, pattern matching has replaced effortful serial 
processing. (p. 51)  
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Thus, once rational inferences become intuitive over time (see also Hinton, 1990; Rumelhart, 
1989). And these "accurate intuitions of experts", according to Kahneman (2011), are 
explained not by heuristics, but "by the effects of prolonged practice". In this way, intuitive 
answers proposed by System 1turn into ones that retain as an output a certain initial variant of 
judgment which is not modified much by System 2.  
This applies both to situations when people rely on associative processes because they 
do not have the necessary knowledge about an issue under consideration as well as to 
practices when individuals already have and effortlessly employ that knowledge at an 
intuitive level. Regarding the first case, Evans (2004) noted that in situations where there is a 
lack of knowledge about an issue and people, considering only the “information in front of 
them”, have to think logically, they quite often become susceptible to various judgment 
biases. Of course, no one is impervious to such biases. Even those, whose rational deliberate 
System 2 is more developed and their System 1 shoots quick and holistic intuitive judgments 
based on knowledge of issues and useful past experiences, they may be prone to biases due to, 
say, a stereotyping prevalence or liability for various cognitive illusions with regard to certain 
issues. However, such people will still be much less susceptible to fallacies of a similar nature 
or shallow judgments due to employing advanced elaborative information processing 
strategies. These, in turn, positively correlate with a higher level of intelligence (for examples, 
see Evans, 2004; Stanovich and West, 2002; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 
1999) and, when it comes to media information processing, with knowledge of political and 
current events as well as with a component that might be qualified in this context as a critical 
assessment of media information (Eveland, 2005) – a relationship which is of great 
importance for this study.  
In particular, Kosicki and McLeod (1990) pointed out three dimensions of information 
processing strategies: selective scanning, active processing, and reflective integration. 
Describing those, the researchers stated: 
 
Selective scanning is a reader or viewer’s response to the volume of 
mediated information and the limited time and energy available for using 
media. Primarily the strategy involves tuning out items that are not of 
interest or use to the audience member. 
Active processing reflects the audience member’s attempt to make sense of 
the story, going beyond the exact information given to interpret the 
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information according to his or her needs. The strategy captures the 
person’s need to “figure out” the story. 
Reflective integration represents the post-exposure salience of information 
such that it occupies the mind and is the subject of interpersonal 
discussion. The key, however, is the incorporation of new information into 
the person’s existing cognitive framework for understanding the subject 
(Kosicki & McLeod, 1990, pp. 75-76). 
 
Later, Eveland (2001, 2005) proposed that the concept of reflective integration be 
replaced with a concept of elaboration which, he stated, “in the context of processing news 
content is thus conceptualized as the cognitive use of news information to make connections 
to past experience and prior knowledge, and to derive implications from news content” 
(Eveland, 2005, p. 224). Among the reasons for such a replacement, he emphasized the 
necessity to separate two concepts of information processing and interpersonal discussion that 
are distinct because, otherwise, measuring the two together would lead to various types of 
error in measurement. Further, based on past research, Eveland (2005) demonstrated an 
existing relationship between information processing strategies and political and current 
events knowledge. The results are shown in the table below; in addition, the dimension of 
reflective integration as stated by Kosicki and McLeod (1990) is also included in the table 
(Table 3): 
 
Table 3. Relationship between information-processing strategies and 
political/current events knowledge*     
Information-processing 
strategies 
Political and Current Events 
Knowledge 
Reflective integration Positive 
Elaborative processing Positive 
Active processing Positive 
Selective scanning Negative 
 *Adapted from Eveland (2005) 
 “Positive” indicates a tendency toward significant positive relationships across studies. 





In addition, Eveland (2005) noted that knowledge and elaboration are reciprocally 
related; that is, greater prior knowledge inspires elaboration, and elaboration, in turn, 
increases and strengthens knowledge. And, for this reason, such a “reciprocal pattern of 
relationships may produce a spiral effect and thus contribute to knowledge gaps” (p. 234). 
Therefore, it can be inferred that greater political knowledge (which is a part of the “political 
expertise” construct in this study) should predict a more advanced elaborative processing 
capacity that, in turn, should be crucial when encountering and assessing manipulated media 
information.  
Besides, significantly, Eveland (2005) developed and proposed a measurement of news 
information-processing strategies which contains specific indicators for revealing each of the 
three dimensions (the initial concept of reflective integration has been replaced by 
“elaborative processing”). These indicators (shown in Table 4 below) can be also perfectly 
utilized in the measurement of media literacy levels as to critical assessment of news media 
information, as had been already demonstrated, for instance, in the study by Guo and Moy 
(1998).  
 








 I often find myself thinking about things I’ve seen/read in the news. 
 I often tie what I see/read in the news to ideas I’ve heard before. 
 I often try to relate what I see/read in the news to my own personal 
experiences. I often think about how what I see/read in the news relates 
to other things I know. 
 Often when I’ve seen /read something in the news. I’ll recall it later and 
think about it. 
 I often make connections between what I see/read in the news and things 
I’ve learned about elsewhere. 
Active processing  I often try to “read between the lines” of what I see/read in the news. 
 I often try to figure out the “real” story behind what I see/read in the 
news (seek additional information) 
Selective scanning  I often skim through the news to get the main points. 
 There is so much news out there that I pick out only the most important 
stories to focus on. 




As can be seen from the above, elaborative information processing, and, specifically, 
news information-processing, is a determining factor in people’s perception and evaluation of 
media information. Manifesting itself in higher levels of political knowledge (and, as likely as 
not, political competence – see Part 3) and media literacy (as to critical assessment of media 
information - see Part 4), elaborative processing thus, and differently in each of the two 
instances, makes it possible to reveal manipulated news information and overrides its effects. 
Besides, within the two-systems model, it also implies the capability of drawing quick holistic 
inferences about an issue that are based on knowledge (for one, of political and current events, 
or how media generally try to influence their audiences, or to what purpose utilization of 
specific media frames is aimed at, etc.) which was frequently employed in the process of 
deliberation, and so, has become automatically activated. Finally, encountering uncertain 
information on a novel issue, individuals with a more developed elaborative component of 
thinking, as might be seen from Eveland’s indicators, would rather not come to a certain 
conclusion about the issue altogether without getting some additional information on the 
topic, than unreservedly accept a standpoint expressed in the given media message or hastily 
judge its content altogether.  
Thus, schematically, the model of an ‘ideal relationship’ between, on the one side, 
high and low levels of political competence and media literacy context in terms of critical 
assessment of media information (referring to as 'high elaborative information-processing 
strategy' and 'low elaborative information-processing strategy', respectively) and, on the other 















Figure 1. Model of the Ideal Relationship between different levels of PC and ML 
context and perception of manipulated media information*  
 
 HIGH ELABORATIVE INFORMATION-PROCESSING STRATEGY 













*PC – political competence, ML context – media literacy context of a particular country, Rejecting [a 
standpoint expressed in a manipulated media message is rejected], Accepting [a standpoint expressed in a 
manipulated media message is accepted]; Spotting and Non-Spotting refer to the revealing and not revealing of 
manipulated information in a media message.  
 
As one can see, taken in their purest form, assuming that no mediators exist, high levels 
of political competence as well as media literacy context in terms of critical assessment of 
media information would mean high levels of elaborative information-processing strategies 
employed by individuals and would inevitably lead to the spotting of and non-susceptibility to 
manipulated media information, whereas low levels would demonstrate an inverse effect, 
making an individual not capable of spotting that information and susceptible to its influence. 
However, when some mediating variables are introduced, the general pattern may likely be 
changed. For example, a more advanced media literacy context should likely be associated 
with lower levels of media trust, although, on the other hand, the same level of media trust 
might be illustrative of the individuals having a lower elaborative information-processing 
capacity. And the reason for that may lie not in the presence of critical thinking but be just 
due to that common nihilistic position “they are all always lying and trying to con me”. Also, 
strong prior opinions – or predispositions – congruent with those expressed in a manipulated 














capacities believe that information they acquired is correct and unbiased, although, in reality, 
it is not. In turn, when it comes to novel issues, Chong and Druckman (2007a) reported 
thereverse finding that even individuals with strong predispositions/values were susceptible to 
framing effects that had arisen from news messages on novel issues due to a lack of 
entrenched interpretations within the individuals’ interpretative schemes.  
Significantly, although levels of political competence along with media literacy 
context may serve here in substance as proxies for levels of elaborative information-
processing, they are not interchangeable factors and by no means duplicate each other when it 
comes to the revealing and evaluation of manipulated media messages on some novel foreign 
affairs issues. Their origins are also quite distinct. Thus, guided by conventional wisdom, one 
would suggest that individuals with high levels of political competence will also be highly 
media literate. However, the evaluation of a media message as manipulated may be not due to 
a ‘political sophisticate's’ high media literacy level but because this politically engaged 
individual is used to sorting through various controversial political cobwebs, finding the 
proper thread of an argument and raking out the correct information. In this way, the person is 
able to extrapolate his or her experience of reasoning in the complex and tricky world of 
politics into the realm of mass communication. Indeed, manipulation or, in other words, one-
sidedness and the bias of media messages on a foreign affairs issue as well as the prevalence 
of opinion rather than facts in it will likely not differ fundamentally from what the person 
encountered when getting information about, say, his or her favorite candidate or political 
party from various sources and during political discussions. Consequently, the ability of 
revealing manipulated media information and being immune against its effects may result in 
this case from specific political knowledge as to which and how various strokes of policy are 
used for fighting political rivals and gaining supporters, that is to say, from ‘political literacy’, 
not media literacy.  
On the other side, being a highly media literate person does not necessarily mean 
having at the same time a high political competence. The person might be knowledgeable in 
some fields other than politics (for example, pharmaceutics, philosophy, sports, engineering, 
etc.) but, at the same time, possess a high level of media literacy and, as a result, be able to 
reveal slanted, unbalanced information as such, irrespective of its type - whether it is political, 
economic, sports-related or whatever else, as the characteristics of manipulated information 
(one-sidedness and bias, predominance of evaluations and opinions instead of facts, presence 
of allegations) are always identical. Hence, my assumption is the following:  a person who is 
able to reveal manipulated information in, say, medical media messages will also be entirely 
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able to reveal it in media messages on different topics – foreign affairs, in this case – through 
the same features inherent in the manipulated information, wherever it is used.   
Therefore, higher levels of political competence and a media literacy context in terms 
of critical assessment of media information are regarded here as manifestations of elaborative 
information-processing strategies, although both have different natures: more narrow, 


























Part 3.  Political Competence 
 
As early as 1954, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee denoted the importance of 
making sense of the political world for the citizenry: 
 
The democratic citizen is expected to be well-informed about political 
affairs. He is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, 
what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party 
stands for, what the likely consequences are. (1954, p.308) 
 
The purpose of such ‘political proficiency’ is the ability to make informed political decisions 
and, most notably, by means of voting. Yet, in addition to the aforementioned, the possession 
of political knowledge, in the broadest sense of the word, offers some additional advantages. 
These include more developed political schemas in the memory, which lead to better political 
learning, retaining and extrapolating from any piece of complex information, as well as more 
advanced analytical processing strategies for evaluating news messages – features that are 
especially significant for this study.  
Thus, Fiske et al. (1990) argued that higher levels of political sophistication are 
indicative of a higher degree of political schemas development. In turn, the developed 
political schemas add a great deal to political learning. Moreover, individuals with more 
developed political schemas consider persuasive messages more carefully and, as a result, are 
able to infer more accurate conclusions from political communications (Hsu & Price, 1993; 
Nelson et al., 1997; Rhee & Cappella, 1997). In this regard, Nelson et al. (1997) stated that 
individuals with higher levels of political sophistication are more resistant to persuasive 
messages for the reason that they already know the arguments used in the messages and, thus, 
are capable of analyzing and rejecting them more easily, especially if the arguments prove to 
be counterattitudinal.  A number of other researchers (e.g., Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; 
Goidel et al., 1997) also pointed out that people with more schematically organized political 
knowledge are better at interpreting new information, storing it in the memory and easily 
retrieving it later. 
In addition to possessing more developed schemas, political sophisticates – or 
political experts – process news more deeply in comparison to less sophisticated individuals, 
and they employ more analytic processing strategies in evaluating messages than do political 
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novices (e.g., Fiske et. al., 1990; Judd and Downing, 1990; Krosnick, 1990; Hsu & Price, 
1993; Rhee & Cappella, 1997; Guo & Moy, 1998). According to Kinder (1990), political 
experts, are more capable of identifying the important parts of information, encoding it in a 
more abstract way, and employing deeper analytic techniques for its processing. In turn, Hsu 
and Price (1993) concluded that political expertise is a “significant predictor of the extent of 
subjects’ analytic processing” (p.687). In characterizing the analytical information processing 
of political experts, the researchers particularly emphasized:   
 
Analytical thinking… involves the generation of cognitive responses to a 
news message and, especially, the generation of issue-relevant responses. 
Analytical thinking further involves consideration of both schema-
consistent and schema-inconsistent information and, consequently, the 
use of reasoned arguments rather than mere evaluations. Experts process 
messages carefully and ruminate over the positions or views presented in 
the messages, whereas novices are less inclined to do so. (p.677)  
 
This description perfectly corresponds to what Eveland (2005) referred to as 
elaborative information-processing strategies that are positively associated – and, moreover, 
reciprocally related – with high levels of political/current affairs knowledge (see Chapter II). 
In the same way, active processing of political information is also positively related to 
political/current affairs knowledge (Eveland, 2005; Guo and Moy, 1993) and, in fact, should 
be regarded – and will be in this study – as an integral part of elaborative thinking. For that 
matter, Guo and Moy (1993) described active processing of information as follows: 
 
It is characterized by mental efforts to go beyond the information 
presented and the context in which information is presented to attain a 
more complete understanding and interpretation of the political figures, 
issues, and events. Here, the interaction between existing political schema 
and incoming political information weighs more heavily. In essence, active 
processing of information develops as a strategy to cope with often 
incomplete and vague information… Rather than simplify filling in 
missing information with prior knowledge and opinion, active processors 
make greater efforts to seek truth through mental rehearsals of new 




Hence, political experts – or, in other words, more politically knowledgeable, 
politically sophisticated individuals – become not only ‘better citizenry’ in the sense of active 
political participation and informed voting but also as deeper and more accurate information 
processors. Moreover, the latter characteristic should presumably concern not only specific 
political information regarded as ‘domestic’ – as to political candidates/parties, election, 
voting, etc. – but also information in a broad manner, and news information in particular, even 
if it refers to some more distant and unknown issues such as, for instance, foreign affairs. Put 
differently, the highly developed elaborative and active information processing component of 
political experts should function identically (say, in a certain ‘schematic’ way) irrespective of 
the type of information encountered, as its evaluation would take its course according to the 
same mechanisms and reference points underlying the process of elaborative thinking (these 
may be considered through the lens of Eveland’s specific indicators presented in Part 2 of this 
Chapter). Finally, political knowledge also carries significant weight as a compound of 
general intelligence. According to Luskin (1990), “the dependence on intelligence should be 
greater for political than for many other sorts of knowledge, because politics is more abstract 
and remote – simply 'harder material' – than, say, sports or cooking” (p.336). Therefore, the 
certain level of political competence (known also as political expertise, political 
sophistication, political knowledge, political involvement) an individual possesses can be 
indicative of his/her general cognitive capacities including information processing strategies 
and, thus, measured in a certain way so as educe the aforementioned attributes.    
The concept of political competence is well known under various terminological 
aliases such as political expertise, political sophistication, political knowledge, political 
awareness, political involvement, and political literacy, to name a few. These terms appear to 
have the same or very similar meaning regardless of the academic discipline within which 
they are used. The remarkable fact is that all of them stress the importance of the cognitive 
aspect of the concept. 
Thus, Zaller’s (1992) ‘political awareness’ refers to “the extent to which an 
individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she encountered… Political 
awareness denotes intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs as against 
emotional or affective engagement or no engagement at all” (p. 21). Political knowledge also 
presumes a person’s cognitive ability to process information and distinguish correct 
information from incorrect (Sartori, 1987, p.117). In this way, knowledge differs from 
political information which is “a relatively narrow and straightforward construct relating to 
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factual knowledge in the political domain” (Price, 1999). In turn, Converse (1964) 
emphasized the cognitive property of political sophistication “where the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (p. 207). Luskin (1987, 
1990) also promoted the concept of political sophistication which is “a matter of cognition” 
and includes “the number, diversity, and organization (both internal and interschema) of a 
person’s political schemata” (p.860). In addition, the number, diversity, and organization of 
information (or, in Luskin’s terms, size, range, and diversity, respectively) are positively 
related. “Political sophistication is cognitive complexity about politics”, Luskin (1992) 
concludes, “Another name for this same variable, in the information processing literature, is 
expertise. Expertise is extensive, organized knowledge. Political sophistication is political 
expertise” (p.861).    
 To measure these concepts, various researchers have used different indicators. 
However, setting apart demographics, the central determinants of the aforementioned 
concepts were cognate enough. In particular, Krosnick (1990), McGraw and Pinney (1990), 
and Zaller (1992) included in their measure of political sophistication such components as 
factual political knowledge, media use, political interest, and political behavior. Fiske et al. 
(1983, 1990) composed the construct of the political expertise of the interlocking set of 
factual political knowledge, media use, political interest, and political activity. A number of 
researchers (e.g. Judd & Downing, 1990; Price & Zaller, 1993; Delli Karpini & Keeter, 1996) 
combined political factual knowledge and political involvement into a single scale. Luskin 
(1990) looked at political factual knowledge, political interest, and media exposure. Guo and 
Moy (1993) included in their measure such constituents as media use, political interest, 
political factual knowledge, and active processing of information. 
Consequently, based on previous research and the empirical confirmation of 
relationships between various components of the central concept derived from them, political 
competence is defined for this study as the amount of political knowledge and experience 
sufficient to process political information, as well as other complex information. As a result of 
such processing, comes a decision whether the information received might be trusted at face 
value or should be verified first before coming to a certain conclusion on it. With that, the 
concept of political competence comprises five components: political interest, media use for 
getting political information, factual political knowledge, political discussion, and political 
participation/activity.   
Political interest poses an internal motivating force and in this study refers to the 
extent to which a person follows politics or how much he or she is interested in politics, in 
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general. Here, no specification is made about any particular political campaign or different 
levels of politics (say, international, national, local) but these have all been incorporated into 
one measure. Those interested more often seek out political information and are, therefore, 
more frequently exposed to news and likely pay more attention to it as well as participate in 
various political activities and political discussions. Even if the last two compounds 
(participation and discussion) are absent for some reason (often because of some personality 
traits such as, for example, introvertedness), due to their greater political interest, such 
persons should still be more politically knowledgeable (meaning here factual knowledge) 
thanks to the news and feasibility of online participation and discussions, and have more 
developed political schemas that, in turn, facilitate more deep and accurate political 
judgments. All that should, among other things, contribute to higher scores on a political 
competence scale. 
Media use refers here to the frequency of intentional political information 
consumption from the news media, in general, and the frequency of seeking in the news 
media additional information on political topics of interest, as well as the types of media most 
often used (newspapers, TV, various Internet news sources) and the types of news content that 
are usually preferred (that is, hard news vs. soft news). Intentionality and additional 
information seeking indicate not only a person’s real interest in politics, but also the 
elaborative information-processing he or she possesses. The type of media most often used 
points to persons preferring to get their news from Internet and, thus, being in contact with the 
varied particularities of online news sources. Lastly, the type of political news content a 
person favors may be indicative of his or her propensity to and need for more serious, analytic 
media materials and, in this way, of his or her higher intellectual abilities. 
Factual political knowledge is “the range of factual information about politics that is 
stored in long-term memory”, as Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, p.10) defined it. Here ‘facts’ 
refer to objectively verifiable political cognitions – say, the name of the person who holds the 
office of prime-minister, or whether a given country has signed the Kyoto Protocol, or what 
political party dominates the country’s parliament, etc. In this way, facts differ from a 
person's political evaluations or beliefs, which are subjective. ‘Range’ pertains to a variety of 
cognitions related to the realm of politics – what a country’s political institutions are, how 
they function, who the main political actors are, etc. Finally, when speaking of long-term 
memory where the factual information is stored, this refers primarily to retaining information 
over time and its availability for future use. Interestingly in this regard, a good many 
researchers found that the amount of factual political knowledge was the best indicator of 
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political competence and its related concepts of 'political expertise', ‘political sophistication’, 
‘political awareness’, ‘political literacy’, etc. (e.g., Luskin, 1987, 1990; Fiske et al., 1990; 
McGraw & Pinney, 1990; Price & Zaller, 1990; Zaller, 1990, 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1993; Price, 1999).  
However, it would be fallacious to rely on this indicator as a single predictor of those 
concepts, for factual political knowledge can, first and foremost, be regarded as a matter of 
memory, the effectiveness of which is often subject to circumstances (say, in terms of 
research, artificiality of study setting, questionnaire design, or even a personal reason of a 
participant – bad mood, fatigue, etc.). Consequently, it would hardly be possible - or reliable - 
to predict on the basis of only factual political knowledge how active an individual is, say, in 
political discussions, developing the competency to argue in favor of her/his political 
standpoints and the counterargumentsof a political opponent as well as to sort through the 
controversies, inconsistencies and persuasive efforts of the political talking points. It would 
also be difficult to know, on the assumption of only factual political knowledge, how often an 
individual intentionally consumes political information from various media. Or, to what 
extent he or she is a politically active citizen, that is, how often he or she deliberately 
participates in various forms of political life. Meanwhile, both aforementioned components 
also add significantly to the general characteristic of individual political competence. And, 
finally, the experimentally explored effects of individuals' levels of factual political 
knowledge on spotting manipulated media information were quite small, and, at the same 
time, no association at all was found between factual political knowledge and susceptibility to 
manipulation in news reports  (Kucherenko & Christen, 2014). All this might denote that 
factual political knowledge alone is not the best indicator of one's entire political competence, 
at least when it comes to the influence of the latter on the perception of media information, 
and, specifically, manipulated media information.  
For this reason, the concept of political competence incorporates several indicators 
that complement and cross-validate each other as, it must be said, the forenamed researchers 
did as well. Also, it is important in this regard that when measuring political knowledge this 
study distinguishes between structural knowledge, referring to what is relatively stable and 
permanent in politics (say, questions about the tasks of parliament, what is proportional 
representation, etc.), and political information, which refers to something situational and 
transient (say, questions about the name of the prime-minister, the parties holding the majority 
in the parliament, etc.). In this way, such a measurement allows us to tap into the real political 
knowledge persons have, and not only the attention they pay to current affairs. Besides, to 
63 
 
ensure a true comparison between the three European countries included in the research (the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Italy) on the political knowledge/competence dimension, this study 
employs questions used in the European Election Study 2009 which are long term (not tied to 
a timeframe), standardized across countries, have different degrees of difficulty, and allow for 
a cross-country comparison (more details follow in Chapter III on methods).    
Political discussion implies deliberation of political issues with other people. Its role 
in promoting political knowledge and, consequently, political expertise is quite considerable. 
Robinson and Levy (1986) revealed a significant relationship between the two – a finding that 
has been confirmed in many other studies (e.g., Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Bennet et al., 2000; 
Scheufele, 2000, 2002; Eveland, 2004; Eveland & Thomson, 2006).  In particular, Gastil & 
Dillard (1999) concluded that participating in face-to-face discussion “often introduces 
conflicting points of view, highlights moral and practical trade-offs, and stimulates critical 
thinking” (p.4; emphasis added). In turn, in line with this conclusion, Eveland & Hively 
(2009) inferred that “discussing politics more often may produce more facts and more 
structuring of political concepts in comparison with those who discuss politics less often” 
(p.218). Although some researchers have suggested using different categories for 
distinguishing the intensity of political discussion (such as whether someone participates in 
the discussion passively by listening, rarely gives an opinion, often gives an opinion, or tries 
to convince others of his or her positions), this study does not set as its mission to explore 
how different types of discussion influence something. Rather, in order to infer a higher level 
of political competence and elaborative information processing, what is meant here is the 
active deliberation of political topics as well as attempts to persuade a discussant opponent(s) 
of one’s political views (including reasons to vote for or against a candidate or a political 
party). Here it is of no importance if such discussions are face-to-face or online.     
The classical definition of political participation holds that it “refers to those 
activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
government personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba & Nie, 1972, p.2). Later 
specifications of the term closely resemble the classic one (Brady, 1999), but more 
importantly, all four main elements required for political participation are included – citizens, 
actions, influence, and political outcomes. As Brady (1999) concisely formulated, “political 
participation, then, requires action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some 
political outcomes” (p.737, emphasis in original). The general typology of political 
participation proposed by Verba and Nie (1972) survives to this day and consists of four parts: 
1) voting in elections (national, local); 2) campaign activity (including attending a political 
64 
 
rally, working in a campaign on behalf of a candidate, contributing money, etc.); 3) citizen 
contacts (e.g., contacting government officials, signing petitions); and 4) cooperative 
participation (for instance, joining a political group or organization). This study employs 
indicators of political participation within the given framework: voting in elections of 
different levels; attending political rallies; contacting officials or politicians; campaigning for 
candidates or political parties; membership of a political organization; and participating in 
political protests. Such elements as ‘contributing money’ have been excluded as not all 
countries included in the study warrant such activity by law.  
Numerous studies found a strong relationship between education and political 
competence and its many aliases (e.g., Verba & Nie, 1972; Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1990; Price 
& Zaller, 1993; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Cassel & Lo, 1997; Gastil & Dillard, 1999; 
Grönlund & Milner, 2006). In particular, Eveland and Scheufele (2000) noted: 
 
Those who attained a higher level of formal education have had more 
training and practice in learning and integrating information, not to 
mention more experience taking tests. They are likely to have better 
reading ability and be better at selecting and storing key points of 
information from a given news story. They are also more likely to engage 
in elaborative processing of mediated information, which is a key 
determinant of learning identified by psychologists and educational 
researchers. (p.217)  
 
Notwithstanding that some researchers argue that “education’s” effects are often 
confounded with those of intelligence, occupation, and interest (e.g., Luskin, 1990), others 
insist that education still matters. Whatever the case, I concede that education should be a 
significant determinant of political competence when a researcher compares an educated vs. 
an uneducated population, specifically when it comes to representative samples. But when 
convenience samples are used, especially those consisting of college/university students, the 
education variable is of little use – the difference between, say, sophomores and juniors in 
levels of political competence will hardly be great enough to draw an inference about the 
significance of one additional year of education.  
Furthermore, for the same reason, if the student population is separated from the low-
educated ‘never-been-a-student’ one, we will likely see the same picture if we compare the 
two different populations - that political competence is still not distributed homogenously 
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across the chosen population. To prove this, it is sufficient to include questions measuring 
political knowledge in order of increasing degree of difficulty, as was done in this study. Such 
an approach allows us to distinguish between those who are really interested in politics and 
others who have learnt some basic political ideas at high school or college (which the low-
educated have not done and so they cannot always answer survey questions) but have no 
further interest in political information. Finally, employing a student population in this study 
to reveal the role of political expertise (and media literacy context) in the perception of 
manipulated media information is not a limitation but a distinct advantage. Bearing in mind 
that, students usually possess better cognitive skills, have higher political knowledge, and 
enjoy more advanced information processing abilities compared to the general public, we 
should be fortunate to access this ‘target population’ which is young, intelligent,  
knowledgeable, and flexibly-minded, to test its ability to withstand the influence of 
manipulated media information. Indeed, if they prove to be susceptible, thus not able to reveal  
bias, one-sidedness, and allegations in a media message and, moreover, they accept the 
message’s standpoint(s), what could one theoretically infer, then, about populations that are 
low-educated, less intelligent, ignorant, and close-minded? In other words, if political 
competence as a possible predictor fails when it comes to, the let us call it, advanced part of 
the general public, the odds are that we can discard it as an explanatory variable with regard 
to the entire population, in this way, ‘generalizing’ our results (we may also consequently 
want to try to modify our measurement of the concept, if it makes sense). However, to ensure 
variation, participants for this study were recruited from different departments, assuming 
rightfully that, for example, those studying political science should score higher on political 
competence than those studying, say, music.  
Therefore, higher scores on the five indicators described above will indicate a higher 
level of political competence, meaning the possession of a larger store of “factual and 
associational political knowledge that facilitates the manipulation of political information 
stored in long-term memory and information encountered in the immediate environment” 
(Goren, 2000). In the same vein, it will also mean a higher level of elaborative information 
processing ability, that is, the ability to think critically, to mentally connect distinct and often 
disjointed pieces of information, and determine the relevance of the information presented, in 
this context, in a media message to the overall conclusions to be inferred from it.  
 




Part 4.  Media Literacy: Skills and Context 
 
 2.4.1. Media literacy in democratic societies: its functions and 
 importance  
The importance of media literacy in the modern world of increasingly growing 
information flows and developing media technologies is universally acknowledged. Being 
media literate encourages and empowers to individuals by strengthening their "access, 
analytic ability and communication skills for monitoring one’s community and the world at a 
personal, social, cultural and global level" (Babad, Peer & Hobbs, 2009, p.3). Aufderhide 
(1993) claimed that “the fundamental objective of media literacy is critical autonomy in 
relationship to all media” (p. 9). Media literate persons can appreciate that the media are 
constructed and construct reality; that they are commercial enterprises; that the media may be 
ideologically and politically biased; that each medium has a unique content, aesthetic, codes, 
and conventions; that information receivers negotiate the meaning of media messages 
according to their own personal experiences. Hobbs (1996) also noted that media literacy 
should promote autonomy. Brown (1998) wrote that media literacy is intended to help media 
information consumers “become active, free participants in the process rather than static, 
passive, and subservient to the images and values communicated in a one-way flow from 
media sources” (p. 47).  
Some scholars have emphasized that the main goal underlying media literacy is not to 
help people becoming better information consumers but better citizens and, in this way, 
topromote social change (e.g., Dyson, 1998; Lewis and Jhally, 1998; Masterman, 1997). 
Thus, Masterman (1997) related the level of the development of participatory democracy with 
the level of control citizens have over state institutions and level of their cooperation with 
media. Mihailidis and Thenvenin also emphasized the need for citizens to "act as critical 
thinkers" in the sense of their ability "to critically access and analyze a constant and diverse 
stream of information on which to base their democratic participation" (p. 4). In particular, the 
authors noted, media literate citizens will be not only able to analyze mediated representations 
of their communities and address issues within them, but also be involved in "deconstructing 
injustices, expressing their own voices, and struggling to create a better society" (Kellner & 
Share, 2007, pp. 19-20).   
 In turn, the European Commission’s approach to media literacy lies in the fact that it is 
an important factor for active citizenship in the modern information society. Specifically, in 
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2007, the EC specified the aim of media literacy as follows: 
 
The aim of media literacy is to increase awareness of the many forms of 
media messages encountered in our everyday lives. It should help citizens 
recognize how the media filter their perceptions and beliefs, shape popular 
culture and influence personal choices. It should empower them with critical 
thinking and creative problem-solving skills to make them judicious 
consumers and producers of information. Media education is part of the 
basic entitlement of every citizen, in every country in the world, to freedom 
of expression and the right to information and it is instrumental in building 
and sustaining democracy. (Cited in the “Study on assessment criteria for 
media literacy levels”, 2009, p. 23) 
 
On the other hand, the 'protectionist' view of media literacy sticks to the idea that 
individuals must be able, first of all, understand and resist various media effects. Thus,  
speculating about media education, Masterman (1985) pointed out that one of its purposes lies 
in helping people understand the ways in which the media distort reality through their 
messages and, subsequently, how our knowledge of the world is shaped by the media 
representations. Later, Ashley et al (2010) succinctly and aptly emphasized the gist of this 
point:       
 
As Marshal McLuhan famously pointed out, humans live in constructed 
media environments as unconsciously as fish in water. Therefore, it can be 
difficult to see that media constructions of reality sometimes offer 
incomplete or inaccurate portrayals of the world we live in. The growing 
field of media literacy aims to make media consumers aware of their media 
environments and increase critical thinking about media’s constructions of 
reality. (Ashley et al, 2010, p. 37) 
 
Kellner and Share (2007) noted that all messages are influenced by the subjectivity and 
biases of their creators and the various contexts in which the messages are communicated. For 
this reason, media literacy, or, as they call it, critical media literacy, questions the 'objective' 
nature of such messages. According to Hobbs and Frost (2003), the focus of media literacy is 
on representations of reality as reflected in various media messages, which are often 
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inaccurate or incomplete. In turn, Buckingham (2003), arguing also that media do not present 
but re-present reality in a specific and biased, non-objective way, also called on the 
consumers of media messages to critically examine them from the following points of view: 
 
Realism:      Is the text intended to be realistic? Why do some texts seem 
   more realistic than others?  
Telling the truth:   How do media claim to tell the truth about the world?  
Presence and absence:  What is included and excluded from the media messages? Who 
   speaks, and who is silenced? 
Bias and objectivity:  Do media texts support particular views about the world? Do 
   they put across moral or political values? 
Stereotyping:   How media represent particular social groups? Are those  
   representations accurate? 
Interpretations:  Why do audiences accept some media representations as true, or 
   reject others as false? 
Influences:   Do media representations affect our views of particular social 
   groups or issues? 
(Buckingham, 2003, p.58) 
 
In effect, the importance of developing and cultivating such a component of media 
literacy as critical thinking (also known as critical evaluating, critical understanding, critical 
analyzing etc.) has been emphasized by many scholars in the field (e.g., Aufderhide, 1993; 
Denski, 1994; Sholle, 1994; Hobbs, 1996; Silverblatt & Eliceiri, 1997; Lewis & Jhally, 1998; 
Alvermann & Hagood, 2000; Hobbs & Frost, 2003; Buckingham 2003, 2006; Kellner & 
Share, 2007, 2010; Silverblatt, 2008; Ashley et al., 2010; Mihailidis & Thevenin, 2013). In 
particular, Hobbs (1996) mentioned the following component necessary for being media 
literate: “the process of critically analyzing and learning to create one’s own messages in 
print, audio, video, and multimedia” (p. 16). Silverblatt and Eliceiri (1997) stated that media 
literacy implies “a critical-thinking skill that enables audiences to decipher the information 
that they receive through the channels of mass communications and empowers them to 
develop independent judgments about media content” (p.48). Rafferty (1999) viewed the role 
of media literacy as making people critical consumers of ideas and information, which means 
they should be able to interpret media messages by creating personal meanings from codes 
and conventions as well as thinking critically about them. In 2008, Silverblatt pointed out 
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that: “Media literacy is, first and foremost, a critical thinking skill that is applied to the source 
of most of the information we receive: the channels of mass communications” (p.4). 
Discussing the goal of media literacy, Ashley et al (2010) noted that it is not about simply 
generating distrust, cynicism or apathy: “The goal is to teach critical thinking skills that will 
help citizens evaluate media content and make judgments based on a more complete 
understanding of how the news is produced. A media literate citizenry is better equipped to 
demand and appreciate quality journalism that truly adheres to the norms to which it aspires” 
(p. 43). Hobbs and Frost (2003) indicated that skills of critical thinking should always be 
applied to print and non-print texts. Under the aforementioned skills, Hobbs and Frost (2003) 
suggested (1) identifying message design and construction techniques; (2) recognizing how 
authors express specific values and points of view; (3) comparing and contrasting messages 
with similar content; (4) noticing when information is omitted from a message; and (5) 
identifying an author's purpose and target audience.  
Thus, critical thinking is one of the central ideas and crucial skills of media literacy, 
along with analysis and evaluation, and conscious processing (Craft et al., 2013). Earlier, 
Potter (2004, 2011) listed the most relevant skills for media literacy as skills of analysis, 
evaluation, grouping, induction, deduction, synthesis, and abstraction. Table 5 briefly 
specifies what task each of the seven skills serves for. 
 
Table 5. The most important skills of media literacy* 
Skill Task 
Analysis Breaking down a message into meaningful elements 
Evaluation Judging the value of an element; the judgment is made by comparing the 
element to some criterion 
Grouping Determining which elements are alike in some way; determining which 
elements are different in some way 
Induction Inferring a pattern across a small set of elements, then generalizing the pattern 
to all elements in the set 
Deduction Using general principles to explain particulars 
Synthesis Assembling elements into a new structure 
Abstracting Creating a brief, clear, and accurate description capturing the essence of a 
message in a smaller number of words than the message itself 





Therefore, by means of these skills, people build and develop their knowledge 
structures, consequently increasing their media literacy, specifically as it pertains to critical 
thinking around the news messages. Potter (2011) emphasized in this regard: 
 
Skill development is what really can make a large difference in a person 
moving from low to high media literacy. People who have weak skills will 
not be able to do much with the information they encounter. They will 
ignore good information and fixate on inaccurate or bad information. They 
will organize information poorly, thus creating weak and faulty knowledge 
structures. In the worst case, people with weak skills will try to avoid 
thinking about information altogether and become passive; the active 
information providers – such as advertisers and entertainers – will become 
the constructors of people’s knowledge structures and will take control over 
of how people see the world. (p. 42)   
 
And whilst the importance of the aforementioned skills holds for diverse forms and 
types of media information, it is specifically true when it comes to news messages. News 
media literacy has even become a special line of research in the broader field of media 
literacy (Mihailidis, 2001, 2012). As Craft et al. (2013) put it:  
 
What sets news apart from media generally and makes it worthy of a 
separate investigation - and an even higher level of scrutiny - is the unique 
role of news in democracy. News, unlike other media content, is expected to 
do the job of informing self-governing citizens (Christians et al., 2009), a 
role that faces mounting challenges as traditional news outlets shrink and 
disappear, and emerging digital products demonstrate both the promise and 
the perils of information online. (p. 4)   
 
For this reason, to be able to make informed decisions on the basis of various political, 
economic, and social news and to fully participate in democratic society, citizens should 
understand what influences news reliability and credibility and be able to distinguish reliable 
and credible information from questionable and uncertain information (Craft et al., 2013). In 
turn, the successful development of this ability, which is crucial for every democratic society's 
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citizenry, should indispensably be related to and depend on the media literacy context existent 
in that society or country.   
           
2.4.2. Description of the concept of media literacy context as is used in the thesis. 
Previous studies in which the concept was established and confirmed 
Media literacy context as is used in this research was based on the results of two studies: 
the 'Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels in the Member States of the 
European Union' (2009) and the 'Study on Testing and Refining Criteria to Assess Media 
Literacy Levels in Europe' (2011). The purpose of the first study was set to provide an 
understanding of what implies to have a media literate citizens, and to identify what level of 
media literacy each of the Member states possesses. The second study was intended to test 
and refine the criteria needed for assessment media literacy levels in EU-27. 
 
2.4.2.1. The Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels in the Member 
States of the European Union 
The study was conducted from October 2008 to July 2009 by the Consortium of 
research institutions in cooperation with many national and international organizations, 
including the European Newspaper Publishers’ Association, a good many of the European 
Media Desks, and numerous experts all over Europe.  
After the analysis of the collected data, which was conducted so to make comparison 
possible and escape influence of national variations, two main dimensions have been 
identified within media literacy: Individual Competencies and Environmental Factors. 
Individual Competencies might be defined as “a personal, individual ability to exercise certain 
skills (access, use, analyse, understand and create). These skills are found within a broader set 
of abilities that allow for increasing levels of awareness, the capacity for critical analysis, a 
creative, problem-solving capacity and the ability to create and communicate content inter 
alia participating to public life” (the Study, 2009, Annex B, p. 4). Environmental Factors 
might be defined as “a set of contextual factors (affecting Individual Competencies) that 
impact the broad span of media literacy, including informational availability, media policy, 
education and the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the media community” (the 






Table 6. Media literacy dimensions and their criteria*   






- Technical skills; required for the effective use of media tools 
 Critical Understanding 
- Cognitive skills; capacities related to knowledge and semiotic operations: 
encoding/decoding, interpreting, evaluating media text 
 Communicative abilities 
- Communicative and participative skills; capacities to interact with others 






Supply of media 
MEDIA LITERACY CONTEXT 
 Media Education as a process to develop media literacy capacities 
 Media literacy policies and regulatory authorities 
 Media industry role and activity in relation to media literacy 
 Civil society role and activity in relation to media literacy 
*Adapted from the Study (2009) 
 
Importantly, the Study (2009) stated that “Environmental Factors contextualize the 
facilitation of media literacy development, and therefore include those factors that engender or 
endanger individual skills” (p. 45). Describing the overall role of Environmental Factors, the 
Study (2009) posited: 
 
“If the factors are favorable, and media literacy has an important and 
considered position in national policy, it follows that media literacy levels 
will be high. This relationship can be demonstrated statistically, and does 
not exclude the possibility the possibility that, in environments largely 
hostile or neutral to the development of media literacy, or without the 
economic capacity to foster access, exceptional cases of individual 
development may be isolated. However, these are likely to be an exception, 
and not the form” (p. 48). 
   
Significantly, the Study (2009) referred to the Critical Understanding component as “the 
most important aspect of the relationship between the individual and the media” (p. 38) and 
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emphasized its development (along with citizen participation) as “the ultimate focus (and 
ambition) of media literacy” (p. 9) . As it was put in the Study (2009): 
 
“The user’s ability to process information in fundamental to understanding 
media messages and texts, without which they cannot find meaning in it. 
Critical Understanding competence allows the user to capture, assimilate 
and produce information. It includes also the use of information to obtain an 
appropriate understanding of the environment and to use the information 
solve problems, to create and produce meaning, etc.” (p. 38)  
 
In addition, within Critical Understanding competence, the Study (2009) made an 
emphasis on the individuals’ ability to distinguish between information and opinion which "is 
fundamental to allow further understanding of the elements, and also to formulate an 
appropriate response to it” (p. 38). Furthermore, the ability to evaluate the media content was 
regarded as “key part of media literacy” (Annex B, p. 9), inasmuch as even “as a simple 
consumer of goods and services, the citizen has to be capable of, amongst others, evaluating 
the value of the messages and, consequently, making informed choices, being able to evaluate 
the offers, to orientate him/herself within all the options and to distinguish among the various 
forms of persuasive discourse (advertising, publicity, commercial promoting, including 
communication strategies in all spheres: political, economical… etc)” (the Study, 2009, 
Annex B, p. 10). In other words, the media consumer has to be able to evaluate a media 
message from such positions as whether it can be trusted; or whether the content is legal; or 
whether it is outdated or up to date; or whether it is the quality reporting in terms of sources, 
details, balance, etc.    
However, the Study (2009) pointed, it is quite ironical that in the countries with the 
wealth of the media available the citizens cannot always make the informed use of them. 
Furthermore, the high necessity for having Critical Understanding competencies, and 
specifically with regard to understanding and evaluating media content, got a global pan-
European tone: 
 
“…while Europe’s populace may be said to exist within a media (rather than 
an information) society, the power of the media has been largely 
underestimated in the past and it constitutes an increasing concern for many 
national and international institutions. As such, it is clear that the principles 
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of democracy that informed the creation of the European Union are under 
threat – not from violent attack, but from apathy and passive disengagement. 
This worrying development can be explained in part by the inability of 
media users (or, in the alternative, “everybody”) to utilize the information 
flow to their (and their society’s) benefit. Media literacy can counter-
balance these dangerous effects through inclusiveness – but it is well to 
remember that “civil” society is often inaudible contextually, and Europe’s 
citizens need to be better equipped to understand the media flow and to 
reveal why a message has been deliberately transmitted in a false or 
misleading way. The media is the primary (if not the only) vehicle for the 
diffusion of political and economic self-interest, and the more media 
literate a society becomes, the less likely it is that individuals and 
groups will subscribe to (or be seduced by) the specious and the 
fallacious” (the Study, 2009, p. 9; emphasis is mine). 
 
Thus, after the specific weighting had been applied to each component of media literacy 
dimensions, all the data analyzed were divided into three levels, taking for a check-point the 
EU average (score of 100). Such an approach made it possible to compare between the levels 
of media literacy of the Member States of the European Union. The mentioned three levels of 
media literacy competences, including both Environmental Factors and Individual 





















INDIVIDUAL COMPETENCIES ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
 
Basic 
The individual has a set of abilities that allow a 
basic use of media. The user knows its function, 
deciphers its basic codes and uses it for specific 
ends. The user’s capacity to critically analyze the 
information received is limited. Her/his 
communicative capacity through media is also 
limited.   
The environment does not provide 




The individual has a medium level of media use, 
knowing in depth its function and is able to carry 
out complex operations. The user knows how to 
obtain and evaluate the information required, 
(s)he evaluates the information search strategies. 
The user is an active producer and participates 
socially. 
The environment provides some 




The individual is an expert in media use, being 
aware of and interested in the legal conditions that 
affect its use. The user has an in-depth knowledge 
of the techniques and languages and can analyze 
and convert the conditions affecting her/his 
communicative relations and the production and 
communication of messages. In the public sphere, 
the user is capable of activating cooperation 
groups that allow  her/him to solve problems.  
The environment provides systematic 
stimuli. Actions are coordinated to 
develop a media literate population.  
*Adapted from the Study (2009). 
 
 
Accordingly, resting upon the measured and deduced indicators, the following 
assessment of media literacy levels of the Member States of the European Union has been 










Figure 2. Media literacy assessment in Europe 
 
Above 130 – Advanced 
70-130 – Medium 
Below 70 – Basic 
 
*Adapted from the Study (2009).  
 
This assessment comprises both Environmental Factors and Individual Competences. 
As we can see, the average European value was set at 100, however, many countries are found 
in the range of 60 to 80. Thus, the advanced levels of media literacy are found in Finland, 
Denmark, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and 
Slovakia conform to the basic level of media literacy. All the other countries lie within the 
range of 70 to 130 that corresponds to the medium level of media literacy.  
However, in terms of the European average (100), we might distinguish between four 
types – or groups – of countries: (1) those that scored somewhat below the average (Estonia, 
Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Malta, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Latvia and Poland), (2) those that scored somewhat above it (Sweden, France, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Ireland, Belgium), (3) those that scored essentially above the average (also 
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conforming to the countries of the advances levels – the Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Finland), 
and, finally, (4) those that scored by far below the value of 100 (also conforming to the 
countries of the basic levels of media literacy – Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, 
Romania). On the basis of this subdivision, I chose for my research three countries from three 
different groups described above: Italy (which belongs to the group scored somewhat below 
the European average), Austria (which is scored somewhat above the average), and the 
Netherlands (which is resided in the “advanced” group of countries). The Member States of 
the fourth group were left out of consideration due to a significant problem related to 
translation of my study questionnaire and treatment news messages into those countries’ 
languages.  
In addition to the assessment of overall media literacy levels by countries, each of its 
dimensions, as well as their components also have been evaluated with a particular value 
allowing additional comparisons between countries by distinct building blocks of media 
literacy. For clarity, Table 8 provides data specifically on the three countries picked over for 
my research. 
 
Table 8. The Netherlands, Austria, and Italy assessment by media literacy dimensions 
and their components*         
 
Country 























EU-27 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 
Netherlands 141,51 138,51 0 141,51 102,73 135,11 121,19 136,69 
Austria 124,12 111,4 0 124,12 95,11 91,63 91,4 110,17 
Italy 68,4 57,36 0 68,4 90,15 92,35 93,13 79,03 
Above 130 – Advanced level 
70-130 – Medium level 
Below 70 – Basic level 
   *Adapted from the Study (2009). 
 
The figures listed in Table 8 will further be used for comparison purposes along with data on 






2.4.2.2 . The Study on Testing and Refining Criteria to Assess Media Literacy Levels in 
Europe 
After the report on the "Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels" 
(2009) was published, a follow-up research was conducted on behalf of the European 
Commission and under the authority of the European Association for Viewers Interests 
(EAVI) and the Danish Technological Institute titled "The Study on Testing and Refining 
Criteria to Assess Media Literacy Levels in Europe" and made public in 2011. Regarding its 
importance to this thesis, the new Study not only sustained importance of media literacy in 
democratization qualifying it as a "strategic value" for the EU and proved many previous 
findings, but also reconfirmed the overall media literacy ranking of the three countries 
included in the thesis research: the Netherlands fell into the category of the most 'advanced' 
countries, Italy was classified as one of the least advanced ones, and Austria was between the 
two. Moreover, the ranking of the mentioned countries according to critical understanding 
component, measured in the new Study, corresponded to the countries rank order distribution 
in overall media literacy ranking, with the Netherlands at the top, Italy at the bottom, and 
Austria in between.     
 
In this way, the three countries' overall media literacy ranks were taken for measures of 
advancement of media literacy context in this research. In other words, the most advanced, or 
favorable, media literacy context was assigned to the Netherlands, and the least one - to Italy. 
Hence, it was expected that more favorable media literacy context should also have a general 
positive effect on individual ability to critically assess media information, in particular, as to 

















Part 5.  Exploratory Questions and Hypotheses  
 
This thesis seeks to answer two principal research questions: what effects, if any, 
individual political competence and media literacy context have on (1) spotting manipulation 
in Internet news reports on novel issues in foreign affairs as well as (2) accepting at face value 
standpoints the manipulated news reports introduce.  
Thus, taking into account the considerations and past studies results discussed in 
previous parts of this chapter, four hypotheses are developed for this study.   
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) states:  The higher the political competence level individuals have, 
the more likely they spot manipulated information in the Internet news reports on a novel 
international affairs topic.  
Extending the line of political competence effects, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states: The higher 
the political competence level individuals have, the less likely the standpoint of the 
manipulated news report will be accepted.  
Both H1 and H2 were developed on the following premises: 
 
- the developed political schemas heavily contribute to political learning, more careful 
consideration of persuasive messages and inferring more accurate conclusions from 
political communications (Hsu & Price, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997; Rhee & Cappella, 
1997); 
 
- more politically sophisticated citizens are more resistant to persuasive messages 
because they have already known the arguments used and, being more knowledgeable, 
are capable more readily to deconstruct and reject them, especially if the arguments 
prove to be counterattitudinal (Nelson et sl., 1997); 
 
- political experts, are more capable to identify important parts of information, encode it 
in more abstract ways, and employ deeper analytic techniques for its processing 
(Kinder, 1990), and political competence is a “significant predictor of the extent of 





- “the dependence on intelligence should be greater for political than for many other 
sorts of knowledge, because politics is more abstract and remote – simply “harder 
material” – than, say, sports or cooking” (Luskin, 1990, p.336). 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states: The more advanced media literacy context a particular 
country has, the more likely participants from that country will spot manipulated information 
in the Internet news reports on a novel international affairs topic. The premises H3 was 
grounded on were the following: 
 
- “it is expected that the more favourable the context will be to media literacy, the 
highest level its population show” (the Study on Assessment Criteria for Media 
Literacy Levels in the Member States of the European Union, Final Report, 2009, p. 
72); 
 
- “the relationship between an individual’s skills and Environmental Factors is two-way 
– a more favorable environmental context enhances individual media literacy levels, 
and the existence of media literate citizens compels the development of coordinated 
policies and actions” (the Study on Assessment Criteria for Media Literacy Levels in 
the Member States of the European Union, Final Report, 2009, p. 78). 
 
Finally, utilizing the logical reasoning that spotting manipulation in news reports and 
rejecting, thus, the manipulated standpoints promoted in those news reports, Hypothesis 4 
(H4) states: Those who are able to spot manipulated media information will not accept the 
standpoint promoted in the information.   
  
In addition to the hypotheses, I formulate four additional, exploratory questions.  
Given that informed media mistrust is expected to be related to the critical thinking 
skills, that, in turn, are assumed to be related in a way to certain levels of political competence 
as well as media literacy context, Exploratory Question 1 (EQ1) asks: Is there a relationship 
between a country media literacy context and informed media mistrust? By the same token, 
Exploratory Question 2 (EQ2) asks: Is there a relationship between political competence 





Further, taken into account that the news reports, used in the study as the stimuli, were 
supposedly taken from different types of the Internet news sources - either 'traditional' or 
'alternative' - that might ultimately influence their perception as to credibility and 
persuasiveness by the study participants, Exploratory Question 3 (EQ3) asks: Is there a 
difference between perception of 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the manipulated 
news report regarding spotting manipulation and accepting the standpoint of the news 
report?   
 
Finally, bearing in mind that the target group of participants in the study were those 
aged 18-26, often referred to as 'heavy Internet users', the question arises whether the 
frequency of online news sources use makes them blear-eyed or clear-eyed regarding 
manipulation in the news. So Exploratory Question 4 (EQ4) asks: Is there a relationship 
between online sources use in a typical week for getting news and spotting manipulated media 
information as well as accepting its standpoint? 
 
In the next chapter I will set out the research design and methodology through which I 
will test the hypotheses and try to answer the questions raised - both my main research 
questions and my four additional, exploratory questions. I will also provide information about 













CHAPTER III.   RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
To test the just mentioned research questions and hypotheses, I employed an 
experimental design as the most appropriate in this case. Its appropriateness was dictated by 
the necessity of testing cause-effect hypotheses/assumptions, employing participants' random 
assignment to stimuli (in other words, to different treatment conditions), controlling for 
participants working individually as well as measurement specifics of the study variables. All 
of those factors along with some others are explained in more detail below in subsections 4.1 
and 4.2.    
 
3.1. The study variables   
In experimental research, there are usually no unanimous terms referring to variables 
that hypothetically have effect and those that are supposed to be affected. The first ones are 
usually named as independent, predictor, treatment, explanatory etc. variables, while the 
second are named as dependent, criterion, outcome, response, etc. variables. If there are other 
variables that are manipulated in an experiment, they are named as, again, independent, 
manipulated variables or simply stimulus (stimuli) (see, for instance, Kittel et al, 2012; 
Druckman et al., 2011; Morton & Williams, 2010; Campbell & Stanley, 1973). 
To avoid unnecessary and ineffective discussions as to whether, if named independent, a 
variable should definitely be manipulated to assess its effect on a dependent variable or, if 
named predictor, a variable should definitely predict something (not just be correlated with a 
response variable), in this study I refer to the variables expected having certain influence as 
explanatory, and to the variables influenced by the first as outcome ones. News reports used 
in the study with the purpose of uncovering relationships between explanatory and outcome 
variables are referred to here as stimuli. Only stimuli can be manipulated in the study, that is, 
fulfill the role of a manipulated variable, as having distinguishing slant (one-sided vs. 
balanced) and the type of the Internet news source they were allegedly taken from 
('traditional' which is popular in a given country vs. 'alternative' which is popular in a given 
country).  
The first outcome variable is spotting/non-spotting that information in the news report is 
one-sided, contains allegations and, overall, cannot be trusted. The second outcome variable 
refers to accepting/non-accepting the resulting standpoint(s) the manipulated news message 
(that one-sided and allegations dominated) promotes. Two explanatory variables supposedly 
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having influence onto both outcomes are political competence and media literacy context. 
They cannot be manipulated in this study and, for this reason, are referred to as quasi-
experimental variables.   
The first quasi-experimental explanatory variable is individual political competence. As 
was previously hypothesized, personal ability to critically evaluate [manipulated] media 
information and make relevant conclusions of it should also be a function of developed 
political competence due to the need of often evaluating various items of political 
information, sort through controversies, and revealing political allegations. The concept 
comprises five dimensions - political interest, media use, factual political knowledge, political 
discussion, and political participation – all of which were integrated into one scale. Political 
competence has been measured as a part of post-hoc analysis. The higher score a person had 
on the scale, the higher level of political competence was assumed. All questions measured 
political competence were identical except for the questions measured factual political 
knowledge about domestic political issues of a particular country. Therefore, to ensure 
comparability between the three countries included in the study on factual political knowledge 
dimension, questions used in the European Election Study 2009 for measuring factual 
political knowledge were employed for the reasons they were long term (not tied for time), 
showed different degree of difficulty, standardized across countries, finally, time-proven. 
The second quasi-experimental explanatory variable – media literacy context – resulted 
from the Member States media literacy ranking. According to this, the three countries selected 
for the study - differ in their ranks: the Netherlands possesses the advanced level of media 
literacy, Austria has a medium-high level and is ranked above European average, and Italy 
with its medium-low level is ranked below European average (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9. Overall media literacy ranks as media literacy context for Austria, Italy 
and the Netherlands* 
 
Above 130 – Advanced level 
70-130 – Medium level 
Below 70 – Basic level 
 
 












Thus, the media literacy context variable was stable or constant for each of the 
countries, and the political competence variable could vary. In effect, with these two variables 
six possible configuration outcomes were anticipated: (1) both political competence and 
media literacy context are not associated with the outcome variable(s); (2) political 
competence is and media literacy context is not associated with the outcome variable(s); (3) 
political competence is not and media literacy context is associated with the outcome 
variable(s); and (4) both political competence and media literacy context are associated with 
the outcome variable(s) (Table 10). In actual fact, only the latter configuration would pose 
difficulties with the clear separation of influence onto the outcome variables between the 
political competence component and the media literacy context.  
 
Table 10. Possible association relationships between explanatory and outcome variables 
Explanatory 
variables 
Possible configurations with regard to outcome variables* 
Political competence - + - + 
Media literacy - - + + 
Explanation Both not associated Only PC associated Only ML associated Both associated 
* PC - political competence, ML - media literacy 
 
3.2. Research Design 
The study has been conducted in the form of a series of survey-based laboratory 
experiments/quasi-experiments that employed between-subjects posttest-only design. In short 
(details are provided below in the subsequent sections of this chapter), first, the study 
participants answered questions measuring their media habits, media trust, and political 
competence. Then they read stimuli - news reports. Finally, they answered questions 
measuring their evaluation of the news reports and demographics. Moreover, one of the 
questions measuring political competence measured the study participants' attitudes toward 
the two countries mentioned in the news reports. This question was not intended to contribute 
to measuring political competence but served for control purposes, as the participants' 
attitudes toward those countries may have affected the upcoming participants' evaluation of 
the news reports.  





 1. Testing cause-effect hypotheses/assumptions . 
 According to Roth’s (1995) identification of tasks that are attempted to be solved by 
means of experiments, there are three different yet often intertwined purposes experiments are 
usually employed for: 
1) Searching for facts, which is mostly used as an additional method for observational 
research for getting some complementary data that enables light to be shed on the 
conflicting results of different observations. With this purpose, there ordinarily is no 
need for exercising random assignment.   
2) Speaking to theorists refers to testing assumptions, hypotheses, theories and further 
contributing to the theory (in the global sense of the word).  
3) Whispering in the ears of princes – this poetic title means only that experimenters 
cooperate with policy-makers in virtue of simulating in their experiments certain 
natural settings for testing something which is useful for specific policy purposes. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned three purposes of carrying out experiments are not 
mutually-exclusive, and one and the same experiment might well comprise two or even all of 
them. Thus, my study combines both the first and second purposes, as it is based on certain 
research data which should be further specified (as to relationships between an individual's 
critical media information assessment and countries' media literacy contexts), as well as on 
some theoretical premises (as to relationships between individual's political competence and 
his/her critical media information assessment ability). 
 
2. Employing random assignment 
In the recently published Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science 
Druckman et al (2011) referred to an experiment as “a deliberate test of a causal proposition, 
typically with random assignment to conditions” designed by investigators “to evaluate the 
causal impacts of potentially informative explanatory variables” (p. 2). Having in the study 
two types of news reports (subdivided further into two more subtypes) that served as stimuli, 
it was necessary to randomly assign participants to read  one of the four. In this way, this 
would allow for individual levels of political competence, the second explanatory variable, as 
well as other variables that were also randomized, as anyone of the participants could be 





3. Controlling for participants working individually  
Given that the second explanatory variable in the study, individual political competence, 
was to be measured during experimental sessions, and stimuli were to be evaluated also on an 
individual basis, it was necessary to carry out the study in controlled settings so as to ensure 
that participants answered questions individually, without seeking help from each other. For 
this reason, all the experimental sessions in all three countries were conducted in classroom 
settings that substituted for laboratory ones. This allowed for controlling that participants 
worked individually.    
 
4. Impossibility of manipulating explanatory variables and employment of random 
sampling 
Usually, when an experiment consists of the manipulation of a treatment variable 
(independent variable or X), followed by observation of a response variable (dependent 
variable or Y), it is referred to as a true experiment. In other words, in such research 
individuals are randomly assigned to different conditions or levels of an 
independent/treatment variable (combination of variables) to see what effect can be measured 
on the dependent/response variable. For the sake of simplicity, when measuring the effects of 
smoking on individuals' health, a researcher would observe how many cigarettes individuals 
smoked during a certain period of time and then measure how their health would be affected 
depending on the number of cigarettes. Participants in a control group would not smoke, of 
course. In this example, the independent/treatment variable would be the number of cigarettes 
smoked, and this variable could be manipulated. Or, to take an another example: influence of 
information on voting decisions. Here, a researcher would present individuals with specific 
information on, say, political candidates as an independent/treatment variable and then the 
individuals decide who they would vote for. Participants in a control group would not receive 
any information. Again, information as a variable could be manipulated and its effects, 
depending on the variants of manipulations, measured. Schematically such type of experiment 









Figure 3. Typical scheme of a true experiment (sometimes fallaciously considered 
as the only correct type for experiments) 
Measurement at baseline   Manipulation   Final measurement (of changes) 
with random assignment 
 
 




Such pretest-posttest experimental design, usually along with employing a random sampling 
procedure, is sometimes, fallaciously, considered as the only 'correct' and 'authoritative' form 
of experiments.  
However, for various reasons, it is far from always feasible or justifiable for a 
researcher to manipulate an independent/treatment/explanatory variable(s), have random 
samples, match treatment and control groups, or have a control group in the study altogether. 
For example, the independent variable might be something that has already existed in the 
population and cannot be manipulated by a researcher (say, gender, age, or countries' media 
literacy ranks that were already measured and already exist). Or, it may be useless to 
manipulate an independent variable as there is no goal to measure how it would change at the 
posttest stage (as is the case with the second explanatory variable, political competence, in 
this study). Also, employing random samples in experiments does not always seem feasible or 
even reasonable. Experimentation is a sequential process, and usually, before coming to some 
'ultimate' results, a researcher goes through various 'intermediate' stages of refining theory, 
changing or adding to explanatory variables and accumulating solid evidence. Thus, when it 
comes particularly to theory testing experimental studies, it would be purely precarious and 
extravagant from the perspective of effort, time and money to use random samples of 
participants at every stage of the theory development, starting from the earliest one.   
Consequently, as the goal of this study is to build and test a theory, not to generalize 
one, there was no preoccupation with external validity or generalizability of a causal 
inference. The focus was on internal validity as a sine qua non in theory-testing experiments. 
In addition, when speaking of external validity, I agree with Druckman and Kam (2011) who 
warned against prioritizing the sample issue for generalizability of experiment results. Instead, 






Dependent variable  
 
 
(condition of health, 




(number of cigarettes 
smoked, type of 
information received)  
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context, time, and conceptual operationalization" (Druckman & Kam, 2011, p.53). From this 
point of view, the preoccupation with external validity in a single experiment, that became a 
"near obsession" at critics of experiments, according to McDermott (2002), often just does not 
make sense.  
As to 'violations' of conditions of a true experiment, even in this case causal 
relationships between independent/treatment/explanatory and dependent/response/outcome 
variables still can be uncovered. Here, the situation is somewhat similar to an observational 
design where two naturally occurred variables are measured and correlated. This is a quasi-
experiment which is also frequently used in various fields of science including the social 
sciences. In a nutshell, while a true experiment usually includes such elements as (1) pre-post 
test design, (2) a treatment group and a control group, and (3) random assignment of 
participants to different conditions, and sometimes (4) random samples of participants, quasi-
experiments usually lack one or more of these design elements.  
In this regard, I share the approach proposed by Morton and Williams (2010) who 
defined experiments more broadly as "an intervention by a researcher into the DGP [data 
generating process] through manipulation of the elements of the DGP" (p. 50). The 
researchers emphasized that experiments as a form of scientific investigation have existed 
long before the introduction of random assignment in 20th century and still allowed for the 
uncovering causal relationships between variables. Thus, if on this basis many studies without 
random assignment would be considered as non-experiments that can bring no valuable 
inferences, many prominent studies that brought scientific breakthroughs, such as, for 
instance, those leading to discovering the smallpox vaccine, should also be classified 
theoretically as 'non-experiments having non-valuable inferences'. However, from the 
practical point of view, the significance of such 'non-experiments' is in point of fact 
invaluable. Morton and Williams (2010) stated bluntly: 
 
The fact that a study does not include randomization or baselines or the 
randomization suffers from problems, in our view, does not make it less of an 
experiment, just as an experiment in which control is minimal is not less than 
an experiment. ...we think it is important not to confound definitions of 
experiments with normative views of desirable properties because what is 
desirable in an experiment depends on the research goal - what the researcher 
seeks to learn - as well as the opportunities before the researcher. What is ideal 
in the experiment also depends on where it is conducted. In field experiments, 
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random assignment can be extremely valuable, although difficult, because 
control is less available; in the laboratory, the opposite relationships holds 
although both control and random assignment can be much easier to 
implement. It would be unreasonable for us to define interventions outside the 
laboratory, where there are disconnects between manipulations, and what 
happens to subjects because of a lack of control or problems with the 
implementation of random assignment as not really experiments, just as we 
think it is unreasonable to define interventions without random assignment and 
baselines as not really experiments. (p. 49-50)        
 
As I stated before, in this study I could not manipulate explanatory variables (countries' 
media literacy ranks and individual political competence) and employ random samples of 
participants. However, I use the element of random assignment of participants to reading 
different stimuli as well as treatment and control groups. Given that during the experimental 
sessions the study participants filled out a pen-and-paper survey and that variables and stimuli 
effects were measured post-hoc, this research is referred to as survey-based posttest only 
experiment/quasi-experiment study. Schematically, this particular experiment looks as 
follows (Figure 4): 
 
Figure 4. Scheme of the present survey-based posttest only experiment/quasi-
experiment study  
No measurement at baseline,          Measurement  
random assignment to different 
types of news reports 
 
 
             
  
 
* MI - manipulated information 
 
Thus posttest only design may be graphically described for two groups in the following 
form: “No Observation – Treatment – Measurement” (for a treatment group) and “No 
Observation – No Treatment – Measurement” (for a control group). In the second case, “no 
treatment” means not only that the control groups does not receive any treatment, but also that 
Explanatory variables 
 
- media literacy (country 
ranks) 
- individual political 
competence 
 
Filling out survey and 
reading balanced or 
manipulated news 
reports 
Outcome variables  
 
- spotting MI* 




it might receive a sort of a neutral treatment which is still regarded as “no treatment”. Here, 
this implied that the control group was assigned to read a balanced news report under one of 
two conditions -- it was allegedly taken from (1) a traditional Internet news source (websites 
of newspapers TV channels, magazines, news agencies, etc.) or from (2) an alternative 
Internet news source (blogs, social networks).  
 
3.3. Stimuli 
Two short simulated news reports - one manipulated and one balanced - were used as 
stimuli in the study. Both news reports were written by the researcher who for 15 years had 
worked as a professional political journalist in his country. The reports were approximately 
the same length (280 words) and initially written in English. 
Both news reports described a protest march which supposedly took place in Moldova 
and the death of a protester (or deaths of protesters in the manipulated version of the report) 
during the protest march. Also, both news reports assigned responsibility for the death(s) to 
the police/president in the manipulated version and the police/president or the protester 
herself/himself (due to heart attack) in the balanced version. At the same time, the 
manipulated version of the news report:   
 lacked the context of the protest march;  
 misled the report readers beginning right from its headline “Peaceful protesters now 
die in Europe: They want free elections and democratic rule”;  
 contained unfounded statements (allegations) such as “At least one demonstrator is 
killed by police” or “the President gave direct orders to the police to use violence”, in 
this way, assigning responsibility for the situation;  
 was completely one-sided in the absence of any opposite viewpoints;  
 integrated framing and reasoning devices including unfounded speculations about the 
horrific consequences of the situation described.  
 
The balanced version of the news report:  
 provided the event context beginning from the headline “Grassroots show of support 
in Moldova Republic against atrocities of Syrian regime results in death of protester”; 
 indicated the possible cause of the death but did not insist on it: “Emergency doctors 
claim death caused by heart attack; in-depth inquiry to be carried out into the case 
nevertheless”;  
 contained the opposition’s viewpoint (from the manipulated version of the report) 
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about the responsibility of the police and the president but also presented opinions of 
the chief of the police and the president regarding the situation described and the 
accusations leveled against them;  
 the language of this report is neutral rather than excessively emotional.  
Thus the two reports are different in their appeal: if the manipulated one was supposed to 
persuade readers, the balanced one was supposed to inform them about the situation resting 
upon the neutral treatment of facts and balanced presentation of opposing viewpoints. 
Both news reports were not formatted to look like actual copies of online news reports 
of particular Internet news sources. It was clear that different news sources had different 
degree of likeability and trustworthiness for different participants, not to mention that the 
reports were allegedly taken either from a 'traditional' or an 'alternative' Internet news source. 
Therefore, it was not only impossible in this situation “to average” such sources to be likeable 
by, at least, the majority of the study participants, but also useless as the purpose of the study 
was not to test the trustworthiness, fairness, balance, etc. of particular Internet news sources in 
a particular country. For this reason, the study stimuli were introduced by the following 
phrases, both in writing on the questionnaires as well as spoken out loud by the researcher 
before the start of each experiment session: “The following news report was taken from one of 
the most popular traditional [or alternative] Internet sources of news in your country. In 
order to avoid identifying the source through any of its characteristics, only the text of the 
news report is reprinted here in a standard computer font”.  
Since both manipulated and balanced news reports were presented in two subtypes each 
- 'taken from a traditional Internet news source' and 'taken from an alternative Internet news 
source', in total, there turned out to be four versions of the news reports. Subsequently, they 
were coded from 1 to 4, where '1' referred to 'balanced version / traditional Internet news 
source', '2' referred to 'balanced version / alternative Internet news source', '3' referred to 
'manipulated version / traditional Internet news source' and '4' referred to 'manipulated version 
/ alternative Internet news source'.  
The initial English language news reports were pretested online using the QuestionPro 
platform among English-language native speakers-PhD researchers of the European 
University Institute. Thirty-five persons were asked to evaluate whether the news reports 
imitated a real modern vital style of Internet news media language. Having obtained the 
feedback, some minor corrections were made to the reports. Both news reports were then 
translated into Italian and German by native speakers of the respective languages – Italian and 
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German language teachers from the Language Center of the European University Institute. 
Furthermore, the translated versions were pretested online using QuestionPro platform among 
Italian- and German-language native speakers-PhD researchers of the European University 
Institute. Twenty-seven German native speakers and twenty-eight Italian native speakers were 
asked to evaluate whether the news reports imitated the real modern vital style of the language 
of Internet news media in their countries. After the feedback had been obtained, some minor 
corrections were made to the Italian-language versions. With regard to the German-language 
versions of the news reports, it was pointed out that some phrases resembled a kind of old-
fashioned language. To resolve the issue, a German-speaking former journalist and public 
relations practitioner, who was working at that time at EUI, was asked to edit the 
aforementioned parts of the news reports. After all the corrections had been done, both news 
reports were pretested again and achieved good estimates with regard to the language used. 
Both versions of the news reports - manipulated and balanced - in all the three 
languages can be found in Appendix B.  
 
3.4. Pretest of the questionnaires along with the study stimuli   
Prior to carrying out the actual study, all the questionnaires in three languages - English, 
Italian and German - were also pretested online. The questionnaire was initially developed in 
English. Then a native English-language speaker, an English language teacher from the 
Language Center of the European University Institute, was asked to proofread the 
questionnaire and make necessary syntactical corrections to it in close coordination with the 
researcher. Furthermore, the questionnaire was pretested for clarity purposes, and again 
corrected afterwards. It was then translated into Italian and German by respective native 
language speakers – teachers of Italian and German from the Language Center of the 
European University Institute. After translation, both the Italian-language version and the 
German-language version were pretested online for clarity and then subsequently corrected to 
take the final form. 
The questions on the questionnaires were presented with the wording and sequence that 
they had in the actual pencil-and-paper questionnaires. The stimuli were also inserted into the 
place where they should have been found - after the set of questions measuring political 
competence. The QuestionPro Survey Software was used for conducting the online pretest. 
The online survey within the software was created, sent, and then analyzed by the researcher. 
Of course, the software did not allow for creating the survey questionnaire to look strictly the 
same as its paper version. However, the purpose of the online pretest was not to test the 
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questionnaire and news reports in settings similar to the real experiment. The purpose was to 
pretest the questionnaire in different languages for clarity and consistency. For this reason, I 
used what is called an 'expert pretest', when experts are informed beforehand about the real 
objectives of the survey (study) and asked to give their opinions on the questions included in 
the survey: wording, clarity, consistency etc. Therefore, the English, Italian and German 
native speakers - PhD researchers of the European University Institute, were asked to answer 
the survey questions and read news reports in their languages and provide evaluations and 
comments about the questionnaire afterwards. The invitation that was sent to the 'experts' 
included the following specification: “What I would ask you is to answer the survey questions 
along with reading a news message included as if you were taking a real survey, that is, 
without any intentional nit-picking. But if, while completing the survey, you unequivocally see 
with your fresh eye that, for instance, some questions look unclear or are formulated 
ambiguously, or answer options are too restricted, or something else, please send me your 
comments / notes (along with the survey, of course) either in a specific field in the very end of 
the survey or as a reply to [e-mail address]”. Of course, only two versions of the news 
reports were included in the online survey – the manipulated and the balanced. No further 
subdivision into traditional or alternative Internet news sources was made. The English-
language “balanced” version of the survey was completed by 21 participants; the English-
language “manipulated” version of the survey was completed by 14 participants; the Italian-
language “balanced” version of the survey was completed by 17 participants; the Italian-
language “manipulated” version of the survey was completed by 11 participants; the German-
language “balanced” version of the survey was completed by 15 participants; the German-
language “manipulated” version of the survey was completed by 12 participants. As a result 
of the online pretest, some corrections in the wording of the questions and language structure 
were made.     
The lack of the necessary resources did not allow for the carrying out of the 
questionnaire pretests in three languages with audiences similar to the intended participants of 
the real study and in settings resembling the supposed ones. None of those who participated in 
the online pretest of the questionnaires took part in the actual study.   
 
3.5. Participants 
The study participants were, with few exceptions, undergraduate students from one 
large Austrian university, one large Italian university, and one large Dutch university. In total, 
1019 persons from the three countries participated in the study. Of those, there were 288 
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Austrian participants, 408 Italian participants, and 323 Dutch participants. Only those who 
indicated citizenship of the countries where the study was carried out were regarded as 
eligible for the study. Thus, participants who had a different citizenship or did not indicate 
their citizenship at all were excluded from further analysis.  
     As a result, after cleaning the datasets on the citizenship dimension and excluding 
those whose questionnaires eventually appeared to be blank or not filled out in the sections 
measuring political competence and the outcome variables, the total number of the study 
participants shrank to 914 persons: specifically, 246 participants from Austria, 394 
participants from Italy and 274 participants from the Netherlands.   
Given that the primary age category in the study was 18-26 year olds, that is, those who 
were referred to as the 'heaviest' Internet users, for the purpose of statistical analysis, the 
Austrian and Italian samples were subdivided into several age categories: the Austrian sample 
into two age categories (18-26 year olds and 27 < year olds), and the Italian sample into three 
age categories (18-26 year olds, 27-35 year olds, and 36≤ year olds). The Dutch sample 
comprised participants of the targeted age category only (18-26 year olds). Statistical tests 
were then made (1) for the combined Austrian-Italian-Dutch sample of those aged 18-26 
years, and (2) for each of the three relatively sizable age categories of the Italian sample - the 
largest of the three countries involved. For the Italian sample, this made it possible to make 
comparative implications as to various relationships between age and other variables, 
including one of the explanatory variables, political competence, and both the outcome 
variables. The frequency distributions and measures of central tendency and deviation for the 















Table 11. Frequency distributions and measures of central tendency and deviation for 







Austria Italy Netherlands 
18-26  N = 225 
M = 21.3 
SD = 1.7 
Range = 8 
N = 237 
M = 22 
SD = 2 
Range = 7 
N = 274 
M = 19.8 
SD = 1,7 
Range = 7 
N = 736 (80,6%) 
M = 21 
SD = 2 
Range = 8 
27-35 N = 15 
M = 30 
SD = 2.4 
Range = 7 
N = 85 
M = 30.1 
SD = 2.7 
Range = 8 
 
-- 
N = 100 (11%) 
M = 30.2 
SD = 2.6 
Range = 8 
36 ≤ N = 5 
M = 38 
SD = 2.1 
Range = 5 
N = 72 
M = 43.4 
SD = 5,5 
Range = 23 
 
-- 
N = 77 (8,4%) 
M = 43.1 
SD = 5.5 
Range = 23 
TOTAL N = 246** 
M = 22.2 
SD = 3.6 
Range = 23 
N = 394 
M = 28 
SD = 8.7 
Range = 40 
N = 274 
M = 19.8 
SD = 1.7 
Range = 7 
N = 914 (100%)** 
M = 23.8 
SD = 7 
Range = 41 
  **913 participants marked their age; 1 participant from Austria did not indicate her/his age 
 
 





Italian-Dutch sample Austria Italy Netherlands 
18-26  
 
N = 225 
F = 151 (67,1%) 
M = 74 (32,9%) 
N = 237 
F = 156 (65,8%) 
M = 81 (34,2%) 
N = 274 
F = 136 (49,6%) 
M = 138 (50,4%) 
N = 736 
F = 443 (60,2%) 
M = 293 (39,8%) 
27-35 N = 15 
F = 4 (26,7%) 
M = 11 (73,3%) 
N = 85 
F = 59 (69,4%) 
M = 26 (30,6%) 
 
-- 
N = 100 
F = 63 (63%) 
M = 37 (37%) 
36 ≤ N = 5 
F = 2 (40%) 
M = 3 (60%) 
N = 72 
F = 49 (68,1%) 
M = 23 (31,9%) 
 
-- 
N = 77 
F = 51 (66,2%) 
M = 26 (33,8%) 
TOTAL N = 246** 
F = 157 (63,8%) 
M = 88 (36,2%) 
N = 394 
F = 264 (67%) 
M = 130 (33%) 
N = 274 
F = 136 (49,6%)  
M = 138 (50,4%) 
N = 914** 
F = 557 (60,9%) 
M = 356 (39,1%) 
 **913 participants marked their gender; 1 participant from Austria did not indicate her/his gender 
 
The participants were randomly assigned to read one of four versions of the news 
reports included into the study questionnaire so that an approximately equal number of 
participants in each country would read each news report. The distribution of the number of 
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participants for the age category of 18-26 years old is shown below in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Distribution of the number of participants by news report types (by 
country and for the combined Austrian-Italian-Dutch sample)  
 
Type of news reports 
Countries Combined Austrian-
Italian-Dutch sample Austria Italy Netherlands 




































As is seen from Table 13, the number of participants who read each type of the news 
reports varied depending, first, on the total number of participants in the given age category, 
and, second, on the total number of participants of different ages and citizenships in a given 
sample. The latter was illustrative of the Austrian sample with 50 participants who read the 
balanced alternative version of the news report and, especially, of the Italian sample where 
only 40 participants in the age category of 18-26 years old read the manipulated traditional 
version of the news report. Taking into consideration that an audience of participants in a 
given experiment session often comprised people of various age (which is, in particular, true 
for Italy) and citizenship (which is, in particular, true for Austria), such skewness, or 
disproportionality, in the number of participants for a certain condition seems rather to be a 
consistent outcome, even if unfavorable.  
     
3.6. The study questionnaire 
The questions for the study questionnaire were partly developed by the researcher and 
partly adopted - and, in some cases, modified - from previous research in political and 
communication sciences. The questionnaire virtually consisted of three parts – (1) pre-stimuli 
questions, (2) stimuli, and (3) post-stimuli questions. In turn, the pre-stimuli part 
encompassed three sections: (a) one measured the use of and trustworthiness toward particular 
97 
 
types of news media, (b) one measured informed media mistrust, and, finally, (c) the last 
measured political competence. The aforementioned sections were intentionally arranged in 
an order starting from simpler questions on media use, then putting questions on informed 
media mistrust, and finishing with more difficult questions asking participants about their 
political interest, activities and knowledge. Here it is important to stress that the second 
section (b) – questions measuring informed media mistrust – had been deliberately separated 
from the stimuli part (reading a news report) by the longer section measuring political 
competence. The reason for such a disposition was to avoid possible priming effects on 
participants from the questions on the informed media mistrust that may have resulted if those 
questions were placed directly before the stimulus, the news report. In other words, if 
participants answered the questions about their trust in the news media right before reading 
the news reports, they would more likely have been influenced by those questions and, while 
reading, evaluated the news reports more thoroughly based on the ideas of the mentioned 
media trust questions. For this reason, such separation decreased the likelihood of priming 
participants by questions on trust in news media.   
Now I will elaborate specifically on the questions of the study questionnaire. 
 
3.6.1. Pre-stimuli questions 
 3.6.1.1. Use and trustworthiness of news media 
The first section of the pre-stimuli part of the questionnaire comprised three questions 
that were all generated by the researcher. The first one (Q1) asked “to indicate on the scale 
from 0 to 7, where “0” means “never” and “7” means “every day”, how many days in a 
typical week participants use the following sources to get news of any kind”. The sources 
were represented by the following options: online sources, magazines, newspapers, radio, and 
television. The term “online sources” was selected purposefully instead of “Internet”, as the 
former was construed to include online versions of magazines, newspapers, radio, TV 
channels, news agencies, news aggregators, newsletters, etc. So a person could read, for 
instance, a newspaper but its online version, not its print edition. This suggestion was also 
repeatedly confirmed by participants during pretest (pilot test) of the questionnaire. Thus Q1 
was intended to measure how often in a typical week participants got news and from which 
news media. The frequency of news consumption should have been indicative of the scope of 
experience of dealing with news of different types (likely including manipulated ones) and 
evaluating it, whether critically or not. The preferences in types of news media, from which 
news was gotten most often, should have allowed for making certain conclusions as to what 
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degree participants were used to dealing with news messages from online news sources, 
which is important given that the study stimuli were allegedly taken from one of them.     
The second question (Q2) asked about the trustworthiness of different news sources: “In 
general, when thinking of these types of media as sources of credible news, do you regard 
some of them as more trustworthy than others? Please indicate your choices on the following 
scale from 1 to 7, where ‘1’ is ‘not at all trustworthy’ and ‘7’ is ‘very trustworthy’”. The 
answer options were as follows: Internet, magazines, newspapers, radio, television. Here 
“Internet” replaced “online sources” from the first question as the issue was 'types of media', 
not 'news sources'.  In other words, the Internet can be referred to as a type of media, whereas 
online news sources cannot. Q2 was intended to take a comparative look at how trustworthy 
the Internet was regarded in comparison to other types of media. The emphasis of the Internet 
was vital, given that the stimuli in this study were asserted to have been taken from Internet 
news sources.  
Finally, the third question (Q3) asked directly about the trustworthiness of distinct types 
of the Internet news sources – traditional and alternative ones – specifying what was meant by 
those terms. In particular, the question read: “In general, when thinking of the Internet as a 
source of credible news, how would you rate the trustworthiness of traditional Internet news 
sources (that is, news websites of TV channels, newspapers, magazines, etc.) and alternative 
Internet news sources (that is, social networks, blogs)? Please indicate your opinion on the 
following scale, where ‘1’ is ‘ not at all trustworthy’ and ‘7’ is ‘very trustworthy’”. There 
were two answer options: 'traditional' Internet news sources (websites of TV channels, 
newspapers, magazines, etc.) and 'alternative' Internet news sources (social networks, blogs). 
Q3 was intended to measure whether there was any difference between trustworthiness 
toward the two types of the Internet news sources. This was important to measure, given that 
the stimuli in this study were allegedly taken from a popular (in a given country) 'traditional' 
or alternative Internet news source. Accordingly, those who would find traditional Internet 
news sources more reliable may have questioned the fairness and reliability of the news report 
that was 'taken from alternative Internet news sources'. And vice versa: those who would find 
alternative Internet news sources more reliable might have mistrusted the news report 
allegedly 'taken from traditional Internet news sources'. In essence, this measure has been 
incorporated into the study for control purposes. 
Both Q2 and Q3 included 7-point semantic differential scales that were selected for 
three main reasons: (1) to avoid potential confusion if each of the questions had a scale with a 
different number of points (say, 5-point scale in one case, and 7-point scale in another); (2) 
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giving participants more freedom to choose a score-answer option; and (3) including a middle 
point (as distinct from, say, 4-point scale). In effect, the literature and previous studies do not 
provide convincing arguments that, for example, the 5-point scale is better than the 7-point 
scale (for overview and mathematical evidence, see Colman, Norris & Preston, 1997). 
Therefore, I chose to use the last one. 
 
3.6.1.2. Measuring informed media mistrust 
The second section included five questions/statements and was introduced with the 
phrase: “How often do the following statements apply to your own experience of getting news 
from various types of media?” The first statement (Q4 in the questionnaire) was: “I find that 
news media reports are fair and balanced”. The second statement (Q5 in the questionnaire) 
was: “I believe that facts and opinions (that is, interpretations of those facts) are clearly 
separated in news media reports”. The third statement (Q6 in the questionnaire) was: “In my 
opinion, the interpretations of facts in news reports are based on solid grounds and not mere 
assertions". The fourth statement (Q7 in the questionnaire) was: “I try to 'read between the 
lines' of what I see/read in the news”. The last statement (Q8 in the questionnaire) was: 
“Overall, I can trust news media reports”. All the questions / statements had four identical 
answer options: always, most of the time, rarely, never. For the purposes of statistical 
analysis, they were later numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively.     
The first, third and fifth statements (Q4, Q6 and Q8, correspondingly) were developed 
by the researcher. Statement three (Q5) was adapted from Gunter (1992). Statement four (Q7) 
was adapted from Eveland (2005), who used it for measuring the individual active 
information-processing strategy. All the others were generated by the researcher. All the 
questions / statements were intended to measure how trustful or skeptical people feel toward 
the news media in general. Or, in other words, they estimated what I referred to in my study 
as informed media mistrust.  
The questions / statements Q4, Q5, Q6 and Q8 were combined into one composite scale 
- informed media mistrust scale (Cronbach’s alpha for the Austrian sample was 0.73, for the 
Italian one 0.62, and for the Dutch one 0.63; for the combined Austrian-Italian-Dutch sample 
Cronbach's alpha was 0.66), whereas Q7 was left off the scale, for its inclusion has reduced 
Cronbach’s alpha significantly - to 0.50 or even less. The differences in the reliability 
coefficient were likely due to the score variance in the samples. As a rule, Cronbach's alpha of 
0.70 and higher is considered desirable. However, values of 0.60 and higher are also 
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acceptable, especially, for exploratory studies (Flynn et al. 1990, Hair et al. 1998), where 
certain concepts are measured for the first time, and to which the present research pertains.   
 
3.6.1.3. Main explanatory variable - Political Competence 
As was mentioned earlier in the text, the concept of political competence encompassed 
six components that were measured: political interest, intentional consumption of political 
news, political discussion, challenging opponent's standpoints during political discussions, 
political participation, and factual political knowledge. Therefore, the third section measured 
all the components and, eventually, produced an overall estimate for individual political 
competence. In total, there were eight questions in the section, seven of which directly 
referred to measuring the aforementioned components of political competence.  
Political interest was measured by the question “To what extent would you say you are 
interested in politics?” (Q9 in the questionnaire) which had four answer options, numbered 1, 
2, 3 and 4, respectively: not at all, a little, somewhat, very much. The question and the answer 
options were adopted from the EU Profiler project, a Voting Advice Application (VAA), 
which has been developed under the auspices of the European Union Democracy Observatory 
(EUDO) at the EUI. The advantages of adopting the question and its answer options from the 
EU Profiler were that (1) they were repeatedly 'verified' through their multiple practical use, 
and (2) they were already translated into the three languages used in my study – English, 
Italian, and German (for further information on the EU Profiler see Trechsel & Mair, 2011).  
Consumption of political news was measured by the following question (Q10 in the 
questionnaire):  “On the following scale from 0 to 7, where “0”means “never” and “7” 
means “every day”, please mark how many days in a typical week you intentionally watch, 
listen to, or read political information from news media”.  This question was adapted from 
Kwak (1999). The answer option is quite obvious: the higher the score on the scale, the higher 
the frequency of intentional consumption of political news by a participant in a typical week.  
Political discussion part was measured by two questions. The first of the two (Q 11 in 
the questionnaire), asked: “In a typical week, how often do you discuss political issues with 
other people (classmates, neighbors, friends, family, acquaintances, or strangers)?” The 
answer options were the following: never, once a week, 2 to 3 times a week, 4 to 5 times a 
week, 6 to 7 times a week, more than 7 times a week (numbered  from 0 to 5, respectively). 
The second question (Q 12 in the questionnaire) specified: “During your political discussions 
with others, how often, on average, do you try to challenge the standpoints of your opponent 
by arguing your case?” The proposed answer options were: never, rarely, often, every time I 
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discuss politics (numbered from 0 to 3, respectively). Q11 was inspired by Eveland and 
Thomson (2006), but instead of  the specification of the time period used in the mentioned 
study as “in the past 6 months”, in my research I changed it for “in a typical week”. In doing 
this, I intended to measure habitual rather than accidental actions. Besides it can be quite 
difficult to remember how many times one has discussed politics in the past 6 months. For the 
same reason, the number of times when politics was discussed was reduced in my study to 
“more than 7 times a week” instead of  Eveland’s “50 times and more” during the past half a 
year. Q12 was generated by the researcher and intended to estimate individuals' active 
participation in political discussions as distinct from merely listening or weakly objecting. I 
assumed that the frequent challenging of someone's political standpoints by an individual may 
have been indicative of the developed critical thinking power he or she possesses, which, in 
turn, was crucial for the ability to critically evaluate news media information.    
Political participation was also measured by two questions. The first question (Q13), 
asked about the various political activities participants were involved in over the past two 
years, and the second question (Q14) asked whether participants intended to vote in the next 
elections, national and local. In particular, Q13 asked about ten types of activities that 
participants may have taken part in: “ever written a letter to a newspaper on a political 
issue”, “joined a political organization”, “already been a member of a political 
organization”, ever written a letter to a politician or official”, “ever signed a petition on a 
political issue”, “ever participated in a march, demonstration, or protest”, “voted in the 
recent national elections”, “attended any political meetings or rallies”, “voted in the recent 
local elections”, “ever campaigned for a candidate/political party”. The answer options were 
categorical: “no” and “yes”. Q14 asked whether participants intended to vote “in the next 
national elections” and “in the next local elections”. The question had three answer options: 
no, yes, undecided. Q13 was adapted from and Q14 was inspired by Brady’s (1999) overview 
of various scales of political activities. All the answer options of Q13 were then summed up in 
a 10-item scale measured political participation, where “0” meant the lowest level of political 
participation and “10” meant the highest level of political participation.  
One of the ten types of activity in Q13 was, to a certain degree, not generally applicable. 
Asking about voting in the recent national elections in the past two years could not been 
answered positively by participants of the Italian sample as the most recent national elections 
had been held in 2008. Nevertheless, the Dutch general elections had been held in September 
2012, and the Austrian presidential elections were held in 2010, both before this study was 
conducted in the aforementioned countries. So for the reason of having identical 
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questionnaires for all countries, the item on voting in the recent national elections was 
included, too. Otherwise, if participants were asked about their political activities in the past 
five years, instead of the past two years, for the sake of giving the Italian participants a chance 
to answer about voting in the recent Italian national elections, the overall results for political 
activities question might have been worse: it is simply more difficult to remember what you 
did in the last five years compared to the past two years.    
Factual political knowledge was measured by seven factual true/false statements 
combined under one question (Q16 in the questionnaire). Four of the statements were 
identical for all the three countries (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands) and referred to issues 
related to the European Union’s politics. Other three statements were similar by implication 
but, at the same time, specific for each of the countries. There were three answer options: 
false, true, don’t know. The question was introduced by the following phrase-request: “Please 
answer whether the following statements are true or false. Even if you are not sure, please 
still try to make your best guess. Only if you really cannot guess, mark the ‘don’t know’ 
option”. In this way, if the answer option 'don't know' was marked, I assumed that a 
participant could not make any guess. Thus, for the purpose of measurement, the 'don't know' 
option for each question was equated to the wrong answer. The statements common for all the 
countries and the matrix for the correct answers were as follows: 
 
Switzerland is a member of the EU False 
The European Union has 25 member states False 
Every country in the EU elects the same number of representatives to the European   
Parliament 
False 















The statements specific for each of the three countries and the matrix for the correct 
answers were: 
 For Austria: 
Die österreichische Bundesministerin für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur heißt Dr. 
Claudia Schmied  
(The Austrian Federal Minister for Education, Arts and Culture is Dr. Claudia Schmied) 
True 
Um bei Nationalratswahlen zu kandidieren, muss man mindestens 25 Jahre alt sein  
(In order to stand as a candidate for national elections, a person must be at least 25 years 
old) 
False 
Der Nationalrat hat 275 Mitglieder 




 For Italy: 
Il Ministro della Pubblica Istruzione in Italia è Francesco Profumo  
(The Minister of Education in Italy is Francesco Profumo) 
True 
E’ necessario avere almeno 25 anni per candidarsi alle elezioni nazionali in Italia 
(Person must be at least 25 years to stand as a candidate for national elections in Italy) 
True 
La Camera dei Deputati ha 945 membri  




 For the Netherlands: 
The Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science is Ronald Plasterk False 
Dutch citizens must be at least 25 years old or older if they want to participate as 
candidates in elections for the House of Representatives 
False 
The Dutch House of Representatives has 225 members False 
 
All the factual questions / statements were taken from the European Elections Study’s 2009 
questionnaire (PIREDEU, http://www.piredeu.eu/public/Voters_Quests.asp). The reasons for 
this decision were the following. First, these seven questions allowed the measuring of 
political knowledge on European Union issues, as well as on national ones. Second, the 
questions /statements had different degrees of difficulty. Third, they were standardized across 
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countries. Fourth, they were verified through the use in multiple surveys. And fifth, they were 
correctly translated into languages of the countries where the EES took place. All the answer 
options of Q16 then were combined into a 7-item scale used to measure participants’ factual 
political knowledge, where “0” meant the lowest level of the factual political knowledge and 
“7” meant the highest level of the factual political knowledge. 
To develop a scale measuring political competence, all the six questions-components 
were added together so that maximum (or correct) values for each of the questions were 
summated. Thus the highest score for the political competence scale in this study was '36', and 
the lowest one was '0'. Later, for the purpose of statistical analysis, aside from the 
aforementioned scale another three-levels political competence scale was composed: 'low' 
with the score range from 1to 12, 'medium' with the score range from 13 to 24, and 'high' with 
the score range from 25 to 36. 
Finally, Q15 in the questionnaire, which preceded the question on factual political 
knowledge (Q16), asked participants to express their overall attitudes toward a set of 
countries, in particular: “Below you find an alphabetical list of eleven countries. How would 
you express your overall opinion of each of them on the following scale from 1 to 5, where ‘1’ 
means ‘very unfavorable’ and ‘5’ means ‘very favorable’”. The countries listed were: 
Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, France, Ireland, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, 
United States, Syria. This question was not intended contributing into measuring political 
competence but served for control purposes, as the stimuli described a protest action in 
Moldova and briefly mentioned Syria (in the balanced version of the news report). Therefore, 
the attitudes toward these two countries should have been taken into account, for they might 
have affected participants' evaluation of the news reports (however, as it turned out later, 
these attitudes did not influence the outcome variables in any way). The formulation of the 
question was taken from Gallup Polls on Country Ratings, which has been used in the polls 
since 1980s and reads as follows: “I’d like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. Is 
it very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” The answer 
options for countries were generated by the researcher and included eleven countries in total, 
with the purpose of not focusing only on the two aforementioned countries. During pretesting 
the questionnaire, as well as during data collecting, sometimes there were individual questions 
as to how to consider the “overall opinion of foreign countries” without focusing on the 
country’s particularities such as politics, economic or foreign policy, etc. Notwithstanding 
those individual remarks, the formulation of the question (Q15) has been kept in the original 
form given, first, more than thirty years of its effective usage in the Gallup Polls. Second, the 
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formulation of “overall opinion of a foreign country” seemed to be a quite understandable 
and, moreover, widespread category of an emotional, rather than a logical, estimation of a 
particular country, and this can be supported by the fact that the majority of participants did 
not have any difficulties in answering this question.*    
 
3.6.2. Post-stimuli questions 
 3.6.2.1. Measures of outcome variables 
The post-stimuli questions measured the outcome variables – spotting manipulated 
media information and accepting the standpoint(s) the manipulated message promoted. The 
questions were generated by the researcher based on the definition of manipulated media 
information used in the study, in particular, “one-sided opinions or allegations that contain 
causal interpretation of the issue or problem described and assign responsibility for it, which  
eventually might lead a consumer of such news information to draw incorrect conclusions 
about the issue or problem”.  
In total, the post-stimuli section comprised nine questions. The first question (Q17 in 
the questionnaire) asked whether participants “already heard, watched or read any 
information on the situation described in the news report above before reading it” and had 
two answer options: yes/no. The intent of this question was not to check participants’ integrity 
(how they could read about a situation that was simulated?), for they might have easily 
confused the country mentioned in the simulated news report with another where a similar 
situation might have really occurred. This question was intended to prepare participants for 
answering more complex questions that required some cognitive effort. Q18 (in the 
questionnaire) asked: “In your personal opinion, is the subject of the news report important?” 
and had four answer options: definitely yes, rather yes, rather no, definitely no. This question 
implied that if a participant did not consider the subject important, he or she could simply not 
think further as to whether the news report was manipulated or balanced and would answer 
further questions in a mechanical way. The next question (Q19 in the questionnaire) asked: 
"Do you find the description of the situation in the news report easy to understand?" and 
proposed the same four answer options as in the preceding question. I assumed that easily 
understandable news should have invoked more univocal evaluations.  
The next question (Q20 in the questionnaire) asked: "Do you consider the news report 
as fact-based?" and had, again, the same four answer options - definitely yes, rather yes,  
*See, for example, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1624/perceptions-foreign-countries.aspx. Last time accessed on 
March 3, 2014. 
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rather no, definitely no. At first thought, this question might have seemed tricky, for no one 
could know for sure that a news report that described a novel subject was definitely based on 
facts. However, I assumed that the manipulated news report, which was one-sided and 
contained unsubstantiated statements, or allegations, should have, at least, implanted doubts 
as to the fact-basedness of the information in the minds of those participants with developed 
critical thinking. In this way, Q20 should have resonated to some degree with the informed 
media mistrust scale. The next question (Q21 in the questionnaire) asked: "Do you agree that 
the news report is balanced?" and had the same four answer options. It measured the one-
sidedness dimension of the manipulated media information definition. The next question (Q22 
in the questionnaire) asked: "Would you say the news report is free from allegations?" and 
had the same four answer options. It measured participants’ ability to distinguish between the 
facts and unsubstantiated opinions that were presented in the news report. Question 23 (Q23 
in the questionnaire) asked: "Is it clear to you from the news report who is responsible for the 
deaths described?" and, again, had the same four answer options – definitely yes, rather yes, 
rather no, definitely no. The next question (Q24 in the questionnaire) asked: Please indicate 
on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" (underlining was 
used in the questionnaire). It had the following four options: protesters, police, president, 
unclear. These two questions (Q23 and Q24) were intended to estimate (1) how well 
participants understood whom the news report blamed and (2) to what degree they accepted 
the standpoint(s) as to the assigning responsibility/blame promoted by the news report. Or, 
following the definition of manipulated media information, whether they accepted the causal 
interpretation of the issue/problem and assigned responsibility for it according to the news 
report's standpoint(s). The last question (Q25 in the questionnaire) asked: “Overall, can the 
news report be trusted?” It also had the four answer options – definitely yes, rather yes, rather 
no, definitely no. 
All these four answer options for questions 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 25 were numbered 
identically: namely, 'definitely yes -4', 'rather yes - 3', 'rather no - 2', 'definitely yes -1'.  
The format for the answer options consisted of four possible answers and was chosen on 
purpose. First, I consciously avoided including any fifth, 'neutral', answer option such as 
'neither... nor', 'don't know' or the like. Such options are usually very attractive for 
participants, for those non-committal replies give the chance of escaping any mental effort 
while responding to survey questions (for a general discussion, see Mondak, 2000; Mondak & 
Canache, 2004). Thus, the inclusion of that option in the measures of the outcome variables 
might have led to the situation where a significant number of answers might have been 
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marked with not particularly helpful 'neutral' answers. For this reason, those options used in 
the questionnaire stimulated participants to think about the news report they read and give 
their opinions on it. Nevertheless, the significant number of people who comprised the study 
samples in each of the three countries and the randomized assignment to conditions served as 
a warranty, that on average, the answers should have been reliable. Second, the proposed 
answer options still allowed for the expression of different degrees of confidence when 
evaluating news reports. This, in turn, made it possible to construct the Likert-type scale for 
estimating possible linear relationships between the variables. Third, the four answer options 
enabled the creation of a binomial variable for measuring the mere fact of spotting. The logic 
behind this was as follows: a person either spotted manipulated information or he/she did not 
spot it.    
Therefore, of the nine post-stimuli questions described, four (namely, Q20, Q21, Q22 
and Q25) were combined into scales - ordinal and binomial ones to measure the spotting of 
manipulated information. To create the ordinal scale, all four questions were simply summed 
up. The scale reliability check showed that for Austrian sample the Cronbach’s alpha was 
0.76, for the Italian sample the Cronbach's alpha was 0.79 and for the Dutch sample the 
Cronbach's alpha was 0.68 which is ≈ 0.70. For the total combined Austrian-Italian-Dutch 
sample the Cronbach's alpha was 0.78. To create a categorical variable, first, I added together 
the 'definitely yes' and 'rather yes' answers to compose one 'yes' dimension, and the 'definitely 
no' and 'rather no' answers to compose one 'no' dimension. Then all the four questions were 
also summed up. As a result, I obtained the variable with two categorical values that were 
recoded in such a way as to denote '1 - spotting' and '0 - non-spotting'.  
Also, by the same token, using the same procedures, two other scales - ordinal and 
binomial - were created, which consisted this time of three questions, Q21, Q22 and Q25. 
This was done with the purpose of checking and the potential refining of results of the 
measurements made with the foregoing 4-items scales that included the question about the 
news reports fact-basedness. Despite, as explained above, the fact that it was considered 
entirely motivated and relevant to include this indirect measure into the 4-items scales of 
spotting manipulated media information, I still decided, by creating the 3-items scales 
consisting of direct measures for spotting one-sidedness and allegation-loadedness, to look at 
whether there was any difference in results between the two types of scale. The scale 
reliability check showed that for the Austrian sample the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.70, for the 
Italian sample the Cronbach's alpha was 0.77 and for the Dutch sample the Cronbach's alpha 
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was 0.62; for the total combined Austrian-Italian-Dutch sample the Cronbach's alpha was 
0.74. 
Question 24 measured the second outcome variable - accepting the news report 
standpoint(s). It asked participants on whom they personally placed responsibility for the 
situations described in the news message. For the purpose of statistical analysis, the answer 
options were later numbered  as follows: 'protesters - 1', 'police - 2', 'president - 3', 'unclear - 
4'. In addition, participants were allowed to choose multiple response options, not just one of 
them. It was expected that, if participants who read the manipulated news report chose such 
answer options as 'police' or 'president' or both, then they fully accepted the report 
standpoints. However if they chose 'protesters' (which, in fact, has almost never been the case) 
or, especially, 'unclear', this required the conducting of further correlation tests with Q23 and 
4-items (3-items) scales for a subsequent interpretation. In turn, if those who read the 
balanced news report chose such answer options as 'protesters', ''police' or 'president' or any 
combination of them, all these choices would be regarded as correct. Yet, if they chose 
'unclear', this again required the conducting of further correlation tests with Q23 and 4-items 
(3-items) scales for a subsequent interpretation. Tentatively, the following interpretations 
were anticipated: 
        
 if participants were unable to spot manipulation in the manipulated news report ('yes' 
answers predominated), the answer option 'unclear' might have meant they were 
unable to make a choice between the police and the president as to who was blamed 
for the death in that news report; 
 if the participants were able to spot manipulation in the manipulated news report ('no' 
answers predominated), the answer option 'unclear' may have meant that the news 
report was not trusted, so it was impossible to place responsibility on someone;  
 if the participants read the balanced news report which contained two opposite points 
of view on the situation described, the answer option 'unclear' may have meant that it 
was impossible to decide who was responsible based on this news report only and 
without getting additional information on the issue. 
 
Given that participants could choose multiple response options in Q24, which 
eventually made participants' lives easier but statistical analysis harder, and, in particular, for 
the manipulated type of the news report, a categorical variable for this question was 
subsequently created. After data were collected, summarized and prepared for further 
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analysis, the following variants of responses became apparent: 'police', 'president', 'police and 
president', 'unclear', 'protesters', 'protesters and police', 'all'. As the manipulated news report 
standpoints indicated that the police or president or both should have been blamed, these 
options were combined under the value of '1 - 'accepting standpoint', and the others under the 
value of '0 - non-accepting standpoint'. 
 
3.6.2.2. Demographic questions 
The questionnaire ended with six questions that measured participants’ demographic 








 year, Master’s, PhD student, 
other (to be specified), department, major or specialization, and citizenship.  
Participants' ages were measured by an open-ended question that asked "What is your 
age?". Subsequently, for the purpose of statistical tests, the study samples were subdivided 
into several age categories (see section Participants for demographic data). The question on 
the university department affiliation of the study participants was aimed at measuring the 
number of those who studied political science. The reason was that such persons might have 
shown higher levels of political competence, either due to their class assignments or because 
they took an interest in political matters, for all intents and purposes. Therefore, comparison 
of participants from different university departments with regard to their levels of political 
competence and its influence on the outcome variables was needed (see section Participants 
for demographic data). The question about participants' citizenship was absolutely crucial for 
the study. First, this question allowed for identifying the number of participants from a 
particular country. Those who indicated a citizenship other than of the country where the 
study was conducted or pointed to dual citizenship were excluded from further statistical 
analysis. Second, the answer options for the citizenship question, where '1' denoted Austria, '2' 
stood for the Netherlands and '3' marked Italy, served as labels for respective countries and, in 
this way, corresponded to those countries' media literacy ranks. In other words, the 
aforementioned answer options were employed in assessing the quality of the second 
explanatory variable, media literacy context.   
At the close of the questionnaire, I thanked participants in writing for their efforts and 
invited their comments.  
All the three questionnaires can be found in Appendix A.  





3.7. The questionnaires / news reports randomization procedure  
  The questionnaires were absolutely identical except for the news reports that were 
included, of which there were two versions, manipulated and balanced, each of which, in turn, 
was claimed to have been taken either from traditional or from alternative Internet news 
sources. To ensure random allocation of participants to one of the news reports, they needed 
to be stacked and then handed out in random order. To provide for that randomization, the 
questionnaires were stacked with the help of the online random numbers generator from 
http://stattrek.com/tables/random.aspx. In other words, for example, having 400 
questionnaires, 100 per each of the four conditions ('traditional-balanced', 'traditional-
manipulated, 'alternative-balanced', 'alternative-manipulated'), I set the value of random 
numbers at '400', with the minimum value of '1' and the maximum value of '400', not allowing 
duplicated entries. As a result, I stacked the questionnaires in the set order I got from the 
random numbers generator. I kept them in that order, then took the questionnaires to a 
classroom where the study took place and, finally, handed them out again in the same order to 
the study participants.   
 
3.8. The study procedure 
 My choice of the universities in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands where I carried out 
the experimental sessions has not been random but made empirically by contacting 
universities and getting either favorable or unfavorable responses from them as to the 
possibility of conducting my study there. The specific arrangements for carrying out the 
experimental sessions in the classroom settings were made directly with professors teaching 
classes well before the intended dates of the experiments - from three to six months. In the 
first place, I contacted professors in different departments of a particular university with a 
short letter of request for help in conducting my study in their classes by employing their 
students as the study participants. I explained in brief my background and what my research 
was about. Also, I noted that, if necessary, I was ready to provide additional detailed 
information on my study as well as a letter of support from my supervisor, Professor 
Alexander Trechsel. Some professors asked me to send them the questionnaire I was going to 
use in the experiment. I sent it along with the added caution that they were not to reveal the 
overall intent of the research and the questions used in it to anyone, and especially to 
prospective study participants. Finally, in my letters I suggested the possibility of giving a 
kind of a class extra-credit to students who would agree to participate in the study.* The total 
* However, I do not know whether any extra-credits were proposed or given by the professors to participants. 
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time I needed for making final arrangements in each country was four months for Austria, 
three months for Italy and six months for the Netherlands.  
The experimental sessions were carried out in March 2012 in Austria (University of 
Vienna), in May-June 2012 in Italy (University of Florence), and in October 2012 in the 
Netherlands (Leiden University). The number of participants in each class (virtually referred 
to as a 'group') was not equal. In Austria, one group consisted of about 120 participants, and 
other groups included from 25 to 35 persons. In Italy, the number of people in each 
experimental session ranged from 20 to 40 persons. In the Netherlands, I had the largest 
scatter as to the quantity of participants in groups - from 10 to 100 persons. The sessions of 
the experiment were conducted in the classrooms where the students had their classes, at the 
beginning of the class, and took from about 12 to 20 for all tasks to be completed by all the 
participants.    
At the beginning of each of the sessions, I was introduced to the students by the 
professor who taught that particular class and who had kindly allowed me make use of her/his 
class for my study. 
Then I told the students in brief about myself and what I was asking them to do. Each 
time I spoke English. In Italy, my introductory speech was immediately interpreted into 
Italian by the professor who taught the class. In Austria, I used a PowerPoint presentation in 
German that word-for-word repeated what I was saying in English. The PPT presentation had 
been earlier checked by native speakers – by a German language teacher of the Language 
Center of the European University Institute and, later for the purpose of cross-checking, by 
one of professors of the University of Vienna. In the Netherlands, I spoke in English but each 
time asked whether everything was clear or if an interpretation into Dutch would be 
preferable (the professors or their teaching assistants were ready to assist). I asked this again 
after the Dutch participants had completed the questionnaires.* 
My introductory speech was as follows:  
“My name is Vasyl Kucherenko. I am a researcher from European University Institute 
which is in Florence, Italy. I am carrying out comparative research in several European 
countries. The purpose of the research is to explore how various popular Internet news 
sources - traditional (that is, websites of newspapers, TVs, news agencies etc.) and alternative  
* The remarkable fact was that no one ever said that something had been incomprehensible or ambiguous 
for them. In response to my specification as to whether they thought that the Dutch language would have better 
fitted the questionnaire and news reports than the English language, there were never any positive responses 
favoring Dutch  
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(that is, blogs, various social networks) - cover foreign news, and to what degree, if at all, 
different types of such foreign news coverage catch (attract) attention of people of different 
ages. I am asking you to participate in this research, and I would really appreciate if you 
agree to take part in it.  
You will complete a questionnaire asking about your use of various news media, 
general attitudes toward news media, and your political and social activity. Then, you will 
read a short piece of news taken from one of the popular Internet news sources in your 
country. 
In order to avoid identifying the source through any of its characteristics - web pages, 
logo, font etc. - only the text of the news report is reprinted here in a standard computer font. 
Finally, you will answer questions asking about your attitudes toward that news report.  
The study will take approximately 15 minutes to complete, even less. Of course, your 
participation in the study is voluntary and you can decline participating or stop participating 
at any time. However, your participation and accurate answers to the questions are very 
important for this research project and for the science, and I would be very grateful to you if 
you complete the questionnaire. Finally, I would like to assure you that all your answers are 
anonymous, no one will be able to identify you from your answers, and all research records 
will be kept private. 
I thank you for your participation, for your efforts in advance. Now I will hand the 
questionnaires out… Now let’s start and, please, work independently!” 
 
While the students were completing the survey, I kept a check on them to ensure that 
they were not talking to each other. If that was the case, as, for example, in Italy, I asked them 
to work independently. There were no such situations in Austria and only rare ones in the 
Netherlands. 
At the end of each of the experimental sessions, after participants had completed and 
returned the questionnaires, they were debriefed. In particular, I told them the following: 
“I thank you very much again for your participation. Now I must tell you that news 
messages in this study were simulated, that is, not real, for the study purposes. Thus, please 
do not believe in everything you have  just read. Finally, I want to ask you not to tell your 
friends, colleagues, other students about the specifics of this study, as those students might be 
the next participants in the study and, for this reason, they shouldn’t know about the details of 
the research beforehand.” 
As the participation in the study was proclaimed to be voluntary, there were several 
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individual cases where students withdrew from the participation. However, the total number 
of such cases amounted to less than ten.  
 
In the next chapter I will present the results of the statistical tests of my hypotheses and 
exploratory questions. The bulk of the chapter will focus on the results pertaining to the 
participants of the three countries in the target age category of 18-26 years. In the rest of the 


























CHAPTER IV.  RESULTS 
 
This chapter consists of two parts. Part 1focuses on a comparison of the Dutch, 
Austrian and Italian participants in the study target age category of 18-26 years old. Here, the 
test results of hypotheses and exploratory questions are preceded by general descriptive data 
with respect to explanatory and outcome variables. More statistics pertaining to the 
participants in this age category can be found in Appendix C. Part 2 encompasses a closer 
look at Italian participants in all the three age categories: 18-26 years old, 27-35 years old, 
and 36≤ years old. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the total number of these 
participants was 394, which allowed for exploring the possible effects of age on levels of 
political competence as well as its role in spotting manipulated media information and 
accepting / rejecting the standpoint(s) the information promotes. Besides, some other key 
points were compared across the three age categories of the Italian sample - in particular, 
levels of informed media mistrust and the trustworthiness of the Internet news sources. Again, 
only principal statistical results on the Italian sample are demonstrated in this chapter. 
Additional statistics are contained in Appendix D.   
 
 
PART 1. The Dutch, Austrian and Italian samples in the age category of 18-26 
years old 
 
4.1. Explanatory variables 
 
    4.1.1 First (main) explanatory variable - Political Competence 
The political competence scale, the main explanatory variable in the study, had the 
lowest possible value of '0' and the highest possible value of '36'. The summary statistics by 









Table 14. Summary statistics for political competence scale (by country)  
Summary statistics Netherlands Austria Italy 



















































Analysis of missing values and outliers in each of the three samples revealed that they 
did not have any significant effect on the overall picture regarding the distribution of political 
competence scale values across the samples. Further details of the analysis are provided in 
Appendix C.  
Further comparisons made within each sample by gender revealed that males generally 





Table 15. Summary statistics by gender for political competence scale (by country)  
Summary 
statistics 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
























































TOTAL, N 136 138 151 74 156 81 
  
Figure 6. Mean values for political competence scale by gender (by country) 
 
Correlations calculated between components of the political competence scale for each 
of the three samples were all positive but differed in their strength from sample to sample. 
However, what is typical of each of the three samples is that the strongest correlations exist 
between 'interest in politics', on the one side, and 'days in typical week intentionally get 
political information from news media' and 'participating in political discussions in a typical 
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week', on the other side; as well as between 'days in typical week intentionally get political 
information from news media' and 'participating in political discussions in a typical week'. 
Also, strong correlations were noted in the Dutch and Italian samples between participants' 
intentions to vote in national and local elections (for details see Appendix C). In addition to 
the scale components correlations, I compared the components' summary statistics between 
the three samples (except for the two categorical 'intentions to vote' questions). The results are 
shown in Table 16 below. 
 
Table 16. Summary statistics for political competence scale components (by 
country) 
Components-questions Netherlands 
(N = 269) 
Austria  
(N = 215) 
Italy 
(N = 221) 
To what extent you are 
interested in politics 
 
(Min=1, Max=4) 
X = 3,6 
Md = 4,0 
SD = 0,6 
X = 2,5 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,8 
X = 2,3 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,7 
Days in a typical week 
intentionally get political 
information from news 
media 
(Min=0, Max=7) 
X = 5,4 
Md = 6,0 
SD = 1,8 
X = 4,1 
Md = 4,0 
SD = 2,0 
X = 3,9 
Md = 4,0 
SD = 2,1 
Participating in political 
discussions in a typical 
week 
(Min=0, Max=5) 
X = 3,2 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 1,3 
X = 1,7 
Md = 2 
SD = 1,1 
X = 1,6 
Md = 1,0 
SD = 1,2 
Challenging standpoints of 
opponent in political 
discussions 
(Min=0, Max=3) 
X = 1,9 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,7 
X = 1,3 
Md = 1,0 
SD = 0,7 
X = 1,4 
Md = 1,0 





X = 4,7 
Md = 5,0 
SD = 1,6 
X = 3,8 
Md = 4,0 
SD = 1,5 
X = 3,2 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 1,6 




X = 3,6 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 1,9 
X = 3,2 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 1,5 
X = 3,2 
Md = 3,0 




 Again, the Dutch participants took the lead in every component of the political 
competence scale followed by the Austrian and Italians, whose summary scores were 
sometimes very close to each other. To gain better insight into score distributions within each 
component of the political competence scale and, thus, make comparison between samples 
more visible, I calculated frequencies for the components (shown in Tables 17 - 24 and 
Figures 7 - 13 below). Although the Dutch participants outnumbered their Austrian and Italian 
counterparts (that in number are almost equal to one another), which led to a somewhat higher 
percentage for the Dutch displayed in the tables and diagrams, the overall tendency is still 
clear.  
Thus, with regard to a degree of interest in politics, the Austrians and Italians virtually 
match as to percentage of those interested 'a little' and 'somewhat' - 48% vs. 49% and 33.5% 
vs. 34%, correspondingly. However, nearly twice as many of the Italian participants were not 
interested in politics at all as compared to their Austrian counterparts and vice versa - the 
Austrians who were very much interested more than twice outnumbered the Italians. The 
Dutch take a dominant lead with 71% of participants who said that they were very much 
interested (Table 17 & Figure 7).  
 
Table 17. Percent distribution of answers to the question "To what extent would 
you say you are interested in politics" (by country) 
Interest in politics Netherlands Austria Italy 
Not at all 0,7 5,4 12,2 
A little 6,6 47,8 48,9 
Somewhat 21,9 33,5 33,8 
Very much 70,8 13,4 5,1 










Figure 7. Percent distribution of answers to the question "To what extent would you 
say you are interested in politics" (by country) 
 
 
In respect of intentionally getting political information from news media, the Dutch 
again stood first: 77% of participants reported consuming political news from 5 to 7 days per 
week as compared to 42,4% of the Austrians and 40% of the Italians (Table 18 & Figure 8). 
 
Table 18. Percent distribution of answers to the question "How many days in a 
typical week you intentionally watch, listen to, or read political information from news 
media" (by country) 
Days per week Netherlands Austria Italy 
Never 1,1 - 5,5 
1 3,3 7,6 11,1 
2 6,6 22,8 12,8 
3 4,0 16,1 12,3 
4 8,0 11,2 18,3 
5 17,5 12,5 13,6 
6 25,9 12,5 13,2 
Every day 33,6 17,4 13,2 







Figure 8. Percent distribution of answers to the question "How many days in a 
typical week you intentionally watch, listen to, or read political information from news 
media" (by country) 
 
 
A majority of the Austrian and Italian participants discussed politics from 1 to 3 times 
in a week (73.3% and 62.5%, respectively), while the majority of the Dutch participants - 
69% - involved themselves in political discussions from 4 to more than 7 times a week. 
Moreover, 20% of the Dutch discussed political issues more than 7 times a week as compared 
to 2% of the Austrians and 3% of the Italians (Table 19 & Figure 9).   
  
Table 19. Percent distribution of answers to the question "How often do you discuss 
political issues with other people in a typical week" (by country) 
Political discussions per week  Netherlands Austria Italy 
Never 1,5 6,7 15,6 
Once a week 8,4 42,9 38,4 
2-3 times a week 21,2 30,4 24,1 
4-5 times a week 27,4 10,7 15,2 
6-7 times a week 21,5 7,6 3,8 
More than 7 times a week 20,1 1,8 3,0 





Figure 9. Percent distribution of answers to the question "How often do you discuss 




In addition, only about 3% of the Dutch participants reported they never challenged the 
standpoints of their opponents in political discussions, while 10.3% of the Austrians and 
15.6% of the Italians stated the same. Conversely, 15.7% of the Dutch declared they challenge 
the opponent's standpoints every time they discuss politics as compared to 3.1% of the 
Austrians and 10.5% of the Italians (Table 20 & Figure 10).   
    
Table 20. Percent distribution of answers to the question "During political 
discussions, how often do you try to challenge the standpoints of your opponent by arguing 
your case" (by country) 
Challenging opponent's 
standpoints during political 
discussions 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
Never 2,9 10,3 15,6 
Rarely 21,5 48,4 35,4 
Often 59,9 38,1 38,4 
Every time I discuss politics 15,7 3,1 10,5 




Figure 10. Percent distribution of answers to the question "During political 
discussions, how often do you try to challenge the standpoints of your opponent by arguing 
your case" (by country) 
 
 
Among the types of political activity, voting in national and local elections gained the 
highest percentage of responses in all samples, followed by signing a petition (the Austrians 
and the Dutch), and participating in a march, demonstration or protest (the Austrians and the 
Italians) (Table 21 & Figure 11).  
 
Table 21. Percent distribution of positive answers to questions on political 
participation  (by particular questions, by country) 
Activity: In past 2 years, have you… Netherlands Austria Italy 
ever written a letter to a newspaper on a political issue 6,6 4,5 3,4 
joined a political organization  25,2 4,5 5,5 
already been a member of a political organization 17,9 4,9 6,3 
ever written a letter to a politician or official 14,2 8.9 3,8 
ever signed a petition on a political issue 64,2 58,9 35,0 
ever participated in a march, demonstration, or protest 31,4 55,8 49,2 
voted in the recent national elections 93,1 89,3 81,9 
attended any political meetings or rallies 43,1 11,2 41,8 
voted in the recent local elections 58,0 84,4 84,3 




Figure 11. Percent distribution of positive answers to questions on political 




Among the three samples, the Italian participants least intended to vote in the next 
national and local elections, followed by the Austrians (Table 22 & Figure 12). 
 
Table 22. Percent distribution of positive answers to questions on intentions to vote 
in the next national and local elections (by country) 
Intention to vote... the Netherlands Austria Italy 
in the next national elections 97,8 88,4 69,6 
in the next local elections 89,3 79,4 72,3 









Figure 12. Percent distribution of positive answers to questions on intentions to 
vote in the next national and local elections (by country) 
 
The factual political knowledge questions comprised four questions conditionally 
referred to as 'external' - about facts relating European Union politics - and three questions 
conditionally referred to as 'internal' - about political facts of the country that the sample was 
drawn from. The results in Table 23 demonstrate that, in general, there is not much difference 
between answers to questions on 'external' and 'internal' politics given by the Dutch and 
Italian participants. However, the Austrian participants showed a higher knowledge of the 











Table 23. Percent distribution of correct answers to factual political knowledge 
questions (by country) 
Questions Netherlands Austria Italy 
Switzerland is a Member of the EU 86,9 92,0 67,9 
The EU has 25 Member States 61,7 58,6 42,9 
Every country in the EU elects the same number of 
representatives to the European Parliament 
62,0 64,9 52,6 
Every six months a different Member State becomes 
President of the Council of the EU 
53,8 55,1 20,3 
The Austrian Minister of Education, Art and Culture 
is Dr. Claudia Schmied 
The Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and 
Science is Ronald Plasterk  








To stand as a candidate for the Austrian National 
Council, a person must be at least 25 years old 
Dutch citizens must be at least 25 years or older if 
they wish to participate as candidates in elections to 
the House of Representatives  
To stand as a candidate for national elections in Italy, 










The National Council in Austria has 275 members 
The House of Representatives of the Netherlands has 
225 members  








A comparison of the total number of correct answers to the factual political knowledge 
questions showed that the Dutch were generally more politically knowledgeable followed by 
the Austrians and then the Italians. Thus, 13.9% of the Dutch participants (or 38 persons) 
answered all the seven factual questions and 23.8% (or 65 persons) answered six questions, 
while only 3.2% of the Austrian participants (or 7 persons) and 0.9% of the Italian 
participants (or 2 persons) answered seven questions, and 11.4% of the Austrians (or 25 
persons) and 7.5% of the Italians (or 17 persons) answered six questions. At the same time, 
there were 0.4% (or 1 person) of those who did not answer any of the questions and 2.9% (or 
8 persons) of those who answered only one question among the Dutch participants as 
compared to 0.5% (or 1 person) and 6.4% (or 14 persons) of the Austrians and 5.7% (or 13 
127 
 
persons) and 9.7% (or 22 persons) of the Italians, respectively. The results are shown in Table 
24 and Figure 13). 
 
Table 24. Percent distribution of a total number of correct answers to factual 
political knowledge questions (by country)  
Total number of 
questions answered 
correctly 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
0 0,4 0,5 5,7 
1 2,9 6,4 9,7 
2 8,8 13,7 16,7 
3 9,5 20,5 24,7 
4 19,4 26,5 25,1 
5 21,2 17,8 9,7 
6 23,8 11,4 7,5 
7 3,9 3,2 0.9 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Figure 13. Percent distribution of total number of correct answers to factual 






4.1.2. Second explanatory variable - Media Literacy Context  
As it was already stated in the previous chapter 'Research Design and Methods', the 
second explanatory variable resulted from the Member States media literacy ranking. 
According to this, the three countries selected for the study differ in their ranks as follows: the 
Netherlands possesses the advanced level of media literacy, Austria has a medium-high level 
and is ranked above European average, and Italy with its medium-low level is ranked below 
European average (see Table 9 in Chapter III for exact numbers).  
 
 
4.2. Outcome variables (and questions inextricably associated with them) 
 
Of nine post-stimuli questions (all but those of demographics), five were used to 
measure the two outcome variables - spotting manipulated media information and accepting 
its standpoint. Of the rest of the four questions, one, which asked whether participants had 
already heard, watched or read any information on the situation described in the news report, 
played an 'opening' part after reading the news report and before participants answered 
questions that measured their opinions of it. The other three - which asked whether 
participants viewed the subject of the news report as important, the description of the situation 
in the news report as easily understandable, and whether it was clear for them from the news 
report who was responsible for the death of protesters - served as 'control' questions. Given 
that there are four conditions in the study, according to the two types and two subtypes of the 
news reports - 'balanced traditional', 'balanced alternative', 'manipulated traditional', 
'manipulated alternative' - separate post-stimuli questions and scales were initially measured 
in correspondence with the conditions. However, if the difference between 'traditional' and 
'alternative' subtypes of the news reports was negligible, only 'manipulated' and 'balanced' 
types were reported in Tables and Figures.   
 
4.2.1. Measuring the importance of the topic of the news reports and their 
understandability 
There were no considerable discrepancies between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes 
of the news reports as regards the 'importance' question. For this reason, the subtypes were 
combined, and the results are reported for 'balanced' and 'manipulated' types. The subject of 
the 'balanced' news report was considered more or less important by a majority of the 
Austrian (58.4%) and Dutch (65.9%) participants and by the overwhelming majority of the 
129 
 
Italian ones (88.6%). At the same time, the topic of the manipulated news was regarded as 
important to one degree or another by the large majority of participants of all the three 
samples - 94.9% of the Austrians, 88.8% of the Dutch, and 98.2% of the Italians. For detailed 
numbers of percent distribution, please see Appendix C.  
With regard to the understandability of the situation described in the news reports, there 
were also no considerable discrepancies between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the 
news reports. For this reason, the subtypes were combined, and the results are reported for 
'balanced' and 'manipulated' types. The large majority of participants in all the three samples 
considered the situations described in both types of the news reports easy to understand.  
Taking into account the fact that either the majority or the overwhelming majority of the 
participants regarded the subject of the news reports as important and the description of the 
situation as easily understandable, most notably in respect to the manipulated type of the news 
report, I assumed that subsequent participants' answers were not given due to reasons such as 
considering the subject matter of the news as not at all valuable or misunderstanding the 
circumstances described in the reports.    
 
4.2.2. First outcome variable - Spotting Manipulated Media Information 
A. Questions measured spotting manipulated information 
Fact-basedness, balance, allegation-loadedness of the news reports and overall trust in it 
were measured by original questions with four ordinal response options: 'definitely no', rather 
no', rather yes', 'definitely yes'. Then these response options were recoded so that to take the 
form of the binary response options 'yes/no' (as was explained in the previous chapter, 
'definitely no' and 'rather no' were summed up as well as 'definitely yes' and 'rather yes'). Here 
are shown percent distributions of responses to the recoded questions measured spotting 
manipulated information. Information on percent distribution of responses to the original 
questions, with four ordinal response options, measured spotting manipulated information can 
be found in Appendix C.   
 
1) Responses to the question about 'fact-basedness' contained no considerable 
discrepancies between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the news reports. For this 
reason, the subtypes were combined, and results are reported for 'balanced' and 'manipulated' 
types. As Tables 25 as well as Figures 14 show, the majority of participants in all the three 
samples considered both the balanced and manipulated news reports as fact-based. In 
addition, the large majority of the Italian participants advanced such opinions, followed by the 
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Dutch and, finally, the Austrian participants. 
 
Table 25. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 64,4 61,0 55,5 59,8 79,9 89,2 
No 35,6 39,0 44,5 40,2 20,1 10,8 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Figure 14. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




Additional information on percent distribution of responses to this question can be 
found in Appendix C. 
 
2) Responses to the question about 'balance' had no considerable discrepancies between 
'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the balanced version of the news report, except for the 
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Italian participants, but they differed according to the subtypes within the manipulated 
version. As is seen from Table 26, a roughly equal number of the Austrian and the Dutch 
participants regarded both subtypes of the balanced news report as balanced or unbalanced, 
whereas among the Italian participants more persons judged the 'alternative' subtype (that is, 
allegedly taken from alternative Internet news sources) as less balanced compared to the 
'traditional' one (that is, allegedly taken from traditional Internet news sources) - 40.3% vs. 
28.4%, respectively.     
 
Table 26. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 
agree that  the news report is balanced?" according to the subtypes of the balanced 
version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Yes 61,1 61,9 39,7 40,0 71,7 59,6 
No 38,8 38,1 60,3 60,0 28,4 40,4 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*BT - balanced traditional, BA - balanced alternative 
 
In respect to the manipulated version of the news report, the majority of the Austrian 
and Dutch participants viewed both of its subtypes as 'not balanced', while the Italians held 
the opposite opinion. In addition, as Tables 27 show, there was a considerable difference 
between perception of the two subtypes of the news report: a higher number of Austrians and 
Italians regarded the 'alternative' subtype as more unbalanced, whereas the Dutch judged the 
'traditional' subtype as so.   
 
Table 27. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 
agree that  the news report is balanced?" according to the subtypes of the manipulated 
version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Yes 35,8 40,5 40,4 25,0 72,5 63,4 
No 64,2 59,4 59,6 75,0 27,5 36,4 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




When the 'traditional and 'alternative' subtypes were merged and the combined balanced 
and manipulated versions of the news reports were compared, a significant difference in 
perception of the different versions of the news reports was noted only in the Dutch sample. 
In particular, almost 62% of those who read the 'manipulated' version did not regard it as 
balanced compared to 38% of those who read the 'traditional' version. Although more 
Austrian participants in the 'manipulated' condition held the same opinion, the difference with 
those in the 'traditional' condition was not so great - 67.6% vs. 60.2%, respectively. The 
majority of Italian participants in just about equal numbers considered both versions of the 
news report as balanced (Tables 28 and Figures 15).    
 
Table 28. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 61,6 38,3 39,8 32,5 66,2 66,7 
No 38,4 61,7 60,2 67,6 33,9 33,3 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Figure 15. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 





Additional information on percent distribution of responses to this question can be 
found in Appendix C. 
 
3) Responses to the question about 'allegation-loadedness' differed according to the 
subtypes within both the balanced and the manipulated versions of the news reports. As is 
seen from Table 29, in all the three samples, a higher number of participants regarded the 
'alternative' subtype of the balanced version of the news report as more allegation-loaded 
compared to the 'traditional' one. In addition, the Italians showed the biggest difference in 
perception between the two subtypes, followed by the Dutch and, then, by the Austrians. As 
to the manipulated version of the news report, the Dutch participants judged the 'alternative' 
subtype as less allegation-loaded compared to the 'traditional' one. There were no differences 
in perception of both the subtypes in the Austrian and the Italian samples. In addition, the 
large majority of the Austrian and the Dutch participants said the manipulated news reports 
were not free of allegations, whereas a majority of the Italian participants held the opposite 
opinion (Tables 29 - 30).  
 
Table 29. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Would you 
say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the subtypes of the balanced 
version of news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Yes 38,8 26,7 24,2 20,0 56,7 38,6 
No 61,2 73,3 75,8 80,0 43,3 61,4 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 









Table 30. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Would you 
say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the subtypes of the 
manipulated version of news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Yes 7,5 18,8 14,1 18,4 57,5 58,5 
No 92,5 81,1 85,9 81,7 42,5 41,5 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
The comparison made between the balanced and manipulated versions with the merged 
'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes demonstrated that both versions were considered as 
allegation-loaded by the Austrian and the Dutch participants; although the balanced version in 
both cases was regarded to a lesser degree as having allegations. At the same time, more 
Italian participants viewed the balanced version as allegation-loaded and the manipulated 
version as allegation-free (Tables 31 and Figures 16). 
 
Table 31. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Would you 




Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 32,6 13,2 22,2 16,2 48,4 58,2 
No 67,4 86,7 77,8 83,8 51,7 41,9 










Figure 16. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Would 
you say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the type of the news report 
(by country)  
 
Additional information on percent distribution of responses to this question can be 
found in Appendix C. 
 
4) Responses to the question about 'overall trust' differed according to the subtypes 
within both the balanced and the manipulated versions of the news reports. As Table 32 
shows, a nearly equal number of the Austrian participants regarded different subtypes of the 
balanced version as trusted or mistrusted. However, a higher percentage in both cases stated 
that the news report cannot be trusted. At the same time, the Dutch and the Italian participants 
were more inclined to trust the news report. However, in both samples a higher percentage did 
not trust the 'alternative' subtype (Table 32). In regard to the manipulated version, the Dutch 
judged 'alternative' subtypes as more trustworthy, a majority of the Italian participants with 
almost equal percentage considered both subtypes as trustworthy, and only in the Austrian 
sample did a higher percentage view the 'alternative' subtype as untrustworthy and less 
trustworthy compared to the 'balanced' subtype (Tables 32 - 33). 






Table 32. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Overall, 
can the news report be trusted?" according to the subtypes of the balanced version of the 
news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Yes 65,7 53,5 39,7 40,0 68,7 56,2 
No 34,3 44,5 60,3 60,0 31,3 43,8 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*BT - balanced traditional, BA - balanced alternative 
 
Table 33. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Overall, 
can the news report be trusted?" according to the subtypes of the manipulated version of 
the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Yes 49,3 60,9 49,1 43,3 80,0 78,6 
No 50,8 39,1 50,9 56,6 20,0 21,5 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
 
When the 'traditional and the 'alternative' subtypes were merged within balanced and 
manipulated versions of the news reports and the combined versions were compared, it 
became evident that a higher percentage of the Austrian and the Italian participants viewed 
the balanced version as less trustworthy compared to the manipulated one, and an almost 
equal percentage of the Dutch regarded both versions as untrustworthy. With that, the 
majority of the Dutch and the Italian participants were more inclined to trust rather than 








Table 34. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Overall, 
can the news report be trusted?" according to the type of the news report (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 59,4 55,1 39,8 46,2 62,8 79,0 
No 40,5 44,8 60,2 53,8 37,2 20,9 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Figure 17. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Overall, 
can the news report be trusted?" according to the type of the news report (by country)  
 
 
Additional information on percent distribution of responses to this question can be 
found in Appendix C. 
 
The comparison made between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the balanced 
and manipulated versions of the news reports within each country sample did not reveal any 
tendencies or regularities for the Austrian sample as to preferring one subtype over another 
when considering the news reports from the viewpoints of fact-basedness, balance, allegation-
loadedness, and overall trust. The Dutch participants trusted the manipulated news report 
allegedly "taken from an alternative Internet news source" (denoted as "MA") to a higher 
degree than that "taken from a traditional Internet news source" (denoted as 'MT'); no 
138 
 
regularities in regard to subtypes of the balanced version were found. The Italian participants 
had less trust for the balanced version of the news report allegedly "taken from an alternative 
Internet news source" (denoted as 'BA') as compared to the one "taken from a traditional 
Internet news source" (denoted as 'BT'). Moreover, they placed higher trust in the manipulated 
version of the news report allegedly "taken from a traditional Internet news source" as 
compared to its 'alternative' counterpart in all but the "balance" questions. The results are 
shown in Figures 18-20 (where BT stands for 'balanced traditional', BA - 'balanced 
alternative', MT - 'manipulated traditional', MA - 'manipulated alternative').  
 
 
Figure 18. Comparison between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the 
balanced and manipulated versions of the news reports: the Netherlands* 
 










Figure 19. Comparison between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the 
balanced and manipulated versions of the news reports: Austria* 
 
* BT - balanced traditional, BA - balanced alternative, MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
 
Figure 20. Comparison between 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the 
balanced and manipulated versions of the news reports: Italy* 
 
* BT - balanced traditional, BA - balanced alternative, MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Finally, Table 35 provides summary statistics for the balanced and manipulated versions 
of the news reports for each country sample. As one can see, the mean and median values are 
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often similar or even identical between the two versions. Nevertheless, as it was shown above, 
in percentage terms differences in the perception of both versions still exist. However, the 
Italian participants remain trustful of the news reports the most.    
 
Table 35. Summary statistics for the balanced and manipulated versions of the 
news reports (by country) 
The news reports 
are... 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Fact-based M = 2,7 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,7 
M = 2,6 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,5 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,6 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 3,0 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,7 
M = 3,2 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
Balanced M = 2,7 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,4 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,3 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,2 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,7 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,7 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
Free from allegations M = 2,3 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,0 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,0 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,7 
M = 2,0 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,5 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,7 
M = 2,5 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
Overall can be trusted M = 2,6 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,5 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,3 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,4 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,7 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,8 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,5 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
 
B. Spotting scales: ordinal and binomial 
Ordinal spotting scale consisting of four questions 
All questions on the scale were statistically significant and positively correlated (see the 
information on correlations in Appendix C).  
As is seen from Table 36, on average, there are not significant differences in perception 
between the balanced and manipulated versions of the news report. In particular, mean and 
median values in the Austrian sample are identical and in the Dutch and Italian samples are 
close to each other as regards both versions of the news report and lie between the values of 
'2', which itself means that the news report is rather not fact-based, balanced, free of 
allegations and trusted, and '3', which itself means that the news report is still rather fact-
based, balanced, allegation-free and trusted. However, in addition, the average values for the 
majority of the Italian participants were closer to '3', and, specifically, the manipulated version 
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of the news report scored higher compared to the balanced one, that is as rather not 
manipulated. Table 37 provides details of the percent distribution of participant responses on 
the ordinal spotting scale of four questions.      
 
Table 36. Summary statistics for the ordinal spotting scale of four questions 
according to the type of news report (by country) 
 Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulate
d 






M = 2,5 
Md = 2,5 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,4 
Md = 2,2 
SD = 0,4 
M = 2,3 
Md = 2,2 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,3 
Md = 2,2 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,7 
Md = 2,7 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,8 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,5 
TOTAL, N 138 136 108 117 121 110 
 
 
Table 37. Percent distribution of participant responses on the ordinal spotting scale 
of four questions according to the type of the news report (by country) 
Responses the Netherlands Austria Italy 
































































































The percentage distribution of participant responses on the ordinal spotting scale of four 
questions demonstrates that the percentage of those who, according to the criteria of the 
manipulated media information in this study, regarded the manipulated news reports as such 
(that is, from the value of '1' - 'definitely no' to the value of '2' - 'rather no' inclusive) was 
35,9% for the Austrian sample, 27,2% for the Dutch sample and only 9,1% for the Italian 
sample. At the same time, the percentage of those who considered the manipulated version of 
the news report as not manipulated (that is, from the value of '4' - 'definitely yes' to the value 
of '3' - 'rather yes' inclusive) was 8,5%, 9,5% and 55,4%, respectively. All the other responses 
lay in between the values of '2' and '3' - 55,5%, 63,3% and 35,5%, respectively. The 
cumulative percentage numbers are shown in Table 38 and Figure 21.   
The comparison of the cumulative percentage numbers between the two versions of the 
news reports demonstrates, in particular, that the balanced version was perceived as 
manipulated by an even higher percentage of the Austrian and Italian participants in 
comparison to the actual manipulated version. The reasons for this may be varied. For one, 
although the balanced version of the news report was pretested before conducting the 
experimental sessions, 'balanced' might still mean different things for different people and, for 
this reason, be perceived differently; or one specific viewpoint in the news report might be 
more impressive and significant for some participants, thus, exerting greater influence on 
them, in comparison to another, opposite viewpoint; or there may be some flaws in some 
persons' critical media literacy skills. A more detailed account of this is provided in the 
Conclusions. 
 
Table 38. Cumulative percent distribution of participant responses on the ordinal 
spotting scale of four questions according to the type of the news report (by country) 
 Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
'No' (as spotting) 20,2 27,2 37,0 35,9 11,5 9,1 
Neither (in between) 53,0 63,3 49,0 55,5 51,2 35,5 
'Yes' (as non-spotting) 26,8 9,5 13,9 8,5 37,2 55,4 







Figure 21. Cumulative percent distribution of participant responses on the ordinal 
spotting scale of four questions according to the type of the news report (by country) 
     
 
Ordinal spotting scale consisting of three questions 
With the purpose of developing a better ordinal spotting scale, the question on the fact-
basedness of the news reports was excluded from the scale, and, therefore, a news one 
consisting of three questions was created. However, the results of both scales were quite 
similar to each other. Consequently, the spotting scale of four questions was used further. 
Summary statistics as well as percent distribution for the spotting scale of three questions can 
be found in Appendix C.  
 
Binomial spotting scale based on four questions 
Transformation of the ordinal spotting scale consisted of four questions (spotscale4) on 
a binomial 'spotting/non-spotting' scale (combining 'definitely no' and 'rather no' response 
options under the name of  'spotting', and 'definitely yes' and 'rather yes' response options 








Table 39. Distribution of participant responses on the binomial spotting scale based 
on four questions (by news report type and by country) 
Binomial 
response options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 












































In other words, only participants who answered 'no' to all the four questions were regarded as 
those who spotted manipulation, whereas all the others - participants who had answered 'yes' 
to all the four questions as well as those who had as individuals answered 'no' to less than four 
questions - were considered as those who did not spot manipulated information. As is seen 
from the table, the Austrian participants took the lead in spotting manipulation in manipulated 
news reports; however, in effect, there is not much difference between the Austrians and the 
Dutch as to this factor given a higher number of participants in the Dutch sample. The Italians 
showed the lowest percentage of those who had potted manipulation in the manipulated type 
of the news report. Table 40 demonstrates the percentage of the participants who either chose 
'yes' answers to all questions (referred to in the table as 'non-spotting') or responded 'no' to 
only 1 to 3 questions (referred to by the corresponding numbers of '1', '2' and '3') compared to 
those who had spotted manipulation.  
 
Table 40. Detailed elaboration of percentage of 'non-spotting' compared to 
'spotting' in participant responses on the binomial spotting scale based on four questions 
(by news report type and by country) 
Detailed response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Non-spotting 22,5 6,6 13,9 7,7 34,7 49,1 
1 23,2 22,8 14,8 17,9 22,3 20,9 
2 21,7 24,3 17,6 23,9 17,4 13,6 
3 15,2 24,3 22,2 22,2 15,7 8,2 
Spotting 17,4 22,1 31,5 28,2 9,9 8,2 




4.2.3. Second outcome variable - Accepting Manipulated News Report Standpoint, or 
who should be blamed for the situation  
The second outcome variable - accepting the standpoint(s) promoted in the manipulated 
news report - was measured by utilizing two questions. In particular, they aimed at revealing 
whether participants, first, understood or not the standpoint(s) a particular news report 
promoted and, second, personally accepted or not the standpoint(s), specifically, of the 
manipulated version of the news report. The standpoint(s) was understood to mean the 
attribution of responsibility for the death(s) of the protester(s) that was described in the news 
reports. The first of the two questions read "Is it clear to you from the news report who is 
responsible for the deaths described?"  and had four response options: definitely yes, rather 
yes, rather no, definitely no. The second question asked "Please indicate on whom you 
personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" (the underlining was used in the 
study questionnaire) and contained four response options: protesters, police, president, 
unclear. Participants were allowed to select more than one response option. As Tables 41 
shows, with regard to the first question, different subtypes of news reports - 'balanced 
traditional' (BT) and 'balanced alternative' (BA) - were assessed quite similarly by the 
Austrian participants. However, there was a difference between BT and BA conditions in the 
Dutch and Italian samples, where more participants in BT condition said it was not clear for 
them who was responsible for the deaths described. With respect to the manipulated version 
of the news report (Table 42), a higher number of the Austrian and Italian participants in the 
MT condition said it was clear who was responsible compared to those in the MA condition, 
whereas in the Dutch sample more participants in the MA condition said the same.  
 
Table 41. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Is it clear 
to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths described?" according to the 
subtypes of the balanced version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Yes 22,4 29,6 17,2 16,0 31,4 36,9 
No 77,6 70,4 82,8 84,0 68,6 63,1 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




Table 42. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Is it clear 
to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths described?" according to the 
subtypes of the manipulated version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Yes 26,9 36,2 45,6 38,3 57,5 51,4 
No 73,1 63,8 54,4 61,7 42,5 48,6 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Nevertheless, of greater interest was the general comparison made between different 
versions of the news report - balanced and manipulated - without their subdivision into 
'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes (Table 43 and Figure 22). As is seen from the table, in 
the balanced condition, 83,3% of the Austrian participants, 73.9% of the Dutch participants 
and 66.1% of the Italian participants said it was not clear for them who is responsible for the 
deaths described in the news report. Given that different standpoints on the situation as well 
as assigning responsibility were presented in the balanced version of the news report, a priori 
it was hypothesized that, at least, not all participants would have a clear understanding who 
was responsible for the deaths. On the other hand, in the manipulated condition, 58.1% of the 
Austrian participants and 68.4% of the Dutch participants said it was not clear who is 
responsible compared to 41.9% of the Austrians and 31.7% of the Dutch who said it was. In 
turn, in the Italian sample 53.6% of participants said it was clear compared to 46.4% of those 
who said it was not. Again, a priori, it was hypothesized that those who stated that it was not 
clear who is responsible may have answered this way either due to the manipulated nature of 
the news report, and thus any standpoint which it contained cannot be trusted and accepted at 









Table 43. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Is it clear 
to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths described?" according to the 
two versions of the news report (by country)  
Response options Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 26,1 31,7 16,7 41,9 33,9 53,6 

















Figure 22. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Is it clear 
to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths described?" according to the 
two versions of the news report (by country)  
 
 
Thus, following the aforementioned logic and given the results obtained for this 
question, the Austrian and the Dutch participants in both conditions and the Italian 
participants in the balanced condition were expected to perform well as to judging who is 
responsible for the situation described, and not accepting the standpoint of the manipulated 
version of the news report without reservation. The next question asked participants to 
indicate who in their personal opinion is responsible for the deaths described in the news 
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report, and was supposed to further elucidate whether participants' personal opinions were the 
same as the standpoint(s) proposed by the news reports or whether they were distinguished 
from them. Tables 44 - 46 demonstrate the distributions of participant responses to the 
question according to the subtypes of the news report versions and, then cumulatively, for the 
combined balanced and manipulated versions. 
In respect to the balanced condition, it is regarded as a normal situation when opinions 
are scattered across response options as different viewpoints as to who is responsible were 
presented in this version of the news report. With that, a majority of participants in all the 
three samples considered the situation described as 'unclear' in terms of being able to express 
a decided opinion on the subject (Table 44). That is exactly what was hypothesized a priori 
for perception with this kind of news report.  
 
Table 44. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" according 
to the subtypes of the balanced version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Protesters 7,5 15,5 13,8 12,0 4,7 5,3 
Police 11,9 8,5 12,1 2,0 12,5 14,0 
President 4,5 7,0 5,2 8,0 18,8 10,0 
President and 
police 
- 2,8 - - 1,6 - 
Protesters and 
police 
3,0 5,6 - - - - 
Protesters and 
president 
- - - - - - 
All of them 3,0 2,8 - - - - 















*BT - balanced traditional, BA - balanced alternative 
 
When the analysis was done by subtypes of the manipulated version of the news report, 
it turned out that in the Dutch sample a higher percentage of participants accepted the news 
report standpoint in the 'alternative' condition compared to the 'traditional' one (47.8% vs. 
37.3%, respectively), and in the Italian sample a reverse situation took place - 70% in the 
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'traditional' condition vs. 52.9% in the 'alternative' one (Table 45). This corresponds to the 
data with questions on spotting when the Dutch participants regarded the 'manipulated 
alternative' and the Italian participants the 'manipulated traditional' news reports as generally 
less manipulated (or more trustworthy, in other words) compared to their respective 
counterparts.    
 
Table 45. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" according 
to the subtypes of the manipulated version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Protesters 6,0 - 1,8 1,7 - 4,3 
Police 9,0 17,4 35,1 30,0 32,5 15,7 
President 11,9 11,6 22,8 13,3 37,5 34,3 
President and 
police 
16,4 18,8 - 1,7 - 2,9 
Protesters and 
police 
3,0 1,4 - - - - 
Protesters and 
president 
- - - - - - 
All of them 3,0 8,7 - - - - 















*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Further comparison made between the balanced and manipulated conditions, (that is,  
the versions of the news reports without their subdivision into 'traditional' and 'alternative' 
conditions), revealed that in the manipulated condition the percent number of participants who 
could not offer a definite opinion as to placing responsibility was from 1.4 to 2 times less than 
in the balanced condition. In particular, given that in this version of the news report the 
responsibility was allegedly assigned to the police and/or president, participants who selected 
the response options 'police', 'president' or both were judged as those who accepted the 
standpoint of the manipulated news report. Overall, 51.3% of the Austrian participants, 42.6% 
of the Dutch participants and 59.1% of the Italian participants, upon reading the manipulated 
news report, indicated that in their personal opinion, responsibility must be assigned to either 
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the police, or president, or both (Table 46). Consequently, the aforementioned percentage of 
participants in each sample showed susceptibility to influence by manipulated media 
information in adopting the event evaluation the news report promoted.  
 
Table 46. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" according 
to the two versions of the news report (by country)  
Response options Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Protesters 11,6 2,9 13,0 1,7 5,0 2,7 
Police 10,1 13,2 7,4 32,5 13,2 21,8 
President 5,8 11,8 6,5 17,9 14,9 35,5 
President and 
police 
1,4 17,6 - 0,9 0,8 1,8 
Protesters and 
police 
4,3 2,2 - - - - 
Protesters and 
president 
- - - - - - 
All of them 2,9 5,9 - - - - 
















Further, as the manipulated news report standpoints indicated that the police or 
president or both should have been blamed, these options were combined under the value of '1 
- 'accepting standpoint', and the others under the value of '0 - non-accepting standpoint'. This 
recoded question for placing responsibility with two categorical values brought the following 








Table 47. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?"  (the 
manipulated version of the news report; categorical values; by country)   
Response options Netherlands Austria  Italy 
N % N % N % 
Non-accepting standpoint 78 57,4% 57 48,7% 45 40,9% 
Accepting standpoint 58 42,6% 60 51,3% 65 59,1% 
TOTAL, N (%) 136 100% 117 100% 110 100% 
 
Figure 23. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" (the 
manipulated type of the news report; categorical values; by country)   
 
As is seen from the above, the Dutch participants gain the lead in not accepting the 
standpoint(s) of the manipulated news report followed by the Austrian participants. However, 
the difference in 'accepting/non-accepting' is less substantial for the Austrians as compared to 
the Dutch and the Italians. 
When the variable with two categorical values for placing responsibility was tested 






Table 48. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" according 
to the subtypes of the manipulated version of the news report* (categorical; by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Non-accepting 
standpoint 
62,7% 52,2% 42,1% 55,0% 30,0% 47,1% 
Accepting 
standpoint 















*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Hence, the Exploratory Question 3, which asked whether there is any difference in 
perception of 'traditional' and 'alternative' subtypes of the news report, is supported to the 
extent that within the manipulated condition the news report allegedly taken from an 
alternative Internet news sources is trusted more by the Dutch participants compared to the 
traditional Internet news sources, whereas one allegedly taken from traditional Internet news 
sources is regarded as more trustworthy by the Italian and the Austrian participants compared 
to the alternative Internet news sources. Although, when asked about the trustworthiness of 
these two types of Internet news sources, the Dutch, the Italians and the Austrians judged the 
alternative ones as less trustworthy compared to the traditional news sources. Presumably, 
only when manipulated media information was encountered, did it become significant for the 
news consumers of all three countries what type of Internet news source reported the 
information, for this predetermined the level of trust in the news. This finding will be 
discussed in further detail in the Conclusions.  
When a chi-square test for independence was performed within the manipulated 
condition (the manipulated news report without its subdivision into two subtypes) for the 
recoded questions "Is it clear to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths 
described?" and "Please indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths 
described?", both transformed into questions with binary responses ('yes/no' for the former 
and 'accepting/non-accepting' for the latter), the results were significant for all the three 
samples. In particular, for the Austrian sample the result was χ
2
(df = 1, N = 117) = 19.81, p 
<0.001, Phi value is 0.411; for the Dutch sample the result was χ
2
(df = 1, N = 136) = 38.60, p 
<0.001, Phi value is 0.533; and for the Italian sample the result was χ
2
(df = 1, N = 110) = 
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30.22, p <0.001, Phi value is 0.524.  
Thus, the results suggest that a strong positive association exists in all samples between 
understanding who is named responsible for the death(s) of the protester(s) in the manipulated 
news report and the personal placing of responsibility by the study participants. In other 
words, those of the participants who answered that it was unclear from the news report who 
was responsible for the deaths were unlikely to accept the standpoint(s) promoted in the 
manipulated news report. And vice versa: those of the participants who responded that it was 
clear who was responsible more likely accepted the standpoint(s) of the manipulated news 
report. Table 49 demonstrates the results.    
Finally, when a chi-square test for independence with the same questions was conducted 
for each of the two subtypes of the manipulated news report, for the Austrian and the Italian 
samples, the results for the 'traditional' subtype appeared to be much worse compared to the 
results for the 'alternative' subtype. In particular, for the Austrian sample the results were χ
2
(df 
= 1, N = 57) = 4.52, p < 0.05, Phi value is 0.282 for the 'traditional' subtype and χ
2
(df = 1, N = 
60) = 16.67, p <0.001, Phi value is 0.527 - for the 'alternative' subtype; for the Italian sample 
the results were χ
2
(df = 1, N = 40) = 4.10, p < 0.05, Phi value is 0.320 for the 'traditional' 
subtype and χ
2
(df = 1, N = 69) = 27.63, p <0.001, Phi value is 0.628 for the 'alternative' 
subtype. As to the Dutch sample, the results were comparable across the two subtypes for the 
manipulated news report; however, slightly higher indices were found for the 'alternative' one: 
χ
2
(df = 1, N = 69) = 20.56, p <0.001, Phi value is 0.546 as compared to χ
2
(df = 1, N = 67) = 













Table 49. Chi-square test for independence between recoded questions 'is it clear 
who is responsible' and 'placing responsibility' by country (the manipulated news report) 
SAMPLE Placing 
responsibility 
 Is it clear who is responsible for 



















































































































































4.3. Measurement participant attitudes toward the scene of action of the news 
report - Republic of Moldova 
Given that both types of the news reports depicted events that supposedly took place in 
Moldova, I measured participants' attitudes toward the country, ranging from '1', 'very 
unfavorable', to '5', 'very favorable'. No significant differences were found between those who 
read 'balanced' and 'manipulated' news reports later in the experiment. In subsequent statistical 
tests, the participant attitudes toward Moldova have been naturally taken into account. Please 
see Appendix C for detailed numbers.  
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4.4. Statistical tests of the study Hypotheses and Exploratory Questions 
4.4.1. Tests of the study Hypotheses 
There were two explanatory and two outcome variables in the study. The first 
explanatory variable was 'individual political competence', which was measured using the 
political competence scale. The second explanatory variable was a 'country media literacy 
context', which was measured by applying the citizenship variable as a proxy. This variable 
had three levels, coded '1' for participants with Austrian citizenship, '2' for those with Dutch 
citizenship and '3' for persons with Italian citizenship. The first outcome variable was 
'spotting manipulated information', which was measured using the binomial spotting scale. 
The second outcome variable was 'accepting a news report standpoint(s)', which was 
measured by the question placing responsibility [for the deaths]-recoded.  
To test Hypothesis 1, which stated that individuals with higher levels of political 
competence should be more able to spot manipulated media information, logistic regression 
by country was run with the political competence scale and the binomial spotting scale as the 
explanatory and outcome variables, respectively. Results turned out to be non-significant for 
every country (Table 50). Exclusion of those participants who had studied political science 
from the analysis did not change the overall picture. 
 
Table 50. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the manipulated news report with the political competence scale 
as the explanatory variable (by country) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 


































When logistic regression tests were run separately for the subtypes of the manipulated 
news report, the political competence scale was significant at p < 0.1 for the Dutch for the 
'traditional' subtype of the news report (χ
2 
= 3,24, df = 1, N = 66, p < 0.08) (Table 51); results 
remained non-significant for the 'alternative' subtypes for every country. Interestingly, the 
beta (B) coefficient is negative, so possessing higher levels of political competence makes the 
Dutch participants less likely to spot manipulated information in the 'traditional' subtype of 
the manipulated news report. Moreover, when those of the Dutch participants who studied 
political science were excluded from the logistic regression test on this subtype of the news 
report, the results improved (χ
2 
= 4,46, df = 1, N = 35, p < 0.05) (Table 52). To put it another 
way, the type of the news source affected how Dutch participants assessed the information the 
news source provided: trust in manipulated information coming from 'traditional' Internet 
news sources increased as individual levels of political competence advanced. As such, in the 
Dutch sample, higher political competence was associated with higher trust in 'traditional' 
Internet news sources. Thus here the role of political competence appeared to be different 
from that suggested by the Hypothesis 1.  
 
Table 51. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the news report with political 
competence scale as the explanatory variable (by country) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 




































Table 52. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the news report with political 
competence scale as the explanatory variable (the Dutch participants not affiliated 
themselves with political science department) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 











Testing each of the five components of the political competence scale as explanatory 
variables separately and spotting as the outcome variable, by country and subtype of the 
manipulated news report, revealed that 'interest in politics' (interpol), 'intentional getting 
political information from news media' (polinfor) and 'factual political knowledge' (polqscal) 
were significant for the Dutch sample in 'manipulated traditional' condition (χ
2 
= 5,38 df = 1, 
N = 67, p < 0.05; χ
2 
= 6,30 df = 1, N = 67, p < 0.05 and χ
2 
= 2,88 df = 1, N = 67, p < 0.1) 
(Table 53 - 55). The beta (B) coefficients were negative in all cases. 
   
Table 53. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the news report with interest in 
politics as the explanatory variable  
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 




































Table 54. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the news report with intentional 
getting political information from news media as the explanatory variable  
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 
Dutch Getting political information 































Table 55. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the news report with factual political 
knowledge as the explanatory variable  
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 
Dutch Factual political knowledge 






























When those Dutch participants who studied political science were excluded from the 
analysis, the results for interest in politics and intentional getting political information from 
news media remained much the same. However, values of chi-square, beta coefficients and 
significance level for factual political knowledge improved considerably (χ
2 
= 10,65 df = 1, N 
= 36, p < 0.01) (Table 56). 
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Table 56. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the news report with factual political 
knowledge as the explanatory variable (the Dutch participants not affiliated with 
political science department) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 
Dutch Factual political knowledge 










Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Moreover, statistically significant results 
with negative beta coefficients for interest in politics, intentional getting political information 
from news media and factual political knowledge found in the Dutch sample go to prove that 
(1) the less participants were interested in politics, (2) the less they intentionally consumed 
political information from the news media, and (3) the less factual political knowledge they 
demonstrated, then the more the Dutch participants were able to spot manipulated media 
information in the news report which allegedly was taken from 'traditional' Internet news 
sources.  
Hypothesis 2 assumed that those with higher levels of political competence should be 
less likely to accept a standpoint from the manipulated news report as to who should be 
blamed for the situation described in the news report. Logistic regression analysis for the 
manipulated news report condition was performed with the recoded question on placing 
responsibility with two categorical response options, 'non-accepting/accepting', as the 
outcome variable and political competence scale as the explanatory variable. The test results 
were not significant for any sample. Conducting logistic regression analysis for each of the 
two subtypes of the manipulated news report brought the same results of non-significance. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that manipulated media information in the Internet news report on a 
novel international affairs topic would more likely be spotted in countries with a more 
advanced media literacy context. To check the hypothesis, I ran a logistic regression test. The 
variable depicting citizenship was used as an explanatory variable, and the binomial scale of 
spotting was used as an outcome variable. Given that spotting manipulation in manipulated 
news reports was of primary interest for this study, tests were conducted for this condition 
only: first, for the manipulated news reports without their subdivision into 'traditional' and 
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'alternative' subtypes; and second, for each of the subtypes separately.  
Thus, for the manipulated type of the news report, logistic regression analysis brought 
the following results shown in Table 57 below (with 'Italian' as a reference category): 
 
Table 57. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the manipulated news report with media literacy context as the 
explanatory variable (reference category 'Italian') 

















As one can see, when only citizenship was entered into the equation, the model was 
significant (χ
2 
= 16,60, df = 2, N = 363, p < 0.001), indicating that from 4.5% to 7% of the 
variance in whether manipulated media information spotting can be predicted from this 
variable. The odds of spotting manipulation in news reports were 4.4 times higher for the 
Austrian and 3.2 times higher for the Dutch participants as compared to the Italians. When the 
reference category was changed from 'Italian' to 'Austrian', 'Dutch' was not significant. This 
result underlined that both the Dutch and the Austrian participants showed closely similar 
scores as to spotting (in fact, manipulation was spotted by 30 Dutch participants vs. 33 
Austrian ones) (Table 58).  
 
Table 58. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the manipulated news report with media literacy context as the 
explanatory variable (reference category 'Austrian') 




















When logistic regression tests were run separately for the subtypes of the manipulated 
news report, the results obtained showed lower significance levels as well as different odds 
ratios for the Dutch participants as compared to the Italians depending on a particular subtype 
of the manipulated news report: 3.9 for the 'traditional' and 2.7 for the 'alternative' (Tables 59 
- 60). 
 
Table 59. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'traditional' subtype of the manipulated news report with 
media literacy context as the explanatory variable (reference category 'Italian') 


















Table 60. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the 'alternative' subtype of the manipulated news report with 
media literacy context as the explanatory variable (reference category 'Italian') 

















Given that some of the Austrian and the Dutch participants - and none of the Italians - 
studied political science, I tried to find out whether this characteristic may to a certain extent 
have been decisive in the citizen variable influence on spotting. I ran logistic regression 
analysis for the manipulated news report with the same explanatory and outcome variables but 
excluded those participants who stated they studied political science. The results were similar 
to those demonstrated above.  
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Thus, the obtained outcomes for Hypothesis 3 indicate of the following:  
(1) the two countries having more advanced media literacy contexts (the Netherlands 
and Austria) demonstrated higher scores on spotting manipulated media information as 
compared to the country ranked lower on the same criterion (Italy); 
(2) however, in spotting, Austria showed somewhat higher scores compared to the 
Netherlands, which, in turn, ranked higher on media literacy context; 
(3) in addition, for the Austrian participants, there was not much difference in the odds 
ratios for 'traditional' and 'alternative' conditions of the manipulated news report when 
compared to the reference condition, while the odds ratios for the Dutch, when compared to 
the Italians, showed difference as a function of a particular subtype of the news report. To put 
it differently, the degree of spotting manipulated media information was dependent on which 
Internet news sources provided the information - the traditional or the alternative ones; 
(4) citizenship, as a proxy for the countries' media literacy context, accounted for only 
4,5% - 7% of the of the variance in whether manipulated media information spotted can be 
predicted from the variable.  
In view of the last, hierarchical logistic regression was performed with variables of the 
political competence scale, the informed media mistrust scale, and gender. Neither political 
competence scale nor gender were significant; informed media mistrust was significant at p < 
0.05. In addition, the explanatory power of the model increased only slightly - to  6% -10%. 
The significance level and odds ratios for Austrian and Dutch also increased and became 
almost equal to each other. (Table 61). 
Table 61. Summary of hierarchical logistic regression analysis predicting spotting 
manipulated media information from the manipulated news report with citizenship, 
political competence scale, informed media mistrust scale and gender as explanatory 
variables (reference category 'Italian') 
Condition B SE Odds ratio p 
Dutch 
Austrian 
Political competence scale 
Informed media mistrust scale 






























However, when the informed media mistrust scale was entered as the explanatory 
variable with the binomial spotting scale as the outcome variable separately for each country, 
only for the Dutch case was there a positive significance at p < 0.05 (Table 62). In addition, 
when the manipulated news report was analyzed by the two subtypes, only the 'alternative' 
one eventually showed significance at p < 0.05 for the Dutch participants, whereas the 
'traditional' was non-significant.    
 
Table 62. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting spotting manipulated 
media information from the manipulated news report with informed media mistrust scale 
as the explanatory variable (by country) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 































Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported only partly. Indeed, participants from the countries 
ranked higher on media literacy showed better scores on spotting manipulated media 
information. However, the relationship implies that some unobserved (in this study) variables 
exist as well as the moderating effects of different subtypes of the manipulated news reports 
in the Dutch and the Italian samples on spotting the manipulation.   
Hypothesis 4 assumed that participants who spotted manipulation in the news report 
would not accept the standpoint it promoted as to assigning responsibility for the death(s) 
described. The hypothesis was tested using the chi-square test of independence. The test was 
conducted with two variables: the original variant of the question on 'placing responsibility' 
(placeres) and binomial spotting scale. However, given that the participants could choose 
multiple response options when responding to this question, not every option eventually had 
the expected values of more than 5. As is known from Cochran (1952), if the expected values 
164 
 
are less than 1 or if more than 20% of them are less than 5, the test results might be 
suspicious. Some scholars, however, consider this 'rule of thumb' as too restrictive (in 
particular, Conover (1999)). I ran the same test with the recoded question on 'placing 
responsibility' with two categorical response options - 'non-accepting/accepting standpoint'. 
The relation between the aforementioned variables was significant in the Austrian sample, 
χ
2
(df = 1, N = 117) = 16.63, p <0.001, and the Dutch sample, χ
2
(df = 1, N = 136) = 5.87, p 
<0.05. The relation was not significant in the Italian sample. The phi value was -0.377 for the 
Austrian sample, indicating a relationship of moderate strength between the variables, and -
0.208 for the Dutch sample, indicating a weak relationship between the variables. Adding into 
the test the variables of gender, department affiliation (controlling for possible effects of 
studying political science) and the informed media mistrust scale as control variables did not 
produce significant results for any sample. Thus spotting manipulation in the news report and 
accepting the standpoint promoted by the manipulated news report were significantly and 
negatively related in the Austrian and the Dutch samples, implying that those who spotted 
manipulated media information would be unlikely to accept its standpoint(s). Interestingly, 
though, as Table 63 shows, in each of the three samples there were participants who 'spotted' 
manipulation in the news report, but who still accepted the standpoint: namely, who should be 














Table 63. Chi-square test for independence between placing responsibility - recoded 
and the binomial spotting scale (by country) 
















































































































































As is seen from the Table, seven participants in both the Austrian and the Dutch 
samples, and three participants in the Italian sample, accepted the standpoints despite 
'spotting' manipulation. There was no 'preferred' subtype of the manipulated news report for 
those who at the same time 'spotted-and-accepted': as for the 'traditional one, there were four 
Austrian, three Dutch and two Italian participants who did so, whereas regarding the 
'alternative' subtype, accordingly, three Austrian, four Dutch and one Italian participants 
showed such 'inconsistent' results. The reasons that made the participants accept - or agree 
with - the standpoint of the manipulated news report, although they had just moments before 
judged it to be based on facts, not balanced, loaded with allegations and such that it cannot be 
trusted, are not quite clear and can only be theoretically assumed here. The detailed account of 
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the issue will be given in the Conclusions.  
 
 4.4.2. Tests of the study Exploratory Questions 
There were four exploratory questions in the study. 
Exploratory Question 1 asked whether there is a relationship between a country's media 
literacy context and the level of informed media mistrust shown by the country's participants 
(the variable of the informed media mistrust scale was transformed into a categorical one with 
two response options 'overall positive attitudes/overall negative attitudes').  
Cronbach's alpha computed for the informed media mistrust scale was 0.74 for the 
Austrian sample, 0.63 for the Dutch sample and 0.62 for the Italian sample.   
Mean values for the informed media mistrust scale seem comparable across country 
samples, as is shown in Table 64.      
 
Table 64. Average measures of informed media mistrust scale (by country) 





X = 2,3 
Md = 2,2 
SD = 0,3 
 
 
X = 2,4 
Md = 2,2 
SD = 0,4 
 
 
X = 2,5 
Md = 2,5 
SD = 0,4 
 
TOTAL, N 274 225 233 
 
 
However, looking at the scale values distribution in more detail, one can see that the 
Italian participants are to some degree more media skeptical compared to the Austrian and, 
especially, Dutch participants. Thus, if we take the value of 2,50 as the middle score of the 
scale, conditionally dividing it into two parts (figuratively speaking, 'higher media trust' vs. 
'lower media trust'), we will see that 35.7 percent of the Italian participants expressed their 
mistrust toward news media in general compared to 22.5 percent of the Austrian participants 
and 14.5 percent of the Dutch participants. Moreover, those who stated their trust in news 
media in the range between 'rarely' and 'never' was 18.1 percent in the Italian case compared 
to 13.2 percent in the Austrian case and 6.5 percent in the Dutch case. The results are shown 




Table 65. Informed media mistrust scale values distribution, % & N (by country) 
 Netherlands Austria Italy 





























































































TOTAL, % (N) 100%      (274) 100%    (225) 100%     (233) 
 
Figure 24. Percent distribution of values for informed media mistrust scale (by 
country) 
 
Further analysis of each of the four questions comprising the informed media mistrust 
scale is described in Appendix C. 
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A chi-square test was employed to see if the relationship exists. The variables of 
citizenship, as a proxy for a country media literacy context, and recoded informed media 
mistrust scales were analyzed. The relationship between the two variables was statistically 
significant (χ
2
(df = 2, N = 732) = 30.93, p < 0.001, Cramer's V value is 0.206). With that, 
based upon adjusted residuals values, the Dutch (adjusted residuals of 4,5/-4,5) and the Italian 
samples (adjusted residuals of -5,1/5,1) contributed the most to the significance in comparison 
to the Austrian sample (adjusted residuals of 0,5/-0,5). Table 66, combining the countries' 
media literacy contexts, mean and median values for the informed media mistrust scale by 
country, and percentage numbers for those who expressed clear positive or clear negative 
attitudes on the scale, demonstrates that the higher a country's media literacy context, the 
lower level of informed media mistrust that country's participants reveal (Table 66 & Figure 
25). 
 
Table 66. Relationship between country media literacy context and measures of 











mean, median & 
SD values 
% of clearly 
positive attitudes 
toward trust in 
news media*  
% of clearly 
negative attitudes 






X = 2,3 
Md = 2,2 











X = 2,4 
Md = 2,2 











X = 2,5 
Md = 2,5 














Figure 25. Relationship between country media literacy context and measures of 
informed media mistrust scale (by country) 
 
Therefore, the Exploratory Question 1 can be answered in the affirmative: there is a 
statistically significant relationship between a country's media literacy rank and the level of 
informed media mistrust the country's participants show. Interestingly, though, the higher a 
country was ranked on media literacy, the higher media trust was demonstrated by the 
participants - which, to a certain extent, looks strange, for the more media literate a person is, 
the more critical he or she is expected to be of news media content in general. Moreover, the 
higher media literacy rank a country had, the wider the percentage gap was between overall 
'trust' and 'mistrust' in news media. After the participants studying political science were 
excluded from the analysis, the results remained much the same. 
Exploratory Question 2 asked whether political competence and informed media 
mistrust were related. To answer the question, Person's correlation test was performed with 
the political competence scale and informed media mistrust scale. Results of the test were 
non-significant for each sample. Components of the political competence scale tested 
separately against the informed media mistrust scale did not bring any significant results, 
either, nor did constituents of the latter when tested against the components of the former one 
by one. Controlling for gender and department affiliation did not change the picture. 
Consequently, political competence and informed media mistrust were not related; 
Exploratory Question 2 is answered in the negative.      
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Exploratory Question 3 asked whether there was a difference in perception of the 
manipulated news report allegedly taken from 'traditional' and 'alternative' Internet news 
sources as to spotting manipulation and accepting the standpoint the news report promoted. 
As was shown previously in the subsection of this chapter on Descriptive statistics, the answer 
was positive, at least, for the Dutch and the Italian samples. Thus the Dutch participants who 
read the manipulated news report overall regarded its 'alternative' subtype as more trustworthy 
in the sense that it was viewed as less manipulated on the spotting scale compared to the 
'traditional' one, and the standpoint of the former was accepted by a higher number of the 
participants compared to the latter. Conversely, the Italian participants credited the 
'traditional' subtype of the manipulated news report with greater trust compared to the 
'alternative' subtype as regards spotting manipulation and accepting the report's standpoint. 
The Austrian participants drew no distinction between the two subtypes of the manipulated 
news report as concerns spotting manipulation, however a higher number of participants 
accepted the standpoint of the news report allegedly taken from a 'traditional' Internet news 
source. Hence, there was a difference in perception of the manipulated news report as to 
spotting manipulation and accepting the standpoint the news report promoted depending on 
the type of Internet news sources, traditional or alternative, where the news report was 
allegedly taken from. A more detailed account of the issue will be given in the Conclusions. 
Finally, Exploratory Question 4 asked whether there was a relationship between more 
intensive Internet use by participants for getting news of any kind and spotting manipulated 
media information as well as accepting the standpoint the manipulated news report promoted. 
To answer this question, a logistic regression test was run with the "Online sources use in a 
typical week for getting news" question as an explanatory variable and the spotting binomial 
scale and placing responsibility-recoded question as outcome variables for the manipulated 
news report condition. The analysis revealed no relationship in any sample between online 
sources use in a typical week and spotting manipulated information for both subtypes of the 
manipulated news report combined as well as for each of them taken separately. However, I 
found a significant positive relationship (p < 0.05) between 'online sources use in a typical 
week' and 'placing responsibility' in the Austrian sample (Table 67). As one can see, the 
relationship might be interpreted as follows: those who used online sources for getting news 
more often, more likely accepted the standpoint of the manipulated news report (the odds 





Table 67. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting 'placing responsibility' 
from 'online sources use in a typical week for getting news' (for both subtypes of the 
manipulated news report, by country) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 































When the two subtypes of the manipulated news report were analyzed separately, the 
significant relationship between the variables was found only for the 'traditional' one (Table 
68).  
 
Table 68. Summary of logistic regression analysis predicting 'placing responsibility' 
from 'online sources use in a typical week for getting news' (for 'traditional' subtype of 
the manipulated news report, by country) 
Condition Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 































Thus those who used online sources more often, had odds ratios of 1.6 greater (or 60% more) 
for accepting the standpoint the 'traditional' subtype of the manipulated news report promoted, 
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as compared to those whose use of online sources was rarer. No effects of gender or 
department affiliation were found. Consequently, the answer to the Exploratory Question 4 is 
positive with respect to accepting the standpoint of the 'traditional' subtype of the manipulated 
news report by the Austrian participants. The reasons behind the results warrant further 
investigation.  
 
Below is the summary table (Table 69) on the Hypotheses and Exploratory Questions 
with regard to the target group of participants aged 18-26 years.   
 
Table 69. Summary of the outcomes of the study Hypotheses and Exploratory 
Questions  
Hypotheses and Exploratory 
Questions (EQs) 
Concise description Outcomes 
Hypothesis 1 The higher the political competence level of individuals, 
the more likely manipulated media information will be 
spotted 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2 The higher the political competence level is, the less 




Hypothesis 3 Manipulated media information will more likely be 




Hypothesis 4 Those who spot manipulation in the news report will not 
accept the standpoint the news report promotes.  
Supported for the 
Dutch and the 
Austrian samples 
EQ 1 Is there a relationship between a country media literacy 
context and informed media mistrust?  
Positive  
EQ 2 Is there a relationship between political competence and 
informed media mistrust? 
Negative 
EQ 3 Is there a difference between perception of 'traditional' 
and 'alternative' subtypes of the manipulated news report 
as to spotting manipulation and accepting the standpoint? 
 
Positive  
EQ 4 Is there a relationship between online sources use in a 
typical week for getting news and spotting manipulated 
media information as well as accepting its standpoint? 







PART 2. The Italian sample 
 
In this study, the target group in each of the three countries included persons aged 18-26 
years - the category that is usually referred to as the 'heaviest Internet users'. However, the 
Italian sample afforded an opportunity to compare three age categories - 18-26, 27-35, and 
36≤ year olds - on major points: individual levels of political competence as well as its role in 
spotting manipulated media information and accepting / rejecting the standpoint(s) the 
information promotes. Besides, some other key points were compared across the three age 
categories of the Italian sample. In this part, only principal data and statistical results are 
displayed. Additional statistical data on the Italian sample can be found in Appendix D.   
The Italian sample consisted of 394 participants in total. Of those, 237 participants were 
in the age category of 19-26 years old, 85 participants were in the age category of 27-35 years 
old, and 72 participants were in the age category of 36≤ years old (the oldest participants was 
aged 59). Table 70 below provided data on participant age. 
 
Table 70. Age of the participants of the Italian sample (by age category; total N = 394) 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 22 30 43,4 
Md 22 30 43 
SD 2 2,7 5,5 
N 237 85 72 
 
The number of participants in the Italian sample by age group assigned to read different 
types/subtypes of the news reports is shown below in Table 71, and summary statistics on the 
age of the participants according to the news report type/subtype is demonstrated in Table 72.  
 
Table 71. Number of participants assigned to different types and subtypes of news 
reports by age category 
Age 
category 
Balanced report Manipulated report  
TOTAL BT BA Total MT MA Total  
19 - 26 y.o. 68 57 125 40 72 112 237 
27 - 35 y.o. 20 22 42 19 24 43 85 




Table 72. Summary statistics on participants' ages according to different types and 
subtypes of news reports by age category 
Age 
category 
Balanced report Manipulated report  
TOTAL BT BA Total MT MA Total  
 
19 - 26 y.o. 
X = 22,2 
Md. = 22 
SD = 2,0 
X = 22,5 
Md. = 22 
SD = 2,2 
X = 22,3 
Md. = 22 
SD = 2,1 
X = 21,4 
Md. = 21 
SD = 1,8 
X = 21,8 
Md. = 21,5 
SD = 2,0 
X = 21,6 
Md. = 21 
SD = 1,9 
X = 22 
Md. = 22 
SD = 2,1 
 
27 - 35 y.o. 
X = 31 
Md. = 31 
SD = 2,6 
X = 30,4 
Md. = 30 
SD = 2,8 
X = 30,5 
Md. = 30 
SD = 2,7 
X = 29,7 
Md. = 29 
SD = 2,6 
X = 30,2 
Md. = 30 
SD = 2,8 
X = 30,1 
Md. = 30 
SD = 2,7 
X = 30,3 
Md. = 30 
SD = 2,7 
 
36 ≤ y.o. 
X = 42,6 
Md. = 40,5 
SD = 5,1 
X = 43,2 
Md. = 40 
SD = 6,1 
X = 43 
Md. = 40 
SD = 5,6 
X = 42,6 
Md. = 43 
SD = 4,6 
X = 45,1 
Md. = 45 
SD = 6,1 
X = 43,9 
Md. = 44 
SD = 5,5 
X = 43,4 
Md. = 43 
SD = 5,5 
 
As is seen, age is quite comparable across the news report conditions within the age 
categories of 18-26 and 27-35 years old. However, in the age groups of 36 ≤ years old, in 
particular as to the 'manipulated' condition, there is some misfit with regard to participants' 
ages. 
 
4.5. Main explanatory variable - Political Competence 
 The descriptive data on the components on the political competence scale showed that 
the participants in the age category of 36 years and older overall demonstrated higher scores 
compared to the other two age categories. By gender, there were no significant differences: 
males were only slightly more active in getting political information, participating in certain 
types of political sctivities and possessing factual political knowledge. For details please see 
Appendix D.   
Participants aged 36 years and older scored the highest on the political competence 






Table 73. Summary statistics of political competence scale by age group 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 17,1 18,0 21,0 
Md 17,0 17,0 21,0 
SD 5,9 6,3 5,3 
Min. 1 5 6 
Max. 32 32 33 
Range 31 27 27 
N 221 81 64 
 
With respect to gender, males scored higher than females on the political competence 
scale (see Appendix D for further details). 
 
4.6. Outcome variables (and questions inextricably associated with them) 
Given that the age category of 19-26 years old was analyzed in Part I of this chapter and 
the number of participants in the other two age categories is not comparable to the first one, 
responses to the following questions are compared according to the two types or versions of 
the news reports - 'balanced' and manipulated', without their subdivision into the subtypes. In 
the process of analysis, no striking meaningful differences worth noting were found between 
perception of different subtypes of the news reports by participants in the age categories of 
27-35 and 36 ≤ years old. 
 
4.6.1. Measuring the importance of the topic of the news reports and their 
understandability 
The great majority of participants in all age groups considered the news reports as 
important. Moreover, the manipulated version is regarded as far more important compared to 
the balanced one. In regard to the 'understandability' question, again, the great majority of 
participants in all age categories viewed the descriptions of the situations in the news report as 
easy to understand. In addition, the participants in the age category of 27-35 years old 
evaluated both 'balanced' and 'manipulated' versions similarly. However, in two other age 
categories a higher percentage of participants regarded the 'balanced' one as less 
'understandable' compared to the 'manipulated' news report, which makes sense as the 
situation is described from various points of view. For detailed numbers of percent 
distribution, please see Appendix D. 
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4.6.2. First outcome variable - Spotting Manipulated Media Information 
A. Questions measured spotting manipulated information 
Fact-basedness, balance, allegation-loadedness of the news reports and overall trust in it 
were measured by original questions with four ordinal response options: 'definitely no', rather 
no', rather yes', 'definitely yes'. Then these response options were recoded so that to take the 
form of the binary response options 'yes/no' (as was explained in the previous chapter, 
'definitely no' and 'rather no' were summed up as well as 'definitely yes' and 'rather yes'). Here 
are shown percent distributions of responses to the recoded questions measured spotting 
manipulated information. Information on percent distribution of responses to the original 
questions, with four ordinal response options, measured spotting manipulated information can 
be found in Appendix D. 
1) Responses to the question about 'fact-basedness' demonstrated that the great majority 
of the participants in all age categories considered the news reports as fact-based. In addition, 
if the 'balanced' one was estimated as so by more than 70% of the participants in each age 
category, the percentage rose to more than 80% in respect of the 'manipulated' version of the 
news report (Table 74). 
 
Table 74. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 79,9 89,2 75,6 86,0 71,4 86,5 
No 20,1 10,8 24,4 14,0 28,6 13,5 
TOTAL, N 124 111 41 43 35 37 
 
2) Responses to the question about 'balance' showed that the 'manipulated' version of the 
news report was viewed as even more balanced compared to the 'balanced' one in all age 
categories. Moreover, the participants in the age category of 19-26 years old appeared to have 
the highest percentage among the three age categories of persons who regarded the 





Table 75. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 66,2 66,7 54,7 71,5 60,0 70,3 
No 33,8 33,3 45,3 28,5 40,0 29,7 
TOTAL, N 124 111 42 42 35 37 
 
 
3) Responses to the question about 'allegation-loadedness' showed that the majority of 
participants in the age categories of 19-26 and 27-35 and the great majority in the age 
category of 36 ≤ years old viewed the 'manipulated' version of the news report as free from 
allegations (Table 76). 
 
Table 76. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Would you 
say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the type of the news reports 
(by age category)  
Response 
options 
19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 48,4 58,2 45,3 57,1 57,1 75,0 
No 51,6 41,8 54,7 41,9 42,8 25,0 
TOTAL, N 124 110 42 43 35 36 
 
 
4) Responses to the question about 'overall trust' showed that the majority of the 
participants in the age categories of 19-26 and 36 ≤ years old trusted the 'balanced' version of 
the news report, whereas the opinions of those in the age category of 27-35 years old were 
split in half. However, when it came to the 'manipulated' type, the percentage of those who 
trusted rose 17% in the age category of 19-26 years old, almost 20% in the age category of 
27-35 years old and 10% in the age category of 36 ≤ years old (Table 77). Thus, the 
'manipulated' version of the news report was regarded as more trustworthy, compared to the 




Table 77. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Overall, 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Yes 62,8 79,0 50,0 71,8 68,6 78,4 
No 37,2 21,0 50,0 30,2 31,4 21,6 
TOTAL, N 121 110 42 43 35 37 
 
 
B. Ordinal and binomial spotting scales of four questions 
Ordinal scale 
All questions in the scale were positively correlated at p < 0.01 for all age categories. 
Cronbach's alpha was 0,76 for the age category of 19-26 years old; 0.86 for the age category 
of 27-35 years old and 0.78 for the age category of 36 ≤ years old. For further details see 
Appendix D. 
Summary statistics for both versions of the news report are comparable across age 
categories with each of the conditions - 'balanced' and 'manipulated' . Mean and median 
values lie in between the values of '2', which itself means that the news report is rather not 
fact-based, balanced, free of allegations and trustworthy, and '3', which itself means that the 
news report is still rather fact-based, balanced, allegation-free and trustworthy. However, 
these average values are closer to '3', and, specifically, this refers to the manipulated version 
of the news report, which means it was evaluated as rather not manipulated. Table 78 provides 
details of percent distribution of participant responses on the ordinal spotting scale.  
     
Table 78. Summary statistics for the ordinal spotting scale according to the type of 
news report by age category 
 19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
 
spotscale4 
M = 2,7 
Md = 2,7 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,8 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,6 
Md = 2,5 
SD = 0,6 
M = 2,8 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,7 
Md = 2,7 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,8 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,4 





Transformation of the ordinal spotting scale consisted of four questions (spotscale4) 
into a binomial 'spotting/non-spotting' scale (combining 'definitely no' and 'rather no' response 
options under the name of  'spotting', and 'definitely yes' and 'rather yes' response options 
under the name of 'non-spotting')  brought the following results (Table 79). In other words, 
only participants who answered 'no' to all the four questions were regarded as those who 
spotted manipulation, whereas all the others - just as much persons who answered 'yes' to all 
the four questions as those who answered 'no' to less than four questions - were considered as 
those who had not spotted manipulated information. 
 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 












































As is seen from the table, more than 90% of the participants in each age category were 
not able to spot manipulation in the manipulated news report, which is not surprising given 
that the same majority regarded the news report as fact-based, balanced (that is, not one-
sided), free from allegations and overall trustworthy. Detailed information on the percentage 
of 'non-spotting' compared to 'spotting' in participant responses on the binomial spotting scale 
can be found in Appendix D. 
 
4.6.3. Second outcome variable - Accepting Manipulated News Report Standpoint, or 
who should be blamed for the situation  
Again, two questions aimed at revealing whether participants, first, understood or not 
the standpoint(s) a particular news report promoted and, second, whether they personally 
accepted or not the standpoint(s) specifically of the manipulated version of the news report. 
The standpoint(s) implied placing responsibility for the death(s) of protester(s) that was 
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described in the news reports. The first of the two questions, read "Is it clear to you from the 
news report who is responsible for the deaths described?", had four response options: 
definitely yes, rather yes, rather no, definitely no. The percentage distribution of participants' 
responses to the question by age category are shown in Table 80 in binary 'yes/no' form 
(response options 'definitely yes' and 'rather yes' were combined under 'yes', and 'definitely no' 
and rather no' were combined under 'no').  
 
Table 80. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Is it clear 
to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths described?"(by age category) 
 Response options 19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 












































As is seen from the table, the majority of participants in all age categories noted that it 
was not clear from the 'balanced' reports who is responsible (as was assumed, for different 
points of view on the situation were presented in the 'balanced' news report). As to its 
'manipulated' version, a somewhat higher percent of the participants in the age category of 19-
26 years old said it was clear, while a considerably higher percentage of the participants in the 
age category of 27-35 stated just the opposite. In the age category of 36 ≤ years old opinions 
were split in half on the issue.  
The second question asked "Please indicate on whom you personally place 
responsibility for the deaths described?" (the underlining was used in the study questionnaire) 
and contained four response options: protesters, police, president, unclear. Participants were 
allowed to select more than one response option, which, in turn, was also intended to help 
clarify any possibly ambiguous results of the previous question. Percentage distribution of 






Table 81. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Please 
indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" according 
to the two versions of the news report (by age category)  
Response options 19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Protesters 5,0 2,7 9,8 - 5,9 - 
Police 13,2 21,8 14,6 20,9 14,7 29,7 
President 14,9 35,5 4,9 32,6 2,9 29,7 
President and 
police 
0,8 1,8 2,4 - - - 
Protesters and 
police 
- - - - - - 
Protesters and 
president 
- - - - - - 
All of them - - - - - - 
















Conspicuously, a clearly higher percentage of the participants in all age categories could 
not definitely place responsibility on anyone after reading the 'balanced' version of the news 
report - for that reason, the majority chose the 'unclear' response option. However, regarding 
the 'manipulated' version of the news report, the percentage of those who responded 'unclear' 
was reduced by more than a half. In addition, the majority in all age categories accepted the 
standpoint(s) of the manipulated news report, with the age categories of 19-26 and 36 ≤ years 
old demonstrated the higher percentage of those accepted.  
Thus, given that in the manipulated version of the news report the responsibility for the 
participants death(s) was allegedly assigned to police and/or president, those participants who 
chose such response options as 'police', 'president' or both were considered as persons who 
accepted the standpoint(s) of the manipulated news report. As a result, the response options 
were recoded respectively into a binary form - 'accepting/non-accepting'. The recoded 
question for placing responsibility with the two categorical values gave the following results 





Table 82. Percent distribution of participant responses to the recoded question 
"Please indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths described?" 
with regard to the manipulated type of the news report by age category   
Response options 19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
N % N % N % 
Non-accepting standpoint 45 40,9% 20 46,5% 15 40,6% 
Accepting standpoint 65 59,1% 23 53,5% 22 59,4% 
TOTAL, N (%) 110 100% 43 100% 37 100% 
 
 
4.7. Measurement participant attitudes toward the scene of action of the news 
report - Republic of Moldova 
Overall attitudes toward Moldova were comparable across the three age categories and 
were unfavorable (or rather unfavorable). Percent distribution and other statistics on  
participants attitudes toward Moldova can be found in Appendix D. 
 
4.8. Statistical tests on effects of political competence on outcome variables and 
peculiarities of accepting the standpoint of the manipulated news reports in three age 
groups of the Italian sample 
The Italian sample afforded the opportunity to compare possible effects of individual 
political competence on outcome variables across three different age groups, as well as to test 
possible peculiarities of accepting/rejecting the standpoint of the manipulated news reports in 
these groups. Therefore, the statistical tests were focused primarily on the above mentioned 
major points. The result of the tests are described below. Additional information on 
correlations for the Italian sample can be found in Appendix D.   
 
4.8.1. Logistic regression analysis with political competence scale as an explanatory 
variable and binomial spotting scale as an outcome variable 
The logistic regression test with political competence scale as an explanatory variable 
and binomial spotting scale as an outcome variable brought non-significant results for each 
age category. When components of the political competence scale were entered as 
explanatory variables one by one, only 'political discussions in a typical week' was significant 




Table 83. Summary of logistic regression analysis for predicting spotting on a 
binomial scale from political discussions, by age category (the manipulated news report) 
Condition 
(age group) 
Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 































In other words, those participants, aged 19-26 years, who more actively participated in 
political discussions in a typical week were more likely to spot manipulation in the news 
report (χ
2 
= 3.92, df = 1, N = 110, p < 0.05).  .  
 
4.8.2. Logistic regression analysis with political competence scale as an explanatory 
variable and placing responsibility/accepting standpoint recoded question as an outcome 
variable 
The logistic regression test with political competence scale as an explanatory variable 
and the placing responsibility/accepting standpoint categorical question as an outcome 
variable brought non-significant results for each age category. When components of the 
political competence scale were entered as explanatory variables one by one, only 'factual 









Table 84. Summary of logistic regression analysis for predicting 'placing 
responsibility/accepting standpoint' from factual political knowledge scale by age category 
(the manipulated news report) 
Condition 
(age group) 
Explanatory variable B SE Odds ratio p 































Stated differently, the higher the factual political knowledge of the participants in the 
mentioned age category, the more likely that they accepted the standpoint(s) the manipulated 
news report promoted (χ
2 
= 5.57, df = 1, N = 37, p < 0.05).   
All other variables, such as informed media mistrust scale, age, gender, online news 
sources use in a typical week, and Internet news sources trustworthiness, were non significant 
when tested in logistic regression. 
 
4.8.3. Chi-square tests for independence for questions "Is it clear who is responsible" 
and "On whom you personally place the responsibility" 
When chi-square test for independence was performed within manipulated condition for 
the questions "Is it clear to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths 
described?" and "Please indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths 
described?", both transformed into ones having binary responses ('yes/no' for the former and 
'accepting/non-accepting' for the latter), the results were significant for all age categories. In 
particular, for the age category 19-26 years old the result was χ
2
(df = 1, N = 110) = 30.22, p 
<0.001, Phi value is 0.524; for the age category of 27-35 years old the result was χ
2
(df = 1, N 
= 43) = 13.64, p <0.001, Phi value is 0.563; and for the age category of 36 ≤ years old the 
result was χ
2
(df = 1, N = 37) = 14.60, p <0.001, Phi value is 0.628.  
Thus, the results suggest that a positive association of high strength exists in all age 
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categories between understanding who is named responsible for the death(s) of the 
protester(s) in the manipulated news report and placing responsibility personally by the study 
participants. In other words, those of the participants who were unclear on the assignment of 
responsibility in the news report it was unlikely that they accepted the standpoint(s) the 
manipulated news report promoted. And vice versa: those of the participants who responded 
that it was clear who was responsible were more likely accepted the standpoint(s) of the 
manipulated news report. Table 85 below demonstrates the results.        
 
Table 85. Chi-square test for independence between questions 'is it clear who is 





 Is it clear who is responsible for 
























































































































































4.8.4. Chi-square tests for independence for the binomial spotting scale and accepting 
the standpoint question 
The results of the chi-square test for independence were non-significant for all age 
categories. Consequently, no association exists between spotting manipulation and accepting 
the standpoint(s) the manipulated news report promotes.  
 
4.9. Summary 
The analysis did not reveal significant differences between the three age categories as to 
spotting manipulated media information and accepting the standpoint(s) it promoted: more 
than 90% of the participants in each age category did not spot the manipulation and about 
60% in the age categories of 19-26 and 36 ≤ years old and 53.5% of the participants in the age 
category of 27-35 years old accepted the standpoint(s) of the manipulated news report. 
Although those in the age category of 36 ≤ years old scored higher on the political 
competence scale as well as on the majority of its components compared to the other two age 
categories, the overall level of political competence appeared to be inefficient as to revealing 
manipulation in a news report and rejecting an unsubstantiated viewpoint that the news report 
introduced; as statistical tests showed, there were moderate-to-strong significant associations 
between who was blamed in the news report and who the majority of participants in each age 
category blamed subsequently. At the same time, when the components of the political 
competence scale were tested separately, participation in political discussions was positively 
predictive of spotting manipulation in the age group of 27-35 years old, while in the age 
category of 36 ≤ years old possessing more factual political knowledge was also positively 
predictive of accepting the standpoint of the manipulated news report. This last 
incomprehensible finding warrants further investigation. Thus, the expected moderating 
effects of 'age' made no difference as concerns the participants of the Italian sample in this 










CHAPTER V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study I investigated the roles of individual political competence and media 
literacy context as applied to (1) spotting manipulated media information in Internet news 
coverage of a new foreign issue as well as to (2) accepting the standpoint(s) of the 
manipulated news report. In addition, the effects of informed media mistrust and perception of 
different subtypes of the manipulated news report were explored.  
Perhaps, the most puzzling finding in the study appeared to be that political competence 
did not have any effect on spotting manipulated media information as well as accepting its 
standpoint(s). In other words, when it comes to encountering manipulated media information 
focused on a novel issue, more politically competent citizens perceive the information in the 
same way as their less politically competent counterparts do. In addition, this finding is as true 
for the target group of participants aged 18-26 years old in each of the three countries, as for 
each and every age category of participants from the Italian sample. With regard to the latter, 
although those who belonged to the 'oldest' age category of 36 ≤ scored the highest on 
political competence as well as the majority of its components, participants in all of the age 
categories - 18-26, 27-35 and 36 ≤ - still showed quite the same outcomes: overall level of 
political competence appeared to be inefficient as to revealing manipulation in a news report 
and rejecting an unsubstantiated viewpoint introduced by the news report. Thus the expected 
moderating effects of 'age' made no difference, at least, as concerns the participants of the 
Italian sample in this thesis research.  
More than this, none of the six components of the political competence scale affected 
spotting/accepting when tested separately. In fact, only for those in the Italian sample aged 
27-35 years old was more frequent participation in political discussions positively predictive 
of spotting manipulation. However, for the target age category, neither frequency of 
intentional consumption of political news, nor participation in political discussions, nor 
challenging an opponent's political standpoints, nor factual political knowledge - that, 
hypothetically, might have played especially significant roles - showed any effect on 
spotting/accepting. Furthermore, in the Dutch sample, the results demonstrated that the less 
the participants were interested in politics and the less they intentionally consumed political 
news and the less factual knowledge they demonstrated, then the more they were able to spot 
manipulation in the news report allegedly taken from 'traditional' Internet news sources.  These 




1) First, political competence as such might have no impact at all on the critical 
assessment of media information in respect to spotting manipulation in news reports and 
resisting their standpoints, meaning that both politically competent and politically 
incompetent individuals are equally susceptible to the media manipulation effects. Put 
differently, both types of individuals might similarly be softly persuaded by manipulated news 
which covers a novel, unfamiliar issue. In a definite way, this result contradicts the inferences 
previously drawn by a number of scholars that more politically competent people can more 
deeply process news, are better at interpreting new information, are more resistant to 
persuasive messages, and can infer more accurate conclusions from political communications 
(see, for one, Fiske et al., 1990; Krosnick, 1990; Hsu & Price, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997; Rhee 
& Capella, 1997; Guo and Moy, 1998). Nevertheless, some reservations should be made with 
respect to this. In particular, the conclusions from previous studies did not refer to effects of 
manipulated news on novel issues, and thus this cannot be considered in such context as a 
total inconsistency. Also, representative samples of participants might bring somewhat 
different results as to the effects of political competence on the perception of manipulated 
news. However, despite providing this kind of external validity, to get just the reverse 
outcome from the representative samples seems rather unlikely, for the general pattern can be 
revealed even with convenience samples of sufficient size, which have high internal validity, 
as was the case in this research, which, moreover, was tested in several contexts (countries). 
The further verification as to whether the level of political competence does or does not 
make an individual more resistant to the persuasive effects of manipulated media information, 
requires the employment in future studies of news messages on various topics, coming from 
various channels of communication (Internet, TV, print). This approach is expected to clarify 
in more detail whether manipulated news covering different political, international, economic, 
social, etc. issues, having a different format and received from different news channels, have 
any similar impact on politically competent / incompetent individuals. Incorporating the 
element of personal interest in an issue covered by the news report would further be expected 
to advance the understanding when the standpoints of manipulated news reports are accepted 
at face value (say, when there is no or minor interest in the issue) and also when the 
standpoints are challenged, assessed critically (say, when the interest in the issue is high). All 
this is aimed at figuring out what feature, if any, of a manipulated news message on an 
unfamiliar issue makes individuals assess it critically depending on their levels of political 
competence.   
189 
 
2) Second, the lack of effects of the components of political competence on outcome 
variables in the Austrian and Italian samples further indicates that the concept of political 
competence should be refined and updated when it is employed to predict the critical 
assessment of news media information and, in particular, the manipulated one. As to the 
seemingly 'illogical' findings from the Dutch sample as well as those found in the Italian 
participants aged 36 ≤ - when those who had more factual political knowledge were more 
likely to accept the standpoint of the manipulated news report - it might be conceivable that 
the frequent consumption of political information from the news media, as a consequence of 
the higher interest in politics and a prerequisite for the subsequent higher level of factual 
political knowledge, contributes to a more 'rigid' rather than flexible reasoning about the 
quality of other information coming from the media. Stated differently, the more frequently 
political media information is consumed, the more rigid become the frameworks within which 
every other piece of political media information is considered and evaluated, and the more 
likely the frameworks will be applied to information that is novel or scarcely familiar to news 
consumers. Thus, if a 'political news junkie', who is used to consuming political information 
which is often based on one-sided opinions bordering on allegations, encounters some 
information on a topic novel to him or her but which is presented in a one-sided 
opinion/allegation fashion, then it is very likely that such information will also be judged as 
'normal', and not biased or manipulated. In this way, he or she might also become susceptible 
to the effects of that information, something that was stated repeatedly in the literature (e.g., 
Chong & Druckman, 2007a; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). Nevertheless, the theoretical 
assumptions presented above, as to a relationship between interest in politics, frequency of 
intentional consumption of political information from the news media, amount of factual 
political knowledge and critical assessment of news media (manipulated) information, warrant 
further investigation. Another potentially valuable aspect that should be taken into account in 
future studies with student or young adults samples is a 'parental factor'. This means that 
parent's educational background, occupation and income might have affected the children's 
political socialization, literacy, preferences, knowledge and, eventually, competence. For this 
reason, it is instructive to control the aforementioned factor, either.  
With regard to the second explanatory variable in the study, media literacy context, I 
found that participants from the countries ranked higher in terms of media literacy context, 
namely Austria and the Netherlands, were better able to spot manipulated information, and 
after the spotting, not to accept its standpoint(s) than were participants from Italy, which was 
ranked the lowest among the three countries. Notwithstanding that in spotting/accepting the 
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standpoint(s) the Austrian participants demonstrated somewhat higher scores compared to the 
Dutch participants, the general trend makes sense.  
In any case, the critical assessment of media messages as a component of individual 
media literacy was not measured in this study. Hence, hypothetically, some other specific 
features of the three countries might have contributed to the differing results as to the 
influence of media literacy context: for instance, due to the difference in media systems 
models. According to those models, Italy, which was ranked the lowest of the three countries 
on media literacy context, belongs to the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, while 
the Netherlands and Austria pertain to the North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist 
Model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). So, theoretically, despite the fact that these models were not 
incorporated into the study design, the results of the Italian participants might have been 
inferior to the results of the Dutch and Austrian participants because of belonging to the 
different media system model.  
Nevertheless, distinguishing between manipulated and non-manipulated media 
messages is an integral part of critical assessment, critical processing or critical understanding 
of media messages which, in turn, is a component of general media literacy. This specific 
integral part of the critical understanding was measured neither in the "Study on Assessment 
Criteria for Media Literacy Levels" (2009) nor in the "Study on Testing and Refining Criteria 
to Assess Media Literacy Levels in Europe" (2011). However, other indicators, including 
indicators measuring the critical understanding component, allowed ranking the mentioned 
countries according to levels of critical understanding and overall media literacy context, both 
of which were congruent for all the three countries. It is probable that if the indicators of 
spotting/accepting were incorporated into those Studies (2009, 2011), Austria and the 
Netherlands would have ranked differently specifically on the indicators, but the whole 
picture would had likely remained the same. For this reason, the hypothesized and proven 
effect of the media literacy context of a particular country on spotting / rejecting the 
manipulation in a news report should be considered valid until disproved by alternative 
evidence. 
Therefore, and specifically in the foregoing regard, future research should employ 
representative samples for making externally valid inferences from media literacy context on 
a country level as well as include in their measurement a set of questions verifying the critical 
assessment component of media literacy on an individual level. In that way, the relationship 
between the media literacy context at country level and spotting / rejecting manipulated media 
information, demonstrated in the thesis, might be either substantiated or refuted. 
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Two other significant study findings, which may also provide directions for future 
research, are related to (1) an 'incoherent' relationship between spotting manipulation in a 
news report and still accepting its standpoint, and (2) a moderating role of a type of the 
Internet news sources (traditional or alternative) in regarding manipulated news reports as 
trustworthy.  
With respect to the former, it seems quite logical that those who can spot manipulation 
are also expected to reject the standpoint(s) promoted in the manipulated news report, 
concerning in this particular case, the unambiguous placing of responsibility. However, in 
reality, in each of the three samples of those who spotted manipulation, some percentage of 
people still accepted the report's viewpoint as to who should be blamed. Moreover, again in 
each of the three samples, of those who did not spot manipulation some percentage - less than 
half in the Austrian and the Italian samples and slightly more than half in the Dutch sample - 
still rejected the promoted standpoint(s) as to decisively placing the responsibility.  
These outcomes raise, at least, three questions. First, what are the reasons for accepting 
the standpoint of the news information by persons who a moment ago had expressed their 
total mistrust toward it? Second, which one of the two, spotting or accepting the standpoint, 
might better characterize a person's skills in the critical assessment of manipulated media 
information? Third, should these two components, spotting and accepting the standpoint, be 
necessarily considered as interrelated? To answer them, additional focused research is needed. 
Although, from the theoretical point of view, and being supported by the aforementioned 
results, it might be assumed that subscribing to a news report's standpoint does not always 
coincide with viewing that news report as balanced, fact-based, and overall trustworthy, on 
account of considering just the opposite features of news messages (such as one-sidedness and 
allegation-loadedness) as being the norm rather than not. In other words, one can spot 
manipulation but considers it to be the ordinary run of things in news reporting, while another 
person cannot see any signs of manipulation due, again, to regarding those as normal 
properties. For this reason, it is not unlikely that spotting manipulation and rejecting the 
standpoint might not resonate in low media literate persons but, at the same time, be 
congruent in those who have higher media literacy knowledge and skills. This is particularly 
the case when it comes to the necessity of observance in news reports of commonly shared 
journalistic principles of truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity, impartiality, fairness and public 
accountability. Therefore, the seemingly strange picture of the relationships between spotting 
manipulation and accepting the standpoint(s) might find its explanation in differences in 
individual media literacy levels. Nevertheless, this is only a theoretical assumption and more 
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sophisticated methods of research are needed, including interviews or/and focus groups, to 
learn about the relationships between the mentioned two components and the reasons 
underlying the evaluation of the manipulated media information (spotting/non-spotting) as 
well as the decision to subscribe to or reject the standpoint(s) it promotes. 
Another attention-grabbing finding is related to the concept of informed media mistrust. 
It was initially expected that higher media literacy context should be associated with lower 
general media trust, as some research before found (see for example, Craft et al., 2013). 
However, the finding appeared to be here just the contrary: the higher a particular country was 
ranked on media literacy context, the higher general media trust demonstrated participants 
from that country. And while the difference between media trust/media mistrust was 
negligible in the Italian participants, the same difference was significant for the Austrian and, 
especially, the Dutch participants. At first thought, such outcomes look questionable and 
inconsistent with the very idea of media literacy, because those who are used to trusting the 
news media are usually said to be less educated and in possessing poor critical thinking skills 
when it comes to evaluating news media messages (Tsfati & Ariely, 2013). However, the 
university students can hardly fall into the category of the 'less educated'. Thus the 
explanation should be different. It is possible, in particular, that media trust was, according to 
Tsfati and Ariely (2013), "positively and rather highly correlated with trust in democracy" 
(p.2). Following this logic, of the three samples, the Dutch participants had the highest level 
of trust in democracy, followed by the Austrian and the Italian. Yet, the trust in democracy 
was not measured in this study, so no conclusive evidence in respect to this assumption can be 
provided. Also, the positive correlation of media trust with media literacy context found in 
this study may be explained by the peculiarities of media market in a particular country, that 
is, when the news media reports are rather usually trusted than not. Moreover, there was no 
specification in the questions measured general news media trust as to whether they referred 
to so-called mainstream news media or various new media. Given that, it is quite possible that 
a part of the study participants, when answered the questions on general media trust, implied 
the mainstream and another part of the study participants meant the new media. 
Unfortunately, any of the proposed explanations does not still clarify entirely the issue of the 
relationship between the critical evaluation of news media information, the informed media 
mistrust and  media literacy context. The resolution of this puzzling issue warrants further 
investigation.  
Lastly, no less intriguing is the finding of the moderating role of a type of the Internet 
news sources in regarding the manipulated news report as trustworthy. In this vein, the Dutch 
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participants regarded the manipulated news report that allegedly came from the 'alternative' 
Internet news sources as more trustworthy and, thus, spotting manipulation in it to a lesser 
degree and accepting its standpoint(s) to a greater degree. In turn, the Austrian and, even to a 
greater degree, the Italian participants trusted more the news report that allegedly was taken 
from the 'traditional' Internet news sources. These particularities indicate in practical terms 
which type of Internet news sources in which country might likely be recognized as more / 
less trustworthy by young people. In addition, the puzzle becomes more intricate if we go 
back to the study question about the trustworthiness of these two types of Internet news 
sources: the Dutch, the Italians and the Austrians then judged the 'alternative' ones as less 
trustworthy when compared to the 'traditional'.  
In light of the foregoing, the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn. Since the 
'alternative' Internet news sources were regarded as those more likely to spread untrustworthy 
information, the opting for the 'traditional' Internet news sources as those which transmit more 
reliable information seems quite natural on the part of the Austrian and Italian participants. 
From this perspective, when they believe the manipulated news report and accept its 
standpoint, I deduce that in these countries the critical evaluation of international news on 
novel issues by individuals might simply 'shut down' when the news is received from the 
'traditional' type of the Internet news sources (nevertheless, some difference in the perception 
will likely exist when it comes to specific subtypes of those news sources - TV channels, 
newspapers, magazines, etc.). In contrast, as far as the Dutch participants are concerned, the 
picture differs radically. Here, despite being regarded in general as also less trustworthy, the 
alternative Internet news sources are still considered as more credible when transmitting the 
manipulated news reports. Such a discrepancy might testify to the fact that the Dutch 
demonstrated the distinct judgments proceeding from two different premises: (1) stereotyping, 
when the generalizable assessment of the 'alternative' Internet news sources as a category was 
required, and (2) personal habits and experiences, when the participants imagined a concrete 
and 'popular' in their country alternative Internet news source that was familiar to them, from 
which the manipulated news report was allegedly taken. In other words, it seems to be quite a 
plausible reason that can be described with the phrase: "My favorite Internet news source (my 
Internet environment - friends, experts, etc.) cannot lie". By the same token, this approach 
may also hold for the Austrian and the Italian participants. However, in this case, if 'the 
favorite Internet news source' appears always to be regarded as truthful and credible, there are 
strong doubts as to the participants' abilities to critically assess particular media information 
as in their advancements in critical media literacy, on the whole.  
194 
 
The above described results make it tempting to preliminarily conclude something about 
the possibilities of persuading the younger Austrians and Italians, at least, through 'traditional' 
Internet news sources when unfamiliar or scarcely familiar international issues are concerned. 
Nevertheless, to all intents and purposes, it will be possible to bring the issue to a close with a 
further investigation using representative samples, particular types of Internet news sources 
(that is, concrete online media outlets, social networks, blogs and microblogs, etc.), and news 
messages varying in their form, content, and appeal. In so doing, future studies will likely be 
able to explore deeply not only this but the wider area of interest in order to get a clearer 
understanding as to which type of Internet news sources, to what degree, and with which 
means can make people informed, politically involved, and ready to take action as well as 
misinformed, prejudiced, and deceived.  
 
In summary, giving weight to the destructiveness of the effects of disinformation and 
misinformation on public opinion, this study focused on how susceptible to those effects are 
young people who receive manipulated news from different types of Internet news sources. 
The findings raise questions not examined before about the role and the form of political 
competence in filtering out the manipulated media information. As it turned out, political 
competence, at least in this study, was unable to help in separating the husk from the grain 
when participants dealt with the manipulated news report on a novel issue. Such unexpected 
results paint, to some extent, a worrying picture: young educated, politically-interested, 
politically-knowledgeable, and politically-active people readily accept the manufactured 
reality, or pseudoreality, proposed by the news media describing a certain international 'hot-
issue'. Moreover, the results of the Italian sample confirmed that not only young people act in 
this way. Even if we can put such effects down to the novelty of the issue and the lack of 
personal involvement with it, the questions remain: is there any link between critical thinking 
and political competence, and, if not, why do we then need political competence at all? Also, 
if it plays a role only on a case-by-case basis, when a politically competent individual is 
strongly personally involved with an issue, should we put political competence aside as an 
ineffective tool or a set of skills for problem-solving and decision-making and, instead, rely in 
all things on some guiding suggestions of the 'sages' in making our informed (or, in this case, 
rather quasi-informed) decisions? In this vein, future studies are expected to further 
investigate not only the role of individual political competence in voting, signing petitions, 
participating in protests as well as other kinds of political behaviors, but also how helpful it is 
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in a great many non-political activities, including consumptions of various types of media 
information, both manipulated and not, that in addition to influencing immediate evaluations 



































APPENDIX A   STUDY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 













































1. To get news of any kind – politics, sport, music, society, etc. – we usually use 
various types of media. On the following scale from 0 to 7, where “0” means 
“never” and “7” means “every day”, please indicate how many days in a typical 
week you use the following news sources to get news: 
 
           never                  every day 
Online sources  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Magazines  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Newspapers  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Television  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. In general, when thinking of these types of media as sources of credible news, do 
you regard some of them as more trustworthy than others? Please indicate your 
choices on the following scale from 1 to 7, where ‘1’ is ‘not at all trustworthy’ and 
‘7’ is ‘very trustworthy’: 
 
       not at all trustworthy                 very trustworthy 
Internet   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Magazines  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Newspapers  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Television  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. In general, when thinking of the Internet as a source of credible news, how would 
you rate the trustworthiness of traditional Internet news sources (that is, news 
websites of TV channels, newspapers, magazines, etc.) and alternative Internet 
news sources (that is, social networks, blogs)? Please indicate your opinion on 
the following scale, where ‘1’ is ‘ not at all trustworthy’ and ‘7’ is ‘very trustworthy’:      
 
 not at all                very 
trustworthy             
trustworthy 
 
‘Traditional’ Internet news sources  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(websites of TVs, newspapers, etc.) 
  
‘Alternative’ Internet news sources  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




How often do the following statements apply to your own experience of getting 
news from various types of media?  
 
 
4. I find that news media reports are fair and balanced 
 
always____ most of the time____  rarely____  never____ 
   
 
 
5. I believe that facts and opinions (that is, interpretations of those facts) are clearly 
separated in news media reports 
 




6. In my opinion, the interpretations of facts in news reports are based on solid 
grounds and not mere assertions  
 




7. I try to “read between the lines” of what I see/read in the news 
 
always____ most of the time____  rarely____  never____ 
 
  
    
8. Overall, I can trust news media reports 
 









Thank you! Now please answer some questions on your social and political 
activity on the following page. 
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9.  To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? 
 
not at all     a little        somewhat            very much
  
       1           2    3            4 
  
 
10. On the following scale from 0 to 7, where “0”means “never” and “7” means “every 
day”, please mark how many days in a typical week you intentionally watch, listen 
to, or read political information from news media: 
 
      never       every day 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
11. In a typical week, how often do you discuss political issues with other people 
(classmates, neighbors, friends, family, acquaintances, or strangers)? 
____ never    
____ once a week   
 ____ 2-3 times a week    
____ 4-5 times a week     
____ 6-7 times a week     
____ more than 7 times a week  
 
 
12. During your political discussions with others, how often, on average, do you try to 
challenge the standpoints of your opponent by arguing your case?  
____ never    
____ rarely 
____ often 
____ every time I discuss politics 
 
13. In the past 2 years, have you: 
         No  Yes 
 ever written a letter to a newspaper on a political issue   0    1 
 joined a political organization       0    1 
 already been a member of a political organization    0    1 
 ever written a letter to a politician or official      0    1 
 ever signed a petition on a political issue      0    1 
 ever participated in a march, demonstration, or protest   0    1 
 voted in the recent national elections         0    1 
 attended any political meetings or rallies        0    1 
 voted in the recent local elections         0    1 




14.  Are you going to vote:    
no    yes     undecided 
- in the next national elections? 0    1     9 
- in the next local elections?  0    1    9 
    
 
15. Below you find an alphabetical list of eleven countries. How would you express 
your overall opinion of each of them on the following scale from 1 to 5, where ‘1’ 
means ‘very unfavorable’ and ‘5’ means ‘very favorable’: 
 
               very                very 
      unfavorable     favorable 
 Belgium   1 2 3  4 5 
 Germany  1 2 3  4 5 
 Great Britain  1 2 3 4 5 
 France   1 2 3  4 5 
 Ireland   1 2 3  4 5 
 Moldova   1 2 3  4 5  
 Montenegro  1 2 3  4 5 
 Poland   1 2 3  4 5 
 Russia   1 2 3  4 5 
 United States  1 2 3  4 5 
 Syria   1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. Please answer whether the following statements are true or false. Even if you are 
not sure, please still try to make your best guess. Only if you really cannot guess, 
mark the ‘don’t know’ option: 
  False True Don’t 
know 
1 Switzerland is a member of the EU  0 1 9 
2 The European Union has 25 member states     0 1 9 
3 Every country in the EU elects the same number of 
representatives to the European Parliament 
0 1 9 
4 Every six months, a different Member State becomes  
president of the Council of the European Union 
0 1 9 
5 The Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science is 
Ronald Plasterk 
0 1 9 
6 Dutch citizens must be at least 25 years old or older if 
they want to participate as candidates in elections for the 
House of Representatives 
0 1 9 
7 The Dutch House of Representatives has 225 members 0 1 9 
 
Please now take a few moments to read the news report on the next page, and 




The following news report was taken from one of the most popular 
‘traditional’/’alternative’ Internet sources of news in your country. In order to 
avoid identifying the source through any of its characteristics, only the text of 
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17. Had you already heard, watched or read any information on the situation 
described in the news report above before reading it? 
 
yes_____   no_____   
 
 
18. In your personal opinion, is the subject of the news report important? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____
  
 
   
19. Do you find the description of the situation in the news report easy to understand? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____ 
 
 
20. Do you consider the news report as fact-based? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____ 
  
 
21. Do you agree that the news report is balanced? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____ 
 
   
22. Would you say the news report is free from allegations? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____ 
 
 
23. Is it clear to you from the news report who is responsible for the deaths 
described? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____ 
 
 
24. Please indicate on whom you personally place responsibility for the deaths 
described? 
 
protesters_____  police_____  president_____              unclear_____ 
  
 
25.  Overall, can the news report be trusted? 
 
definitely yes_____  rather yes_____  rather no_____ definitely no_____ 
 







Finally, please answer some questions about yourself and your academic 
status:  
 
26. What is your age? ________ 
 
27.  What is your gender? 
___Female  ___Male 
 
28. What is your citizenship? 
_____________________________ 
 
29. You are: 
____ 1st year student 
____ 2nd year student 
____ 3rd year student 
____ 4th year student 
____ Master’s student 
____ PhD student 
____ Other (please specify)_______________________________________ 
 
30. What is your department? ___________________________________________ 
 
31. What is your major/specialization? _____________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! You’ve really made a great 
difference to this important piece of research. If you have any comments, 

















































1. Per ogni genere di notizie – sulla politica, lo sport, la musica, la società etc.- 
usiamo di solito diversi tipi di fonti informative. Sulla seguente scala da 0 a 7, 
dove “0” significa “mai” e “7” significa “ogni giorno”, indica per favore quanti 
giorni alla settimana usi le seguenti fonti per ricevere notizie : 
 
    mai                ogni giorno 
Fonti online  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
Riviste   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Quotidiani  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Televisione  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. Pensando a questi tipi di media come fonti di notizie credibili, consideri alcuni 
di essi come più attendibili di altri ? Indica per favore le tue scelte sulla 
seguente scala da 1 a 7 dove ‘1’ è ‘non attendibile affatto’ e ‘7’ è ‘molto 
attendibile’: 
non attendibile       molto 
          affatto      attendibile 
Internet   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Riviste   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Quotidiani  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Televisione  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. Pensando a Internet come a una fonte di notizie credibili, come valuteresti 
l’attendibilità delle fonti tradizionali di notizie su Internet (cioè, siti web di 
telegiornali, di quotidiani, riviste etc.) e  quella delle fonti alternative di notizie 
su Internet (cioè social networks, blogs etc.) ? Indica per favore la tua opinione 
sulla seguente scala dove ‘1’ è ‘non attendibile affatto’ e ‘7’ è ‘molto 
attendibile’: 
 non attendibile       molto 
                      affatto             attendibile 
 
Fonti di notizie Internet ‘tradizionali’ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(websites di TV, di quotidiani, etc.) 
  
Fonti di notizie Internet ‘alternative’ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




In che misura le seguenti affermazioni riflettono la tua esperienza nel ricevere 
notizie da vari tipi di media ?  
 
4. Penso che le notizie nei media siano corrette ed equilibrate. 
 
sempre____ la maggior parte delle volte____ raramente____  mai____ 
 
   
 
5. Credo che i fatti e le opinioni (cioè l’interpretazione di quei fatti) siano 
chiaramente separati nelle notizie riportate dai media. 
 




6. Secondo me le interpretazioni dei fatti nelle notizie sono basate su solide 
fondamenta e non sono semplicemente asserzioni gratuite.  
 




7. Quando vedo o leggo le notizie cerco di “leggere tra le righe”. 
 
sempre____ la maggior parte delle volte____ raramente____  mai____ 
 
  
    
8. Nell’insieme credo nelle notizie riportate dai media. 
 








Grazie! Ti chiediamo ora di rispondere ad alcune domande sulle tue attività 





9. Quanto ti consideri interessato/a alla politica ? 
 
per niente  poco   abbastanza      molto  
       1       2           3            4   
 
 
10. Sulla seguente scala da 0 a 7, dove “0” significa “mai” e “7” significa “ogni 
giorno”, indica per favore quanti giorni, in una settimana tipo, intenzionalmente 
guardi, ascolti o leggi informazioni politiche dai media giornalistici: 
 
     mai       ogni giorno 




11. In una settimana tipo, quante volte discuti di politica con altra gente (compagni 
di corso, vicini, amici, conoscenti o estranei) ? 
 
____ mai 
____ una volta alla settimana 
 ____ 2-3 volte alla settimana 
____ 4-5 volte alla settimana 
____ 6-7 volte alla settimana 
____ più di 7 volte alla settimana 
 
 
12. Durante le tue discussioni politiche, quanto spesso, mediamente, cerchi di 
mettere in questione i punti di vista dei tuoi avversari sostenendo la tua 
posizione? 
 
____ mai         
____ raramente   
____ spesso       
____ ogni volta che discuto di politica  
 
   
 
13. Negli ultimi 2 anni hai (mai): 
        No  Sì 
 scritto una lettera a un giornale su una questione politica  0    1 
 fatto parte di un’organizzazione politica     0    1 
 sei già stato membro di un’organizzazione politica   0    1 
 scritto una lettera a un politico o a un funzionario    0    1 
 firmato una petizione di argomento politico     0    1 
 partecipato a una Marcia, dimostrazione o protesta   0    1 
 votato nelle ultime elezioni nazionali       0    1 
 partecipato ad assemblee politiche o manifestazioni   0    1 
 votato nelle ultime elezioni locali        0    1 
 fatto propaganda per un candidato/partito politico   0    1  
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14. Pensi di andare a votare :    
       no    si        indeciso/a 
- nelle prossime elezioni politiche ?  0    1     9 
- nelle prossime elezioni amministrative ? 0    1    9 
 
 
15. Qui di seguito troverai una lista in ordine alfabetico di 11 paesi. Come 
esprimeresti la tua opinione generale su ognuno di essi sulla seguente scala 
da 1 a 5, dove ‘1’ significa ‘sfavorevole’ e ‘5’ significa ‘favorevole’ : 
 
        molto    molto 
      sfavorevole         favorevole 
 Belgio  1 2 3 4    5 
 Germania  1 2 3 4    5 
 Gran Bretagna 1         2           3           4          5 
 Francia  1 2 3 4    5 
 Irlanda  1 2 3 4    5 
 Moldavia  1 2 3 4    5  
 Montenegro 1 2 3 4    5 
 Polonia  1 2 3 4    5 
 Russia  1 2 3 4    5 
 Stati Uniti  1 2 3 4    5 
 
 
16. Per favore indica se queste affermazioni sono vere o false. Anche se non sei 
sicuro, prova ugualmente a fare la tua migliore ipotesi. Segna la risposta “non 
so” solo se non sai veramente che cosa rispondere: 
  Falso Vero Non so 
1 La Svizzera è uno Stato Membro dell’Unione Europea.  0 1 9 
2 L’Unione Europea è composta da 25 Stati Membri 0 1 9 
3 Ogni Stato Membro dell’UE elegge lo stesso numero di 
Europarlamentari. 
0 1 9 
4 Ogni sei mesi, un diverso Stato Membro diventa 
presidente del Consiglio dell’Unione Europea. 
0 1 9 
5 Il Ministro della Pubblica Istruzione in Italia è Francesco 
Profumo 
0 1 9 
6 E’ necessario avere almeno 25 anni per candidarsi alle 
elezioni nazionali in Italia. 
0 1 9 







Ti chiediamo ora di dedicare qualche minuto alla lettura delle notizie riportate 




La seguente notizia è stata ripresa da una delle più note fonti 
‘tradizionali/alternative’ di notizie su Internet nel tuo paese. 
Per evitare l’identificazione della fonte attraverso una qualsiasi delle sue 
caratteristiche, è riportato qui solo il testo della notizia stampato in un 


























17. Avevi già sentito, visto o letto qualcosa sulla situazione descritta nella notizia 
riportata sopra prima di leggerla ?  
 
sì _____   no_____   
 
 
18. Secondo te, l’argomento della notizia è importante ?  
 
assolutamente sì_____      più sì che no_____     più no che sì_____ assolutamente no_____ 
 
  
   
19. Trovi che la descrizione della situazione riportata nella notizia sia facile da capire ? 
 




20. Pensi che la notizia sia basata su fatti ? 
 




21. Concordi che la notizia sia equilibrata ? 
 
assolutamente sì_____      più sì che no_____     più no che sì_____ assolutamente no_____  
   
 
 
22. Diresti che nel resoconto della notizia non ci sono asserzioni infondate? 
 




23. Secondo te risulta chiaramente dalla notizia chi è responsabile della morte descritta ? 
 




24. Potresti indicare chi  secondo te è responsabile della morte descritta ? 
 




25. Nell’insieme, diresti che la notizia è attendibile ? 
 




Infine, puoi rispondere per favore ad alcune domande su di te e il tuo status 
accademico:  
 
26. Quanti anni hai? ________ 
27. Di che sesso sei ? 
 
____Femminile  ____Maschile 
 
 
28. Qual è la tua cittadinanza ? ______________________________________ 
 
29. Sei: 
____ studente di 1° anno 
____ studente di 2° anno 
____ studente di 3° anno 
____ studente di 4° anno 
____ Laureato (Master) 
____ Dottorando 
____ Altro (specificare) _____________________ 
 
30. Qual è il tuo dipartimento? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 




Grazie veramente di aver partecipato ! Hai dato un contributo assolutamente 
essenziale a questa importante parte della ricerca. Se hai dei commenti, per 























































1. Um Nachrichten jeglicher Art zu erfahren – Politik, Sport, Musik, Gesellschaft – 
greifen wir gewöhnlich auf verschiedene Medien zurück. Auf der folgenden Skala von 
0 bis 7, wobei “0” - “nie  ” und “7” - “jeden Tag ” bedeutet, markieren Sie bitte, wie  
viele Tage in einer typischen Woche Sie auf folgende Medien zurückgreifen, um 
Nachrichten zu erhalten: 
 
      nie            jeden Tag      
Internet  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Zeitschriften 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Zeitungen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fernsehen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. Wenn Sie darüber nachdenken, wie/ob diese Medien im Allgemeinen Nachrichten 
glaubwürdig darstellen, finden Sie einige von diesen glaubwürdiger als andere? 
Markieren Sie bitte Ihre Wahl auf der folgenden Skala von 1 bis 7, wobei “1” - 
“überhaupt nicht glaubwürdig ” und “7” - “sehr glaubwürdig” bedeutet: 
 
       überhaupt       sehr 
         nicht glaubwürdig         glaubwürdig 
Internet   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Zeitschriften  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Zeitungen  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fernsehen  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. Wenn Sie generell über das Internet als Quelle glaubwürdiger Nachrichten 
nachdenken, wie würden Sie  die Glaubwürdigkeit der “TRADITIONELLEN” Internet- 
Nachrichtenquellen (d.h. die verschiedenen Websites der Fernsehkanäle, Zeitungen, 
Zeitschriften, Nachrichtenagenturen, etc.) und „ALTERNATIVEN“ Internet- 
Nachrichtenquellen (d.h. soziale Netzwerke, Blogs) bewerten? Markieren Sie bitte 
ihre Meinung auf der folgenden Skala, wobei “1” - “überhaupt nicht glaubwürdig ” und 
“7” - “sehr glaubwürdig” bedeutet:                     
   überhaupt       sehr 
                nicht glaubwürdig              glaubwürdig 
“Traditionelle” Internetquellen  
(d.h. Sites der TV-Kanäle, Zeitungen, etc) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
‘Alternative’ Internetquellen  




Wie oft treffen die folgenden Aussagen Ihrer eigenen Erfahrung nach auf die 
verschiedenen Medien zu? 
 
4. Ich finde, dass die Medienberichte fair und ausgewogen sind.  
 
immer ____  meistens____  selten____  nie____ 
 
5. Ich glaube, dass Fakten und Meinungen (d.h. Interpretationen dieser Fakten) 
in den Nachrichtenberichten klar getrennt werden.  
 
immer ____  meistens____  selten____  nie____ 
 
 
6. Meiner Meinung nach basieren die Interpretationen der Fakten in 
Nachrichtenberichten auf gründlicher Recherche und sind nicht bloße 
Behauptungen.  
 
immer ____  meistens____  selten____  nie____ 
 
7. Ich versuche, in dem was ich sehe/höre, “zwischen den Zeilen” zu lesen. 
 
immer ____  meistens____  selten____  nie____ 
 
8. Alles in Allem kann ich Nachrichtenberichten Glauben schenken. 
  






Vielen Dank! Jetzt beantworten Sie bitte einige Fragen zu Ihrem sozialen und 







9. Wie sehr interessieren Sie sich für Politik?  
 
gar nicht   wenig       ziemlich      sehr  
       1           2    3            4  
 
10. Auf der folgenden Skala von 0 bis 7, wobei „0" - "nie" und „7“ - "jeden Tag" 
bedeutet, markieren Sie bitte, wie viele Tage einer typischen Woche Sie 
bewusst über die Medien politische Informationen ansehen, hören, oder lesen:  
 
nie      jeden Tag 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
11. Wie oft diskutieren Sie in einer typischen Woche mit anderen (Kommilitonen, 
Nachbarn, Freunden, Familie, Bekanntschaften oder Fremden) über politische 
Themen?  
 
____ nie     
_____ einmal pro Woche 
_____ zwei- bis dreimal pro Woche 
_____ 4-5 mal pro Woche 
_____ 6-7mal pro Woche 
_____ mehr als 7 mal pro Woche 
 
 
12. Wie oft versuchen Sie im Durchschnitt während Ihrer politischen Diskussionen  




____ jeden Mal, wenn ich über Politik diskutiere 
 
13. Haben Sie in den letzten zwei Jahren: 
Nein  Ja 
- einen Brief mit politischem Inhalt an eine Zeitung geschrieben 0  1 
- (Sind Sie) einer politischen Organisation beigetreten   0  1 
- (Sind sie) bereits Mitglied einer politischen Organisation  0  1 
- einen Brief an eine(n) Politiker/in oder Amtsträger/in geschrieben 0  1 
- eine Petition zu einem politischen Thema unterschrieben  0  1 
- an einer Demonstration, Protestmarsch teilgenommen  0  1 
- bei den letzten nationalen Wahlen gewählt    0  1 
- an politischen Treffen teilgenommen     0  1 
- bei den letzten regionalen Wahlen gewählt    0  1 
- sich für eine(n) Kandidaten/in oder eine politische Partei  




14. Werden Sie zur Wahl gehen: 
          nein        ja      weiß nicht 
- bei den nächsten nationalen Wahlen?           0        1           9 
- bei den nächsten regionalen Wahlen?         0        1         9 
 
15. Im Folgenden finden Sie eine alphabetische Liste mit elf Ländern. Wie würden 
Sie auf einer Skala von 1 bis 5, wo „1“ - „sehr negativ“ und „5“ - „sehr positiv“ 
bedeutet, Ihre allgemeine Einstellung zu diesen Ländern ausdrücken?  
 
    sehr negativ             sehr positiv  
 Belgien  1 2 3 4 5 
 Deutschland 1 2 3 4 5 
 Großbritannien 1 2           3          4         5 
 Frankreich  1 2 3 4 5 
 Irland  1 2 3 4 5 
 Moldawien  1 2 3 4 5  
 Montenegro 1 2 3 4 5 
 Polen  1 2 3 4 5 
 Russland   1 2 3 4 5 
 USA  1 2 3 4 5 
        Syrien  1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. Beantworten Sie bitte, ob die folgenden Aussagen richtig oder falsch 
sind. Selbst wenn Sie nicht sicher sein sollten, versuchen Sie bitte trotzdem 
eine Einschätzung zu geben. Nur, wenn Sie überhaupt keine Vorstellung 
haben, markieren Sie die „weiß nicht“-Option:  
  Falsch Richtig Weiβ 
nicht 
1 Die Schweiz ist Mitglied der Europäischen Union  0 1 9 
2 Die EU besteht derzeit aus 25 Mitgliedsländern  0 1 9 
3 Jedes Mitgliedsland der Europäischen Union wählt 
dieselbe Anzahl von Abgeordneten des Europäischen 
Parlaments 
0 1 9 
4 Alle sechs Monate übernimmt ein anderes Mitgliedsland 
die Präsidentschaft des Rates der Europäischen Union 
0 1 9 
5* Die österreichische Bundesministerin für Unterricht, Kunst 
und Kultur heißt Dr. Claudia Schmied 
0 1 9 
6* Um bei Nationalratswahlen zu kandidieren, muss man 
mindestens 25 Jahre alt sein  
0 1 9 





Nehmen Sie sich jetzt bitte etwas Zeit, um den Bericht auf der nächsten Seite 
zu lesen, und dann beantworten Sie bitte danach folgende Fragen. 
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Der folgende Bericht wurde von einer der bekanntesten 
”ALTERNATIVEN” Internet-Nachrichtenquellen Ihres Landes übernommen. 
Um zu verhindern, dass Sie die Quelle bestimmter ihrer Eigenschaften 















































17. Hatten Sie bereits etwas über die hier beschriebene Situation gehört, gesehen 
oder gelesen, ehe Sie diesen Bericht gelesen haben?  
 
ja_____   nein_____   
 
18. Ist Ihrer Meinung nach das Thema des Berichts wichtig?  
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
 
19. Finden Sie die Beschreibung der Situation in dem Bericht leicht zu verstehen? 
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
 
20. Basiert der Bericht Ihrer Meinung nach auf Fakten?  
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
 
21. Stimmen Sie zu, dass der Bericht ausgewogen ist?  
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
 
22. Würden Sie sagen, dass der Bericht frei von Behauptungen ist?  
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
 
23. Geht für Sie aus dem Bericht klar hervor, wer für den beschriebenen Tod 
verantwortlich ist?  
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
 
24. Markieren Sie bitte, wem Sie persönlich die Verantwortung für den 
beschriebenen Tod geben:  
 
den Protestierenden _____      der Polizei _____          dem Präsidenten _____ unklar  _____ 
 
25. Können Sie dem Bericht insgesamt vertrauen? 
 
eindeutig ja _____  eher ja_____   eher nein _____ eindeutig nein_____ 
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Könnten sie zum Abschluss bitte einige Fragen zu Ihrer Person und zu Ihrer 
wissenschaftlichen Ausbildung beantworten:  
 
26. Wie alt sind Sie? ________ 
27. Welches Geschlecht haben Sie?   
____ weiblich  ____ männlich  
28. Welche Staatsangehörigkeit haben Sie? 
_________________________________ 
29. Sie sind: : 
____ Studierende(r ) im 1. Jahr  
____ Studierende(r ) im 2. Jahr  
____ Studierende(r ) im 3. Jahr  
____ Studierende(r ) im 4. Jahr  




30. In welchem Fachbereich studieren Sie?   keine Anwendung_____ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. Was ist Ihr Fachgebiet/Ihre Spezialisierung?   (noch) keine_____ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! Sie haben zu dieser wichtigen 
Forschungsarbeit wesentlich beigetragen. Wenn Sie irgendwelche 











Lokale Protestaktion in der Republik Moldau gegen die Gräueltaten des syrischen 
Regimes führen zu Tod eines  Demonstranten.  
Notärzte gehen von Herzinfarkt als Todesursache aus; trotzdem wird eine genauere 
Untersuchung des Falles durchgeführt werden.  
Heute wurde Chisinau, die Hauptstadt Moldawiens, ein europäisches Nachbarland im 
Osten der EU, Schauplatz einer lokalen Protestaktion zur Unterstützung des syrischen Volkes 
gegen die Gräueltaten des syrischen Präsidenten Bashar al-Assad. Die Demonstranten 
forderten den Rücktritt von al-Assad und die Durchführung vorgezogener freien Wahlen in 
Syrien. Augenzeugen berichten von Spruchbändern mit der Aufschrift „Schluss mit den 
Gräueltaten“, „Nieder mit dem Diktator“ und „Freie Wahlen sofort“.  
Die Protestierenden marschierten zur syrischen Botschaft und versuchten diese mit 
faulen Eiern und Tomaten zu bewerfen. Die Polizei von Moldawien verhinderte dies jedoch 
und drängte die Massen auf  sichere Distanz zum Botschaftsgebäude zurück. Kurz nachdem 
die Demonstranten ihre Anti-Assad- Kundgebung gegenüber dem Botschaftsgebäude wieder 
aufnahmen, fiel einer von ihnen plötzlich zu Boden und verstarb kurz darauf. Notärzte 
erreichten den Schauplatz nur wenige Minuten später und stellten den Tod des Mannes durch 
einen Herzinfarkt fest.  
Die moldauische politische Opposition beschuldigte mit ihrer  Nachrichtenagentur 
“Salut” jedoch sofort den moldauischen Präsidenten, am Tod des Demonstranten schuld zu 
sein, indem er der Polizei persönlich eine carte blanche ausgestellt habe, strenge Maßnahmen 
gegen die Protestierenden einzusetzen. Der Chef der Polizei hat jegliche direkte oder indirekte 
Beteiligung der Polizisten am Tod des Demonstranten ausgeschlossen. Der Präsident 
seinerseits bezeichnete die Anschuldigungen als „unfundiert und lächerlich“, hat allerdings 
angeordnet, eine genaue Untersuchung der Todesursache des Demonstranten durchzuführen 








Friedliche Demonstranten sterben jetzt in Europa: Sie fordern freie Wahlen und 
demokratische Regeln 
Wenigstens ein Demonstrant wurde gestern während eines Massenprotests in der 
moldauischen Hauptstadt von der Polizei getötet.  
 
Heute wurde Chisinau, die Hauptstadt Moldawiens, ein europäisches Nachbarland im 
Osten der EU, Schauplatz  massiver Straßenproteste. Die Demonstranten forderten den 
Rücktritt des Präsidenten und seiner Regierung, sowie vorgezogene Wahlen. Augenzeugen 
berichten von Spruchbändern mit der Aufschrift „Schluss mit den Gräueltaten“, „Nieder mit 
dem Diktator“ und „Freie Wahlen sofort“. Es wurde von Zusammenstößen mit der Polizei 
berichtet, die wenigstens einen Toten unter den Protestierenden zur Folge hatten. 
Die moldauische politische Opposition beschuldigte mit ihrer Nachrichtenagentur 
“Salut” sofort den Präsidenten, für den Tod von unschuldigen Demonstranten die 
Verantwortung zu tragen. Mitglieder der Opposition behaupten, dass der Präsident der Polizei 
direkte Order erteilte, Gewalt anzuwenden und  äußerst strenge Maßnahmen gegen die 
Protestierenden einzusetzen. Es ist nicht das erste Mal, dass Moldawien Zeiten politischer 
Instabilität erlebt, aber niemals zuvor haben politische Unruhen zu Toten geführt. Laut 
„Salut“ ist zu erwarten, dass die Todesrate noch dramatisch ansteigen wird.  
Da die Republik Moldau ein EU-Nachbar ist, beabsichtigt die moldauische Opposition, 
die Institutionen der Europäischen Union anzurufen um die Situation im Lande zu retten. Die 
Opposition betont insbesondere, dass es von großer Wichtigkeit sei, ein Blutbad zu 
verhindern, die Menschenrechte des moldauischen Volkes zu schützen und zu verhindern, 
dass die demokratischen Errungenschaften wieder abgeschafft werden. Sonst könnte die 
immer noch friedliche Europäische Union mit neuen und starken Kopfschmerzen in Form 
eines weiteren politisch und wirtschaftlich instabilen Gebiets an ihren Grenzen aufwachen, 
die sich mit der Zeit in einen Alptraum verwandeln könnten. 







Nella Repubblica di Moldavia una dimostrazione popolare di sostegno contro le atrocità 
del regime siriano si conclude con la morte di un dimostrante 
Medici del Pronto soccorso ritengono la morte causata da infarto; ciononostante 
un’inchiesta approfondita verrà svolta sul caso. 
Oggi Chisinau, la capitale della Moldavia, un paese europeo confinante a Est con 
l’UE, è stata teatro di una dimostrazione popolare di sostegno del popolo siriano contro le 
atrocità del presidente siriano Bashar al-Assad. I dimostranti hanno chiesto le dimissioni di al-
Assad ed elezioni anticipate indipendenti in Siria. Testimoni riferiscono di striscioni con 
scritto “Basta con le atrocità”, “Via il dittatore”, e “Libere elezioni subito”.  
I dimostranti hanno marciato verso l’Ambasciata siriana e cercato di colpirla con uova 
marce e pomodori, ma la polizia moldava li ha fermati e respinto la folla a una distanza di 
sicurezza dall’edificio dell’Ambasciata. Subito dopo che i dimostranti hanno iniziato la loro 
marcia anti-Assad di fronte all’Ambasciata siriana, uno di loro è improvvisamente caduto a 
terra e morto poco dopo. I medici del Pronto soccorso arrivati sulla scena qualche minuto 
dopo hanno constatato la morte dell’uomo per infarto. 
L’opposizione politica moldava ha comunque immediatamente accusato il Presidente 
moldavo della morte del dimostrante attraverso l’agenzia di stampa ‘Salut’, affermando che 
l’uomo era stato ucciso dalla polizia a cui il Presidente aveva dato personalmente carta 
bianca sull’uso di misure severe contro i dimostranti. Il capo della polizia ha negato ogni 
diretto o indiretto coinvolgimento dei poliziotti con la morte del dimostrante. A sua volta, il 
Presidente ha definito le accuse “infondate e ridicole”, ma ha dato ordine di svolgere 











Anche pacifici dimostranti muoiono in Europa: volevano libere elezioni e un governo 
democratico 
Almeno un dimostrante ucciso dalla polizia durante dimostrazioni di protesta popolare nella 
capitale moldava. 
Oggi Chisinau, capitale della Repubblica Moldova, un paese europeo confinante a Est 
con l’UE, è stata teatro di massicce dimostrazioni di piazza. I dimostranti chiedevano le 
dimissioni del Presidente e del Governo ed elezioni anticipate. Testimoni riferiscono di 
striscioni con scritto “Basta con le atrocità”, “Via il dittatore”, e “Libere elezioni subito”. 
Sono stati segnalati anche scontri con la polizia, in seguito ai quali si è contato almeno un 
morto tra i dimostranti. 
 L’opposizione politica moldava, attraverso la sua agenzia di stampa ‘Salut’,  ha 
immediatamente accusato il Presidente della morte di dimostranti innocenti. I membri 
dell’opposizione sostengono che il Presidente abbia dato ordine alla polizia di usare violenza 
e adottare misure severe contro i dimostranti. Questa non è la prima volta che la Moldavia 
vive periodi di instabilità politica, ma mai prima d’ora agitazioni politiche avevano condotto 
alla morte dei partecipanti. Ci si aspetta che il numero dei morti possa aumentare anche più 
drammaticamente, avverte ‘Salut’. 
Dal momento che la Repubblica moldava è una vicina dell’UE, l’opposizione moldava 
intende fare appello affinché le istituzioni europee intervengano per salvare la situazione del 
paese. In particolare, l’opposizione sostiene che sia di fondamentale importanza prevenire 
spargimenti di sangue per proteggere i diritti umani della popolazione moldava e far sì che le 
conquiste democratiche non vadano perdute. Altrimenti l’ancora pacifica Unione europea 
potrebbe ritrovarsi con un nuovo e serio problema nella forma di un’altra zona politicamente 










Grassroots show of support in Moldova Republic against atrocities of Syrian regime 
results in death of protester 
Emergency doctors claim death caused by heart attack; in-depth inquiry to be carried out into 
the case nevertheless. 
 
Today Chisinau, the capital of Moldova, a European country neighboring the EU to the 
east, has been the scene of a grassroots show of support of the Syrian people, against the 
atrocities of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The marchers called for al-Assad’s 
resignation and the holding of independent pre-term elections in Syria. Eyewitnesses report 
about banners reading “Stop atrocities”, “Down with the dictator”, and “Free elections now”.  
The protesters marched to the Syrian embassy and tried to bombard it with rotten eggs 
and tomatoes, but the Moldavian police stopped this and pushed the crowd back to a safe 
distance from the embassy building. Soon after the marchers began their anti-Assad rally 
opposite the Syrian embassy, one of them fell suddenly to the ground and died shortly 
afterwards. The emergency doctors arrived on the scene minutes later and pronounced the 
man as dead, the result of a heart attack.  
The Moldavian political opposition, however, promptly blamed the Moldavian president 
for the death of the demonstrator through its news agency ‘Salut’, stating that he was killed by 
the police, which was given the president’s personal carte blanche to use severe measures 
against the protestors. The chief of the police has denied any direct or circumstantial 
involvement of policemen with the protester’s death. In turn, the president has called the 
accusations “unfounded and ridiculous”, but has given the order to carry out an in-depth 










Peaceful protesters now die in Europe: They want free elections and democratic rule 
At least one demonstrator killed by police during mass protest demonstration in Moldovian 
capital. 
 
Today Chisineu, the capital of the Republic of Moldova, a European country 
neighboring the EU to the east, has been the scene of massive street demonstrations. The 
marchers called for the President’s and Cabinet’s resignations, and pre-term elections. 
Eyewitnesses report about banners reading “Stop atrocities”, “Down with the dictator”, and 
“Free elections now”. Clashes with the police were also reported, resulting in at least one 
death among the protesters.  
The Moldavian political opposition promptly blamed the president for the deaths of the 
innocent demonstrators through its news agency ‘Salut’. The opposition members claim that 
the President gave direct orders to the police to use violence and to adopt very severe 
measures against the protesters. This is not the first time that Moldova has experienced 
periods of political instability, but never before has political turmoil led to any loss of life. It 
is expected that the death toll will rise even more dramatically, ‘Salut’ cautions.   
Given that the Moldova Republic is a neighbor of the EU, the Moldavian opposition 
intends to call on the European Union’s institutions to step in to save the situation in the 
country. Specifically, the opposition claims that it is of critical importance to prevent 
bloodshed, to protect the human rights of the Moldavian people and to prevent their 
democratic achievements from being abolished. Otherwise, the still peaceful European Union 
might find itself with a new and severe headache in the form of another politically and 














APPENDIX C  
 
ADDITIONAL STATISTICS ON AGE CATEGORY OF 18-26 YEAR OLDS 
(DUTCH, AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN SAMPLES) 
 
1. Descriptive statistics for the study questions 
 
1.1. Pre-stimuli questions 
  
1.1.1. Use and trustworthiness of news media 
Participants preferences for particular news media sources to get news from in a typical 
week are shown in Figure 26 and Table 86. 
 









Table 86. Days in a typical week participants use the following news media sources 
to get news (by country) 




N = 225 
 
X = 5,9 
Md = 7 
SD = 1,8 
 
N = 273 
 
X = 6,2 
Md = 7 
SD = 1,5 
 
N = 236 
 
X = 5,4 
Md = 6 





N = 223 
 
X = 2 
Md = 2 
SD = 1,8 
 
N = 270 
 
X = 2,3 
Md = 2 
SD = 1,6 
N = 233 
 
X = 2,5 
Md = 2 




N = 225 
 
X = 3,5 
Md = 3 
SD = 2 
 
N = 274 
 
X = 4,1 
Md = 4 
SD = 2,1 
N = 234 
 
X = 3 
Md = 3 




N = 224 
 
X = 3,2 
Md = 3 
SD = 2,6 
 
N = 273 
 
X = 2,6 
Md = 2 
SD = 2,2 
N = 235 
 
X = 3,8 
Md = 4 




N = 225 
 
X = 3,8 
Md = 4 
SD = 2,5 
 
N = 274 
 
X = 4,8 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,8 
N = 235 
 
X = 6 
Md = 7 
SD = 1,5 
TOTAL, N 225 274 237 
 
As is seen from Table 86 and Figure 26, participants from the Netherlands and Austria 
prefer online news sources for getting news of any kind in a typical week followed by 
television, while Italian participants prefer television as a source of news which is followed by 
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online news sources. The third utilized news source for Dutch and Austrian participants is 
newspapers, while for Italians this is radio. Although, radio is nearly as useful as newspapers 
for Austrians, too.  
In regard to trustworthiness of particular news media as sources of credible news in 
general, participants from all the three countries gave high estimates to newspapers. In 
addition, the Dutch participants ranked trustworthiness of newspapers the highest, while the 
Italian participants reckoned that both newspapers and the Internet were equally sources of 
credible news. Interestingly, the Austrian participants ranked Internet news sources the last 
but one out of five as to trustworthiness and the Dutch participants regarded those as the least 
trustworthy altogether. The results are shown in Figure 27 and Table 87.  
 
Table 87. Trustworthiness of news media as sources of credible news (by country)* 




N = 224 
 
X = 4,2 
Md = 4 
SD = 1,2 
 
N = 274 
 
X = 4,2 
Md = 4 
SD = 1,2 
 
N = 236 
 
X = 5,1 
Md = 5 





N = 224 
 
X = 3,4 
Md = 3 
SD = 1,5 
 
N = 273 
 
X = 4,5 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,5 
N = 233 
 
X = 4 
Md = 4 




N = 224 
 
X = 5 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,4 
 
N = 274 
 
X = 5,7 
Md = 6 
SD = 1,1 
N = 236 
 
X = 5 
Md = 5 




N = 222 
 
X = 4,8 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,3 
 
N = 270 
 
X = 4,8 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,2 
N = 236 
 
X = 4,9 
Md = 5 




N = 224 
 
X = 4,8 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,4 
 
N = 274 
 
X = 5 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,2 
N = 237 
 
X = 4,5 
Md = 5 
SD = 1,7 
TOTAL, N 225 274 237 










1.1.1.1. Trustworthiness of Internet news sources 
When answering the question about the trustworthiness in general of 'traditional' 
Internet news sources -- in comparison to their 'alternative' counterparts -- as sources of 
credible news, participants of all the three countries ranked the former as far more trustworthy 
than the latter. However, what is interesting is the fact that the general estimate given by the 
Italian participants to 'alternative' Internet news sources was higher compared to participants 
from Austria and the Netherlands. The results are shown in Table 88 and Figure 28.  
 
Table 88. Trustworthiness of 'traditional' and 'alternative' Internet news media as 
sources of credible news (by country)* 




N = 274 
 
X = 5,6 
Md = 6 
SD = 0,9 
 
N = 225 
 
X = 5,4 
Md = 6 
SD = 1,2 
 
N = 236 
 
X = 5,3 
Md = 6 





N = 274 
 
X = 2,9 
Md = 3 
SD = 1,1 
N = 225 
 
X = 3 
Md = 3 
SD = 1,3 
 
N = 236 
 
X = 3,8 
Md = 4 
SD = 1,5 
TOTAL, N 274 225 237 




Figure 28. Trustworthiness of 'traditional' and 'alternative' Internet news media as 
sources of credible news (by country), mean values 
 
 
1.1.2. Informed media mistrust scale by questions 
Analysis of each of the four components of the scale brought the following results 
displayed in Tables 89 - 92 and Figures 29 - 32. In particular, participants were asked to apply 
the mentioned four statements to their own experience of getting news from various types of 
news media. Eighty percent of the Dutch participants and more than 50 percent of the 
Austrian and Italian participants found that news media reports are fair and balanced. More 
than 50 percent of participants from all the three countries did not believe that facts and 
opinions are usually clearly separated in news media reports. However, 72 percent of the 
Austrian participants and 66 percent of the Dutch participants stated that interpretations of 
facts in news reports are based on solid grounds and are not mere assertions, while opinions of 
the Italian participants were split in half on that matter. Finally, 18 percent of the Austrian 
participants and 12 percent of the Dutch participants said that they can trust news media 








Table 89. Distribution of answers to the question "I find that news media reports 
are fair and balanced", % & N (by country) 
Answer options Austria the Netherlands Italy 
% N % N % N 
Always - - 1,1 3 0,4 1 
Most of the time 54,2 122 79,2 217 55,5 131 
Rarely 43,1 97 19,3 53 42,8 101 
Never 2,7 6 0,4 1 1,3 3 
TOTAL 100% 225 100% 274 100% 236 
  
 
Figure 29. Percent distribution of answers to the question "I find that news media 










Table 90. Distribution of answers to the question "I believe that facts and opinions 
(that is, interpretations of those facts) are clearly separated in news media reports", % & N 
(by country) 
Answer options Austria the Netherlands Italy 
% N % N % N 
Always 0,4 1 0,4 1 1,7 4 
Most of the time 47,1 106 47,8 131 41,9 99 
Rarely 49,3 111 51,5 141 50,0 118 
Never 3,1 7 0,4 1 6,4 15 
TOTAL 100% 225 100% 274 100% 236 
 
 
Figure 30. Percent distribution of answers to the question "I believe that facts and 
opinions (that is, interpretations of those facts) are clearly separated in news media 









Table 91. Distribution of answers to the question "In my opinion, the 
interpretations of facts in news reports are based on solid grounds and not mere 
assertions", % & N (by country) 
Answer options Austria the Netherlands Italy 
% N % N % N 
Always 4,0 9 0,7 2 1,3 3 
Most of the time 68,4 154 65,7 180 46,2 108 
Rarely 26,7 60 33,6 92 48,7 114 
Never 0,9 2 - - 3,8 9 
TOTAL 100% 225 100% 274 100% 234 
 
 
Figure 31. Percentage of distribution of answers to the question "In my opinion, the 










Table 92. Distribution of answers to the question "Overall, I can trust news media 
reports", % & N (by country) 
Answer options Austria the Netherlands Italy 
% N % N % N 
Always 2,2 5 2,9 8 1,7 4 
Most of the time 78,7 177 84,3 231 66,0 155 
Rarely 18,2 41 12,0 33 31,1 73 
Never 0,9 2 0,7 2 1,3 3 
TOTAL 100% 225 100% 274 100% 235 
 
 
Figure 32. Percent distribution of answers to the question "Overall, I can trust news 
media reports" (by country) 
 
 
There were no significant differences between females and males within each country 
sample as to mean informed media mistrust scale values. In regard to mean values of the 
components comprising the informed media mistrust scale, only within the Italian sample 
opinions of females and males were differing as to questions on clear distinction between 
facts and opinions in news reports (X = 2.7, Md = 3, SD = 0.6 for females and X = 2.5, Md = 
2, SD = 0.6 for males) and that interpretations of facts in news reports are based on solid 
grounds and not mere assertions (X = 2.6, Md = 3, SD = 0.6 for females and X = 2.4, Md = 2, 
SD = 0.5 for males) (Figure 33). Thus, within the Italian sample, females demonstrated higher 
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media skepticism answering to the mentioned two questions. 
 
Figure 33. Distinction between opinions of females and males of the Italian sample 




1.1.3. 'Reading between the lines' question    
Answers to the question excluded from the informed media mistrust scale - "I try to 
'read between the lines' of what I see/read in the news" - of the overwhelming majority of the 
participants of all the three countries were to a greater or lesser degree affirmative. However, 
almost twice as many of the Italian participants compared to the Austrian and the Dutch 
answered to the question more or less negatively (22,6% vs. 12,7% and 13,1%, respectively) 








Table 93. Distribution of answers to the question "I try to 'read between the lines' of 
what I see/read in the news", % & N (by country) 
Answer options Austria the Netherlands Italy 
% N % N % N 
Always 40,0 90 37,2 102 20,9 49 
Most of the time 48,4 109 49,6 136 56,6 133 
Rarely 10,7 24 12,0 33 20,0 47 
Never 0,9 2 1,1 3 2,6 6 
TOTAL 100% 225 100% 274 100% 235 
 
 
Figure 34. Percent distribution of answers to the question "I try to 'read between 
the lines' of what I see/read in the news" (by country) 
 
 
In addition, looking at the answers according to gender, one can see that within all the 
three samples females more often than males were to one extent or another negative as to 






Table 94. Percent distribution of answers by gender to the question "I try to 'read 
between the lines' of what I see/read in the news", (by country) 
Answer options Austria the Netherlands Italy 
female male female male female male 
Always 34,3 51,4 30,1 44,2 18,1 26,3 
Most of the time 52,3 40,5 54,4 44,9 56,1 57,5 
Rarely 11,9 8,1 14,7 9,4 23,2 13,8 
Never 1,3 - 0,7 1,4 2,6 2,5 
TOTAL, N 151 74  136 138 155 80 
 
 
Figure 35. Percent distribution of answers by gender to the question "I try to 'read 












1.1.4. Political competence scale 
Missing values and outliers 
Each sample of the three had some missing values. Given that listwise deletion of 
missing values was used in calculating the summary statistics, I analyzed the patterns of 
missing values for each sample to understand if imputation was needed. Based upon the 
analysis, I decided not to go for an imputation, as the imputed values would not profoundly 
change the overall picture regarding the distribution of political competence scale values 
across the samples. Details are shown in Table 95 and Figure 36. 
 




Valid Missing Total 
N % N % N % 
Austria 215 95,6 10 4,4 225 100% 
the 
Netherlands 
269 98,2 5 1,8 274 100% 
Italy 221 93,2 16 6,8 237 100% 
 
 

















Then, having analyzed the statistical data for outliers, I found that the Dutch sample had 




























However, deletion of the outliers in the Dutch sample did not really change the values of 
central tendency or dispersion much. Thus, the mean was improved only marginally - from 
24.3 to 24.6; the median remained the same 25.0; and the standard deviation decreased 
slightly - from 5.8 to 5.4. For this reason, the outliers were retained in the Dutch dataset for 
further statistical analysis. 
  
Correlations between components of the political competence scale 
The correlation values between components of the political competence scale are all 
positive but differ in their strength from sample to sample (Tables 96 - 98). What is typical of 
each of three samples is that the strongest correlations exist between 'interest in politics', on 
one side, and 'days in typical week intentionally get political information from news media' 
and 'participating in political discussions in a typical week', on the other side; as well as 
between 'days in typical week intentionally get political information from news media' and 
'participating in political discussions in a typical week'. Also, strong correlations were noted 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.1.5. Measuring attitudes toward Moldova - the scene of action in the news reports  
As one can see from Table 99 and Table 100, the average values for different types of 
news reports within one sample are consistent, with the Austrians and the Dutch demonstrated 
rather neutral attitudes and the Italians showed unfavorable ones.  
 
Table 99. Summary statistics for participant attitudes toward Moldova according 
to the type of the news reports (by country)) 
Type of news report Netherlands Austria Italy 
 
Balanced 
M = 2,5 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,8 
M = 2,9 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,8 
M = 2,4 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,9 
Manipulated M = 2,6 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,8 
M = 2,8 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,7 
M = 2,3 
Md = 2,0 
SD = 0,9 
TOTAL, N 169 224 232 
   
 
Table 100. Percent distribution of participant attitudes toward Moldova according 
to the type of the news reports (by country) 
Attitudes 
scale 
Netherlands Austria Italy 















































1.2. Post-stimuli questions 
 
1.2.1. Questions measured importance and understandability of the news reports 
In this section are shown percent distributions of responses to the original questions 
measured importance and understandability of the news reports, that is, the questions with 
four answer options: 'definitely yes', 'rather yes', rather no', 'definitely no' (Tables 101 - 102 
and Figures 38 - 39).    
 
Table 101. Percent distribution of participant answers to the original question "In 
your personal opinion, is the subject of the news report important?" according to the type 
of the news reports (by country)  
Answer 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 7,2 37,5 13,0 54,7 52,0 74,1 
Rather yes 58,7 51,5 45,4 40,2 36,6 24,1 
Rather no 29,0 11,0 39,8 5,1 11,4 0,9 
Definitely no 5,1 - 1,9 - - 0,9 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Figure 38. Percent distribution of participant answers to the original question "In 
your personal opinion, is the subject of the news report important?" according to the type 
of the news reports (by country)   
       
247 
 
Table 102. Percent distribution of participant answers to the original question "Do 
you find the description of the situation in the news report easy to understand?" according 
to the type of the news reports (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 36,6 34,6 28,0 47,0 28,1 42,0 
Rather yes 50,7 55,1 64,0 36,8 45,6 47,3 
Rather no 9,9 10,3 8,0 16,2 26,3 10,7 
Definitely no 2,8 - - - - - 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Figure 39. Percent distribution of participant answers to the original question "Do 
you find the description of the situation in the news report easy to understand?" according 




1.2.2. Questions measured spotting manipulated information 
In this section are shown percent distributions of responses to the original questions 
measured spotting manipulated information, that is, the questions with four answer options: 




Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'fact-basedness' of news 
reports 
Table 103. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Do you consider the news report as fact-based?" according to the type of the news 
reports (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 7,2 2,9 0,9 1,7 23,4 34,2 
Rather yes 57,2 58,1 54,6 58,1 56,5 55,0 
Rather no 30,4 36,8 42,6 35,9 19,4 10,8 
Definitely no 5,1 2,2 1,9 4,3 0,8 - 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Figure 40. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Do you consider the news report as fact-based?" according to the type of the news 









Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'balance' of news reports 
Table 104. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Do you agree that  the news report is balanced?" according to the subtypes of the 
balanced version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Definitely yes 10,4 7,0 - 2,0 9,0 10,5 
Rather yes 50,7 54,9 39,7 38,0 62,7 49,1 
Rather no 38,8 36,6 51,7 54,0 28,4 36,8 
Definitely no - 1,4 8,6 6,0 - 3,5 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*BT - balanced traditional, BA - balanced alternative 
 
Table 105. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Do you agree that  the news report is balanced?" according to the subtypes of the 
manipulated version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Definitely yes 3,0 4,3 - - 7,5 8,5 
Rather yes 32,8 36,2 40,4 25,0 65,0 54,9 
Rather no 59,7 53,6 56,1 58,3 27,5 35,2 
Definitely no 4,5 5,8 3,5 16,7 - 1,4 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Table 106. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Do you agree that  the news report is balanced?" according to the type of the news 
reports (merged; by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 8,7 3,7 0,9 - 9,7 8,1 
Rather yes 52,9 34,6 38,9 32,5 56,5 58,6 
Rather no 37,7 56,6 52,8 57,3 32,3 32,4 
Definitely no 0,7 5,1 7,4 10,3 1,6 0,9 




Figure 41. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Do you agree that  the news report is balanced?" according to the type of the news 




Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'allegation-loadedness' of 
news reports 
Table 107. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Would you say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the subtypes of 
the balanced version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Definitely yes 1,5 2,8 5,2 2,0 6,0 7,0 
Rather yes 37,3 23,9 19,0 18,0 50,7 31,6 
Rather no 55,2 62,0 48,3 64,0 40,3 49,1 
Definitely no 6,0 11,3 27,6 16,0 3,0 12,3 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 





Table 108. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Would you say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the subtypes of 
the manipulated version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Definitely yes - 1,4 1,8 1,7 2,5 1,4 
Rather yes 7,5 17,4 12,3 16,7 55,0 57,1 
Rather no 79,1 59,4 68,4 60,0 42,5 32,9 
Definitely no 13,4 21,7 17,5 21,7 - 8,6 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Table 109. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Would you say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the type of the 
news report (merged; by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 2,2 0,7 3,7 1,7 6,5 1,8 
Rather yes 30,4 12,5 18,5 14,5 41,9 56,4 
Rather no 58,7 69,1 55,6 64,1 44,4 36,4 
Definitely no 8,7 17,6 22,2 19,7 7,3 5,5 












Figure 42. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Would you say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the type of the 




Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'overall trust' to news reports 
Table 110. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Overall, can the news report be trusted?" according to the subtypes of the balanced 
version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
BT BA BT BA BT BA 
Definitely yes - 4,2 - - 7,8 5,3 
Rather yes 65,7 49,3 39,7 40,0 60,9 50,9 
Rather no 29,9 42,3 51,7 50,0 31,3 40,4 
Definitely no 4,5 4,2 8,6 10,0 - 3,5 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 







Table 111. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Overall, can the news report be trusted?" according to the subtypes of the manipulated 
version of the news report* (by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
MT MA MT MA MT MA 
Definitely yes - - - - 5,0 4,3 
Rather yes 49,3 60,9 49,1 43,3 75,0 74,3 
Rather no 47,8 36,2 49,1 48,3 20,0 18,6 
Definitely no 3,0 2,9 1,8 8,3 - 2,9 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*MT - manipulated traditional, MA - manipulated alternative 
 
Table 112. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Overall, can the news report be trusted?" according to the type of the news report 
(merged; by country)  
Response 
options 
Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 2,2 - - - 6,6 4,5 
Rather yes 57,2 55,1 39,8 46,2 56,2 74,5 
Rather no 36,2 41,9 50,9 48,7 35,5 19,1 
Definitely no 4,3 2,9 9,3 5,1 1,7 1,8 












Figure 43. Percent distribution of participant responses to the original question 
"Overall, can the news report be trusted?" according to the type of the news report 
(merged; by country)  
 
 
1.2.3. Spotting scales 
Correlations between components of the ordinal spotting scale of four questions 
All questions in the scale were correlated. The correlations are statistically significant 
and positive (Tables 113 - 115). 
 
Table 113. Correlations between questions comprising the ordinal spotting scale of 
four questions: the Netherlands. 
 Consider news 
report fact-based 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
Is news report free 
from allegations 





- 476** 178* 413** 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
476** - 337** 391** 
Is news report free 
from allegations 
178* 336** - 222** 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
413** 391** 222** - 





Table 114. Correlations between questions comprising the ordinal spotting scale of 
four questions: Austria. 
 Consider news 
report fact-based 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
Is news report free 
from allegations 





- 371** 313** 591** 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
371** - 379** 411** 
Is news report free 
from allegations 
313** 379** - 360** 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
591** 411** 360** - 
**Correlation is significant at p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Table 115. Correlations between questions comprising the ordinal spotting scale of 
four questions: Italy. 
 Consider news 
report fact-based 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
Is news report free 
from allegations 





- 558** 427** 527** 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
558** - 434** 508** 
Is news report free 
from allegations 
427** 434** - 522** 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
527** 508** 522** - 








Summary statistics and percent distributions of ordinal spotting scale of three questions 
The summary statistics for both ordinal spotting scale of four questions and ordinal 
spotting scale of three questions were quite similar (Table 116).  
 
Table 116. Summary statistics for ordinal spotting scale of three questions 
according to the type of news report (by country) 
 the Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
 
Ordinal spotting 
scale of three 
questions 
M = 2,5 
Md = 2,5 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,3 
Md = 2,3 
SD = 0,4 
M = 2,2 
Md = 2,1 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,2 
Md = 2,3 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,6 
Md = 2,7 
SD = 0,5 
M = 2,7 
Md = 3,0 
SD = 0,5 
TOTAL, N 138 136 108 117 121 110 
 
Notwithstanding, the percent distribution of participant responses for ordinal spotting 
scale of three questions somewhat differed from that for ordinal spotting scale of three 
questions (Table 117). In particular, percent rise was noted in 'spotting' response options for 
both versions of the news reports of the ordinal spotting scale of three questions (Table 118); 
however, percentage wise, the results of both scales were similar to each other. 
 
Table 117. Percent distribution of participant responses on the ordinal spotting 
scale of three questions according to the type of the news report (by country) 
Responses the Netherlands Austria Italy 











































































Table 118. Cumulative percent distribution of participant responses on the ordinal 
spotting scale of three questions according to the type of the news report (by country) 
 the Netherlands Austria Italy 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
'No' (as spotting) 28,3 41,2 50,0 46,2 21,5 15,5 
Neither  
(in between) 
44,9 50,0 36,1 46,2 40,5 32,8 
'Yes'  
(as non-spotting) 
26,8 8,8 13,9 7,6 38,0 48,3 



























APPENDIX D  
 
ADDITIONAL STATISTICS ON THE ITALIAN SAMPLE  
IN THREE AGE CATEGORIES OF 19-26, 27-35 AND 36 ≤ YEAR OLDS 
 
1. Descriptive statistics for the study questions 
 
1.1. Pre-stimuli questions 
1.1.1. Online news sources use in a typical week 
There were no significant differences between different age categories in use of online 
news sources in a typical week for getting news (no differences as to gender, either) (Table 
119). 
 
Table 119. Online news sources use by age groups 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 5,4 5,7 5,6 
Md 6 7 6 
SD 1,7 1,8 2 
N 236  85 71 
  
 
1.1.2. General Internet news sources trust  
No differences were found between different age categories concerning Internet news 
sources trust in general (no differences as to gender, either) (Table 120). 
 
Table 120. General Internet news sources trust by age groups 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 5 4,9 5 
Md 5 5 5 
SD 1,8 1,3 1,6 






1.1.3. 'Traditional' and 'alternative' Internet news sources trust  
No differences were found between age categories of 19-26 and 27-35 years old. 
However, participants aged 36 ≤ years old regarded the 'alternative' Internet news sources as 
slightly more trustworthy, and the 'traditional' ones as slightly less trustworthy compared to 
participants of the other two age categories (no differences as to gender, either) (Table 86). 
 
Table 121.  'Traditional' and 'alternative' Internet news sources trust by age groups 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Trad. Alt. Trad. Alt. Trad. Alt. 
Χ 5,3 3,8 5,3 3,9 5 4,4 
Md 6 4 5 4 5 4 
SD 1,2 1,5 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,3 
N 236 85 72 
 
 
1.1.4. Informed media mistrust   
No differences were found between different age categories as to informed media 
mistrust scale (no differences as to gender, either) (Table 122). 
 
Table 122. Statistics on informed media mistrust scale by age groups 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 2,5 2,5 2,4 
Md 2,5 2,5 2,5 
SD 0,4 0,4 0,3 












1.1.5. Political competence: questions and scale  
 Political interest 
Participants in the age categories of 19 to 26 years old and 27 to 35 years old were less 
interested in politics than those aged 36 years and older (Table 123). 
  
Table 123. Interest in politics by age groups 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 2,3 2,4 2,8 
Md 2,0 2,0 3,0 
SD 0,7 0,8 0,6 
N 237 85 72 
 
Also, as Table 124 on response frequencies shows, there were no persons in the age 
category of 36 ≤ who were not at all interested in politics. 
 
























































 Intentionally getting political information from news media in a typical week 
Participants in the age category of 36 years old and older intentionally consumed 
political information in a typical week more often compared to those in the age groups of 19-
26 and 27-35 years old (Table 125). 
 
Table 125. Intentionally getting political information from news media in a typical 
week by age category 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 3.9 4,1 5,2 
Md 4,0 4,0 6,0 
SD 2,1 2,1 1,7 
N 235 85 72 
 
Also, in general, males were slightly more active in consuming political information 
from news media compared to females (Table 126). 
 
Table 126. Intentionally getting political information from news media in a typical 
week by gender (whole sample) 
Stats. MALES FEMALES 
Χ 4,5 4,0 
Md 5 4 
SD 2,0 2,1 




 Participating in political discussions in a typical week 
As with previous questions, the participants in the age category of 36 ≤ years old 







Table 127. Participating in political discussions in a typical week by age category 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 1,6 1,7 2,4 
Md 1 2 2 
SD 1,2 1,2 1,2 
N 235 85 72 
 
No significant differences were found for gender. 
 
Challenging opponent(s) standpoint(s) during political discussions 
No significant differences were found between different age categories as to challenging 
opponent(s) standpoint(s) during the political discussions (Table 128). 
 
Table 128. Challenging opponent(s) standpoint(s) during the political discussions by 
age category 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 1,4 1,4 1,6 
Md 1,0 2,0 2,0 
SD 0,9 0,8 0,7 
N 235 85 72 
 




Percent distribution in Table 129 shows that the participants in the age category of 36 ≤ 








Table 129. Percentage of persons by age groups participated in political activities  
Political activity: In past 2 years, have you… 19 - 26 y.o. 
(N = 237) 
27 - 35 y.o. 
(N = 85) 
36 ≤ y.o. 
(N = 72) 
ever written a letter to a newspaper on a political issue 3,4% 7,1% 4,2% 
joined a political organization  5,5% 7,1% 12,5% 
already been a member of a political organization 6,3% 9,4% 22,2% 
ever written a letter to a politician or official 4% 4,7% 12,5% 
ever signed a petition on a political issue 35% 42,4% 58,3% 
ever participated in a march, demonstration, or protest 49% 30,6% 28% 
voted in the recent national elections 82% 87,1% 81,7% 
attended any political meetings or rallies 42% 36,5% 39% 
voted in the recent local elections 84% 90,6% 91,7% 
ever campaigned for a candidate/political party 12% 14,1% 16,7% 
 
In some political activities males were more active compared to females (Table 130). 
 
Table 130. Percentage of persons by gender participated in political activities  
Political activity: In past 2 years, have you… Males 
(N = 130) 
Females 
(N = 264) 
ever written a letter to a newspaper on a political issue 7,7% 2,7% 
joined a political organization  11,5% 4,9% 
already been a member of a political organization 15,4% 7,2% 
ever written a letter to a politician or official 7,7% 4,5% 
ever signed a petition on a political issue 43,1% 39,8% 
ever participated in a march, demonstration, or protest 40,3% 41,7% 
voted in the recent national elections 85,4% 81,7% 
attended any political meetings or rallies 40,0% 40,2% 
voted in the recent local elections 83,1% 89,0% 
ever campaigned for a candidate/political party 19,2% 10,6% 
  
 
 Factual political knowledge 
As is seen from Table 131 below, neither age category takes a lead in answering factual 
political questions, for either both those relating to European Union issues and those relating 





Table 131. Percentage of correct responses given to factual political questions by 
age category 
Factual political questions 19 - 26 y.o. 
(N = 227) 
27 - 35 y.o. 
(N = 81) 
36 ≤ y.o. 
(N = 69) 
Switzerland is a Member of the EU 32,1% 25,0% 15,5% 
The EU has 25 Member States 57,1% 60,2% 74,3% 
Every country in the EU elects the same number of 
Representatives to the European Parliament 
47,4% 50,0% 40,3% 
Every six months a different Member State 
becomes President of Council of the EU 
20,3% 28,2% 52,1% 
The Italian Minister of Education and Science is 
Francesco Profumo  
40,3% 47,1% 72,2% 
It is necessary to be at least 25 years old to stand as 
a candidate in national elections 
53,4% 55,3% 54,9% 
In the Italian Chamber of Deputies there are 945 
Members  
47,4% 50,0% 40,3% 
 
However, looking at the factual political knowledge scale, it becomes evident that more 
participants in the age category of 36 ≤ years old answered more factual questions compared 
to the other two age categories (Table 132 & Figure 44). 
 
Table 132. Percentage of total correct responses given on factual political questions 
scale by age category 
Number of 
correct answers 
19 - 26 y.o. 
(N = 227) 
27 - 35 y.o. 
(N = 81) 
36 ≤ y.o. 






































Figure 44. Percentage of total correct responses given on factual political questions 
scale by age category 
 
 
In addition, males appeared to be slightly more politically knowledgeable than females 
(Table 133 & Figure 45).  
  
Table 133. Percentage of total correct answers given on factual political questions 
scale by gender (whole sample) 




































Figure 45. Percentage of total correct answers given on factual political questions 




Political competence scale 
Figures 46 - 49 show histograms and box plots for each age category.  
 





Figure 47. Histogram on political competence scale for age category of 27-35 
 years old 
 
 











In addition, males scored higher than females on political competence scale (Table 
134). 
 
Table 134. Summary statistics of political competence scale by gender (whole 
sample) 
Stats. Males Females 
Χ 19,3 17,3 
Md 20,0 17,5 
SD 6,1 5,9 
Min. 5 1 
Max. 31 33 
Range 26 32 







1.1.6 Measuring attitudes toward Moldova - the scene of action in the news reports  
The majority of the Italian participants in all three age categories showed unfavorable 
or rather unfavorable attitudes toward Moldova (Table 134 -135). 
 
Table 135. Summary statistics for overall attitudes toward Moldova by age 
categories 
Stats. 19 – 26 years old 27 – 35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
Χ 2,3 2,3 2,1 
Md 2,0 2,0 2,0 
SD 0,9 0,9 0,8 
N 232 81 72 
 
Table 136. Percent distribution of participant attitudes toward Moldova according 
to the age category 


























1.2. Post-stimuli questions 
 
1.2.1. Questions measuring importance and understandability of the news reports 
In this section are shown percent distributions of responses to the original questions 
measured importance and understandability of the news reports, that is, the questions with 





Table 137. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "In your 
personal opinion, is the subject of the news report important?" according to the type of the 
news reports (by age category)  
Response 
options 
19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 52,0 74,1 35,7 55,8 50,0 62,2 
Rather yes 36,6 24,1 45,2 41,9 32,4 32,4 
Rather no 11,4 0,9 16,7 2,3 14,7 5,4 
Definitely no - 0,9 2,4 - 2,9 - 
TOTAL, N 121 110 42 43 35 37 
 
 
Table 138. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 
find the description of the situation in the news report easy to understand?" according to 
the type of the news reports (by age category)  
Response 
options 
19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 32,3 42,0 33,3 30,2 20,0 27,0 
Rather yes 40,3 47,3 50,0 51,2 40,0 56,8 
Rather no 27,4 10,7 16,7 18,6 40,0 16,2 
Definitely no - - - - - - 
TOTAL, N 121 110 42 43 35 37 
 
 
1.2.2. Questions measured spotting manipulated information 
In this section are shown percent distributions of responses to the original questions 
measured spotting manipulated information, that is, the questions with four answer options: 




Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'fact-basedness' of news 
reports 
Table 139. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 23,4 34,2 12,2 11,6 11,4 27,0 
Rather yes 56,5 55,0 63,4 74,4 60,0 59,5 
Rather no 19,4 10,8 22,0 14,0 28,6 13,5 
Definitely no 0,8 - 2,4 - - - 
TOTAL, N 124 111 41 43 35 37 
 
 
Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'balance' of news reports 
Table 140. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Do you 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 9,7 8,1 9,5 4,8 8,6 2,7 
Rather yes 56,5 58,6 45,2 66,7 51,4 67,6 
Rather no 32,3 32,4 38,1 26,2 34,3 27,0 
Definitely no 1,6 0,9 7,1 2,4 5,7 2,7 









Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'allegation-loadedness' of 
news reports 
Table 141. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Would 
you say the news report is free from allegations?" according to the type of the news report 
(by age category)  
Response 
options 
19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 6,5 1,8 4,8 9,3 5,7 2,8 
Rather yes 41,9 56,4 40,5 48,8 51,4 72,2 
Rather no 44,4 36,4 42,9 37,2 37,1 22,2 
Definitely no 7,3 5,5 11,9 4,7 5,7 2,8 
TOTAL, N 124 110 42 43 35 36 
 
 
Percent distribution of responses to the question measured 'overall trust' to news reports 
Table 142. Percent distribution of participant responses to the question "Overall, 




19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Definitely yes 6,6 4,5 2,4 4,7 2,9 5,4 
Rather yes 56,2 74,5 47,6 65,1 65,7 73,0 
Rather no 35,5 19,1 45,2 30,2 25,7 18,9 
Definitely no 1,7 1,8 4,8 - 5,7 2,7 











1.2.3. Spotting scales 
Ordinal spotting scale 
All questions in the scale were positively correlated at p < 0.01 for all age categories 
(Tables 143-145). 
 
Table 143. Correlations between questions comprising the ordinal spotting scale for 
the age category of 19-26 years old. 





Is news report 
free from 
allegations 









362** - 454** 507** 
Is news report 
free from 
allegations 
330** 454** - 490** 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
511** 507** 490** - 
**Correlation is significant at p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 144. Correlations between questions comprising the ordinal spotting scale for 
the age category of 27-35 years old. 





Is news report 
free from 
allegations 









588** - 721** 644** 
Is news report 
free from 
allegations 
534** 721** - 644** 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
556** 644** 627** - 






Table 145. Correlations between questions comprising the ordinal spotting scale for 
the age category of 36 ≤ years old. 
 Consider news 
report fact-based 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
Is news report free 
from allegations 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
Consider news 
report fact-based 
- 463** 340** 537** 
Agree news report 
is balanced 
463** - 446** 561** 
Is news report free 
from allegations 
340** 446** - 505** 
Overall can you 
trust news report 
537** 561** 505** - 
**Correlation is significant at p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Binomial spotting scale 
Table 146 demonstrates the percentage of the participants who either chose 'yes' 
answers to all the questions (referred to in the table as 'non-spotting') or responded 'no' to only 
1 to 3 questions (referred to as corresponding numbers of '1', '2' and '3') compared to those 
who spotted manipulation (answered 'no' to all four questions).  
 
Table 146. Detailed elaboration of percentage of 'non-spotting' compared to 
'spotting' in participant responses on the binomial spotting scale (by age category) 
Detailed response 
options 
19-26 years old 27-35 years old 36 ≤ years old 
balanced manipulated balanced manipulated balanced manipulated 
Non-spotting 34,7 49,1 39,0 52,4 42,9 61,1 
1 22,3 20,9 7,3 14,3 14,3 13,9 
2 17,4 13,6 9,8 9,5 11,4 5,6 
3 15,7 8,2 24,4 16,7 20,0 11,1 
























Interestingly, for each age category, there were moderate negative correlations between 
the informed media mistrust scale and trustworthiness of traditional Internet news sources. 
To put it another way, the more a participant mistrusted media in general, the less he or she 
regarded traditional Internet news sources as trustworthy. No similar correlations were 
applied to alternative Internet news sources. In particular, for the age category of 19-26 years 
old: r(232) = - 0.33, p < 0.01; for the age category of 27-35 years old: r(84) = - 0.45, p < 0.01; 
for the age category of 36 ≤ years old:  r(71) = - 0.44, p < 0.01. 
Also, moderate positive correlations were found in each age group between online news 
sources for getting news in a typical week and considering the Internet as a trustworthy source 
of news. In particular, for the age category of 19-26 years old: r(235) = 0.44, p < 0.01 for the 
age category of 27-35 years old: r(85) = 0.32, p < 0.01; for the age category of 36 ≤ years old:  
r(70) =  0.43, p < 0.01.  
In turn, trustworthiness of the Internet as a source of news was positively correlated in 
all age categories (from weak to moderate correlations) with trustworthiness of traditional and 
alternative Internet news sources. In particular, for the age category of 19-26 years old: r(235) 
= 0.17, p < 0.01 and r(235) = 0.45, p < 0.01, respectively; for the age category of 27-35 years 
old: r(85) = 0.42,       p < 0.01 and r(85) = 0.34, p < 0.01, respectively; for the age category of 


















ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS OF 
MEDIA LITERACY ACCORDING TO THE STUDY ON ASSESSMENT 
CRITERIA FOR MEDIA LITERACY LEVELS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009) 
 
The media literacy dimensions and their components (criteria) might be depicted 
in the form of pyramid to demonstrate their sequence order, relations to each other and 
interrelations (Figure 100). In the base of the pyramid are Media Availability and Media 
Literacy Context, that both are necessary prerequisites for effective developing 
Individual Competencies. They share one level because, notwithstanding they are 
autonomous components, they are still interrelated as, on one side, media literacy policy 
is supposed to be implemented in the context of media availability, and, on the other 
side, the context affects to a certain degree media availability. The next levels is 
covered by personal competencies that are a part of Individual Competencies, and starts 
with Use which preconditions further development of media literacy expertise. Then 
follows Critical Understanding component which consists of “knowledge, behavior and 
understanding of media context and content, and how it manifests itself in behavior”, 
and “includes all the cognitive processes that influence the user’s practices” allowing 
the user “to evaluate aspects of the media, by way of comparing different types and 
sources of information, arriving to conclusions about its veracity and appropriateness, 
and making informed choices” (The Study, 2009, p. 33). At the top of the pyramid are 
Communicative Abilities that are termed in the Study as the highest level of media 
literacy. In this respect, the Study (2009) considered media literacy as the result of 
dynamic processes between the base (Availability and Context) and the peak 
(Communicative Abilities) through individual media competencies (Media Use and 
Critical Understanding) emphasizing that “it is to state the obvious that the higher steps 























Adapted from the Study (2009). 
 
The following table (Table 147) demonstrates components of this dimension of 








- Social  
Relations 




- Knowledge about Media 
- User Behavior 
- Understanding Media Content 
Use 
 
- Balanced and active use of media 
- Advanced Internet use 
- Computer and Internet Skills 
Media Availability 
 
Cinema, Internet, Mobile Phones, 
Newspapers, Radio, Television 
Media Literacy Context 
 
Media Education, Media Literacy 











Table 147. Environmental Factors, their components, and indicators 









Media Education  ML presence in the curriculum 
 ML teachers training 
 ML educational activities 
 ML didactic resources 
Media Literacy 
Policy 
 Existence of Regulatory Authorities 
 Importance of the Authorities Legal 
Mission 
 Activities of Regulators on Media Literacy 
Media Industry  Newspapers 
 Television channels 
 Cinema festivals 
 Telephone companies 
 Internet providers 
 Other organizations 
Civil Society  Organizations which are active in ML 
 Activities of ML developed by civil 
associations 





Mobile Phones  Mobile phones per 100 inhabitants 
Internet  Broadband penetration rate 
Television  Population and household equipment 
Radio  Radio sets per 1000 inhabitants 
Newspapers  Newspaper circulation 
Cinema  Screens per country 
*Adapted from the Final Report of the Study (2009) 
 
Media Availability is understood to mean how various types of media are 
distributed within a certain environment, as well as how easily they are accessed by 
individuals. Naturally, diversity of media choices exerts a considerable influence on the 
development of media literacy. The Study (2009) refers to such diversity as media 
pluralism and distinguishes between its five types that are crucial for evaluation of the 




(1) Geographical  
 how fairly and proportionately local and regional communities and their 
interests are represented. 
(2) Cultural  
 how fairly and proportionately cultural and social groups are represented. 
(3) Political  
 how fairly and proportionately various political views and groups are 
represented. 
(4) Media types and genres. 
(5) Ownership and control. 
In relation to Media Education, the Study (2009) stated that only if a country has a 
very effective national media education curriculum in place, which is well established, 
citizens should be more confident while interacting and engaging with all general forms 
of media. As the Study (2009) put it: “Any media education initiative is based on the 
assumption that educational efforts have a positive effects on the skills and capabilities 
of the individual recipient. It is therefore not unreasonable to establish a positive, 
though not unanimous, relationship between media education and the progress made in 
individuals’ technical Use, Critical Understanding and Communicative Abilities” (p. 
52). 
  The factor of Media Literacy Policy evaluated national legislation and policies as 
to media literacy development, including “obligations, regulations, and actions, 
organizations, manifestos of organizations and civic participation with a view to 
influencing the regulation of media literacy” (p. 49). Media Industry component took 
into account various non-governmental and non-educational activities and initiatives 
relating to promotion of media literacy. It considered programs, campaigns, user-
participation organizations, strategies, supply of resources and the development of 
didactic material. Finally, the impact of Civil Society on promoting media literacy is that 
civil society organizations and initiatives through active citizen participation stimulate 
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